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PRELIMINARIES

TO DIVORCE

Temporary Orders
A successful presentation of facts to support a favorable division of
property on divorce and the preservation of the marital property pending divorce are often dependent upon the use of remedies available to
litigants during the sixty-day waiting period prior to divorce.' Under
the Divorce Act of 1841,2 which still governs Texas divorce practice
* Professor of Law, Southern Methodist University; B.A., The University of
Texas; B.C.L., M.A., Oxford University; LL.M., Columbia University.
1. TEx. FAMILY CODE ANN. § 3.60 (1975).
2. Tex. Laws 1841, An Act Concerning Divorce and Alimony §§ 1-14, at 19-22, 2
H. GAMMEL, LAWS OF TEXAS 483-86 (1898).
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to a considerable degree, the divorce court may make such temporary

orders as it deems necessary and equitable while the divorce proceedings are pending.

In addition to ordinary means of discovery,' the

Family Code specifically provides that the court may require an inventory and appraisal of property in the possession of either party.4 Injunctive relief with respect to disposition of the community estate may
also be granted 5 and may be directed to any party including third parties.6 Such an order is enforceable by contempt proceedings7 but is
3. See TEx. R. Civ. P. 167; Rudberg, Enforcing Divorce Judgments and Property
Settlement Agreements in Texas, 5 TEX. TacH. L. REv. 645-46 (1974).
It was
pointed out in Hopkins v. Hopkins, 540 S.W.2d 783, 788-89 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus
Christi 1976, no writ), that a party need not be required to produce documents in the
possession of another.
Both spouses are competent to testify for or against each other throughout the proceeding. TEX. FAMILY CODE ANN. § 3.62 (1975).
4. TEX. FAMILY CODE ANN. § 3.56 (1975) Third persons joined in the divorce
proceeding may also be affected by such orders.
5. Id. § 3.56. A court might in some instances restrain the disposition of separate
property, but instances when courts have been petitioned to do so are very rare. Judicial
standards frequently employed in granting injunctive relief are discussed in Rudberg,
Enforcing Divorce Judgments and Property Settlement Agreements in Texas, 5 TEX.
TECH L. REV. 645, 646-47 (1974). The court is permitted to dispense with a bond when
injunctive relief is sought by one spouse against the other. TEx. R. CIV. P. 693a. A
bond is required, however, when such relief is sought against third parties. TEX. R. Civ.
P. 684. See Goodwin v. Goodwin, 456 S.W.2d 885 (Tex. 1970); Hopkins v. Hopkins,
539 S.W.2d 242, 246 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1976, no writ); Couch Mortgage Co.
v. Hughes, 536 S.W.2d 70, 72 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1976, no writ).
6. See Rudberg, Enforcing Divorce Judgments and Property Settlement Agreements
in Texas, 5 TEx. T cH L. REv. 645, 647 (1974). "Frequently the use of injunctions
against third parties is more effective than temporary injunctive relief against the other
spouse. Jurisdiction must be obtained by making that person or firm a party to the suit."
Id. at 647. Mr. Rudberg offers many other valuable insights and suggestions in planning
divorce litigation with a view toward discovery and effective enforcement of the ultimate
decree as well as temporary orders. Id. at 645-48. See also Hopkins v. Hopkins, 539
S.W.2d 242, 243-48 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1976, no writ).
In the discovery process inquiry should be made with respect to transfers that may
have been fraudulent, constructively fraudulent, or illusory. See McKnight & Dorsaneo,
Management and Liability of Community Property and the Joinder of Spouses in Suits in
INSTITUTE ON TEXAS FAMILY LAW F-1, F-6 to -8 (State Bar of Texas 1976); McKnight,
Management, Control and Liability of Marital Property in INSTITUTE ON TEXAS FAMILY
LAW AND COMMUNITY PROPERTY 159, 167-69 (J. McKnight ed. 1975).
See also
Carnes v. Meador, 533 S.W.2d 365 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
With respect to the use of masters as fact finders in the process of property division,
see Tax. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 2338-9b.2 (Supp. 1976) (Dallas County Domestic
Relation Courts); TEX. R. Civ. P. 171. See also Bell v. Bell, 540 S.W.2d 432, 437-38
(Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1976, no writ), for a discussion of rule 171 and
TEx. A'r'Y GEN. Op. No. H-609 (1975).
The case of Roberson v. Roberson, 420
S.W.2d 495 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1967, writ ref'd n.r.e.), was also discussed. 540 S.W.2d at 439.
7. Dickson v. Dickson, 516 S.W.2d 28, 31 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1974, no writ),
discussed in McKnight, Family Law, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 29 Sw. L.J. 67, 72
(1975).
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The leading case in point is Ex parte Preston.9

There

the husband had been ordered not to dispose of particular community
realty pending the final hearing of the divorce. In defiance of the court

order, the husband sold the property for $20,000. When called on to
account for the proceeds, he testified that he no longer had the money.
He further elaborated that he was so angered by the court's order that

he had flushed it down the toilet. The trial court refused to believe
this testimony and held the husband in contempt to compel compliance
with the court's order. The supreme court upheld the citation for civil

contempt.10
In order to collect and conserve the marital property, the court may
appoint a receiver;" however, in Keton v. Clark 2 the court said that
it would be too extreme a remedy to appoint a receiver to collect the
wages of one spouse for disbursement to the other. In Couch Mortgage Co. v. Hughes" the court was held lacking in authority to appoint
a receiver of corporate property in the possession of the corporation,
even though the corporation was substantially owned by the spouses,
unless it were shown "that the corporation [is] the alter ego of one
8. Wells v. Wells, 539 S.W.2d 220, 222-23 (Tex. Civ. App.--Houston [1st Dist.]
1976, writ dism'd).
9. 162 Tex. 379, 347 S.W.2d 938 (1961). For a further discussion of the scope of
Preston, see notes 350-54 infra and accompanying text.
10. Id. at 384, 347 S.W.2d at 940-41. See also Ex parte Butler, 523 S.W.2d 309
(Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [ist Dist.] 1975, no writ). With respect to a judge sitting
for another in connection with temporary matters, see Ex parte Lowery, 518 S.W.2d 897,
902 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1975, no writ). For a discussion of these and other
authorities see McKnight, Family Law, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 30 Sw. L.J. 68, 74
(1976). For a discussion of the enforcement of a court order through the use of the
contempt powers see notes 350-54 infra and accompanying text.
11. TEX. FAMILY CODE ANN. § 3.58 (1975). Under prior law courts occasionally
appointed receivers of marital property, but receivership has always been a somewhat
unusual remedy in the divorce process. See Gunther v. Gunther, 283 S.W.2d 826, 828
(Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1955, writ dism'd); Kinsey v. Kinsey, 77 S.W.2d 881, 882
(Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1934, no writ). See also First S. Properties, Inc. v. Vallone,
533 S.W.2d 339 (Tex. 1976); Rudberg, Enforcing Divorce Judgments and Property
Settlement Agreements in Texas, 5 TEX. TECH L. REV. 645, 647 (1974). "Receivership
may be required when a blanket injunction against the other spouse is appropriate if
someone must be in a position to collect and pay out assets. Based on the writer's
experience, a receivership is generally an unsatisfactory experience and should be used
only in extreme cases." Id. at 647. Mr. Rudberg, however, goes on to recommend the
"seldom used method of safeguarding cash, securities, jewelry and other assets occupying
comparable amounts of space . . . by requiring the delivery of such assets into the
registry of the court...." Id. at 648.
12. 67 S.W.2d 437, 439 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1934, writ ref'd).
13. 536 S.W.2d 70 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 1976, no writ). For a
further discussion of receivership, see McKnight, Commentary on the Texas Family
Code, Title 1, 5 TEX.TECH L. REv. 281, 339 (1974).
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of the parties."' 4 The appointment of auditors and the requirement
of accountings are also available as ancillary remedies under the Texas
Rules of Civil Procedure, 5 but these devices are rarely used.
The court may go further in dealing with the marital property by fixing payments for child support and temporary alimony. 16 In fact, the

court may take almost any action which it deems just, although it cannot
issue temporary orders concerning the payment of attorney's fees.' 7

In spite of the Texas Supreme Court's holding in Wallace v. Briggs 8
with respect to the court's lack of authority to grant temporary attorney's

fees, it is not unknown for courts to make what is, in effect, an allowance in advance for attorney's fees and some of their expenses incurred
in preparing for trial. This is particularly true when there is some
degree of agreement on the point between the parties and their coun-

sel. Pending the final hearing on the divorce, the court may restrain
the transfer of property and the incurring of indebtedness' 9 against the
property and may order one of the spouses to vacate certain premises
or to maintain certain property.20
Transfers of Property Pending Divorce
.Section 3.57 of the Family Code, which has its antecedents in the

Divorce Act of 1841, provides that if, pending divorce, a spouse makes
a transfer of community property or incurs a community debt with the
intent to injure the other spouse and the person with whom that spouse
is dealing has notice of that intent, such transfer or debt is void as to

the other spouse. 2 ' This section is, therefore, a species of fraudulent

14. Couch Mortgage Co. v. Hughes, 536 S.W.2d 70, 72 (Tex.. Civ. App.-Houston
[1st Dist.] 1976, no writ).
15. TEx. R. Civ. P. 172.
16. TEx. FAMILY CODE ANN. §§ 3.58, 3.59 (1975).
17. From time to time it has been suggested that section 3.58 of the Family Code be
amended to allow an award of attorney's fees pending final judgment. However, many
attorneys have opposed the reform on the ground that a temporary award might
jeopardize the magnitude of the ultimate fee and would not really compensate counsel
effectively for time and expense devoted to the matter pendente lite.
18. 162 Tex. 485, 488, 348 S.W.2d 523, 525 (1961).
19. Tax. FAMILY CODE ANN. § 3.57 (1975).
20. See Ex parte Valdez, 521 S.W.2d 724, 727 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 1975, no writ).
21. Goodwin v. Goodwin, 451 S.W.2d 532, 534 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo), rev'd
on other grounds, 456 S.W.2d 885 (Tex. 1970), noted in McKnight & Raggio, Family
Law, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 25 Sw. L.J. 34, 41 n.53 (1971).
Notice, of course, is irrelevant in the case of voluntary recipients. See, e.g., Herring v.
Blakeley, 385 S.W.2d 843, 846-47 (Tex. 1965), noted in 19 Sw. L.J. 370 (1965);
National Maritime Union v. Augustine, 458 S.W.2d 832, 833 (Tex. Civ. App.-
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conveyance statute designed to protect the deprived spouse pendente
lite.

22

Designed for general use in situations involving a claimant of an
interest in land, filing notice of lis pendens may also be utilized by a
party for protection against disposition of real property by another party
pending divorce. Notice of lis pendens may therefore be filed with
respect to particular property, the disposition of which is put in issue,
in order to give notice to any prospective purchaser. 23 In Fannin Bank
v. Blystone24 the Waco Court of Civil Appeals made some misleading
Beaumont 1970, no writ) Both cases involved change of beneficiary for employee
benefits. For acts of fraud committed pendente lite with a paramour, see Roye v. Roye,
404 S.W.2d 92, 96 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1966, no writ) (involving release of security
for a loan). With respect to fraud, constructive fraud, and illusory transfers as to the
other spouse in general, see McKnight & Dorsaneo, Management and Liability of
Community Property and the Joinder of Spouses in Suits in INSrTUTE ON TEXAS FAMILY
LAW F-6 to -8 (State Bar of Texas 1976); cf. Teas v. Republic Nat'l Bank, 460 S.W.2d
233, 242 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1970, writ ref'd n.r.e.). Teas, however, may need
reexamination in the light of Hawes v. Central Tex. Prod. Credit Ass'n, 492 S.W.2d
714, 716 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin), aff'd, 503 S.W.2d 234, 236 (Tex. 1973). National
Maritime and Teas are discussed in McKnight & Raggio, Family Law, Annual Survey of
Texas Law, 25 Sw. L.J. 34, 46-47 n.89 (1971). See also Ex parte Harvill, 415 S.W.2d
174 (Tex. 1967), noted in McKnight, Matrimonial Property, Annual Survey of Texas
Law, 22 Sw. L.J. 129, 139 (1968) (attorney as an apparent fraudulent transferee);
Bridges v. Bridges, 404 S.W.2d 48 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1966, no writ), discussed
in McKnight, MatrimonialProperty, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 21 Sw. L.J. 39, 46-47
(1967).
For contractual liability incurred pending divorce and its effect under a property
settlement agreement, see Morgan v. Morgan, 406 S.W.2d 347, 351 (Tex. Civ.App.-San
Antonio 1966, no writ), discussed in McKnight, Matrimonial Property, Annual Survey
of Texas Law, 22 Sw. L.J. 129, 143-44 (1968). For tortious liability and its impact on a
community insurance contract pendente lite, see Firemen's Ins. Co. v. Burch, 426 S.W.2d
306, 308-09 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin), rev'd on other grounds, 442 S.W.2d 331, 335
(Tex. 1968), discussed in McKnight, Matrimonial Property, Annual Survey of Texas
Law, 23 Sw. L.J. 44, 51 (1969). Courts frequently restrain a spouse from incurring
debts or making transfers "except in the ordinary course of business." As to the
equivocal nature of such language, see Ex parte Butler, 523 S.W.2d 309, 312 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1975, no writ). Mr. Rudberg prefers the blanket temporary
restraining order, putting the burden on the restrained spouse to seek a modification in
case of emergency. Rudberg, Enforcing Divorce Judgments and Property Settlement
Agreements in Texas, 5 TEx. TECH L. REv. 645, 647 (1974).
22. A merely capricious or excessive disposition that constitutes a constructive fraud
will not suffice to satisfy the terms of section 3.57. See Carnes v. Meador, 533 S.W.2d
365, 372 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.). As in the case of TEx. Bus. &
COMM. CODE ANN. § 24.02 (1968), one who is not the object of the fraud cannot claim
that the transaction is void. Herndon v. Reed, 82 Tex. 647, 652, 18 S.W. 665, 666
(1891). Section 3.57 of the Family Code is very similar to section 24.02 of the Business
and Commerce Code, though the arrangement of language in the respective sections is
not identical. See McKnight, Commentary on the Texas Family Code, Title 1, 5 TEx.
TEcH L. REV. 281, 333-34 (1974).

23.

TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6640 (1969).

24. 417 S.W.2d 502 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1967), writ refd n.r.e. per curiam, 424
S.W.2d 626 (Tex. 1968).

Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2022

5

St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 8 [2022], No. 3, Art. 2

ST. MARY'S LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 8:413

remarks in this respect by holding that anyone who buys realty from
a spouse involved in divorce proceedings is on notice of those proceedings as a matter of law.25 In holding that the purchaser had actual
knowledge of the divorce proceeding and was, therefore, charged with
the consequences thereof, 26 the supreme court did not correct this misleading conclusion. The holding of the Waco Court of Civil Appeals
would require a buyer to search the records of every county in Texas
to be sure that a person offering realty for sale was not involved in a
suit for divorce in which disposition of the realty was in issue. As *a
consequence, an inordinate burden would be put on any purchaser. In
First Southern Properties, Inc. v. Gregory2 7 it was held that in the
absence of a lis pendens filing, a purchase of the separate property of
a spouse is not affected by constructive notice of a pending divorce.2 8
Hence, in spite of what is said in the Fannin opinion, filing a notice
of lis pendens is the appropriate means of protecting one's client from
disposition of real property to innocent third-party purchasers. 29
Recently the Supreme Court of Texas was faced with a related but
somewhat different problem in First Southern Properties, Inc. v.
Vallone. 0 There a receiver was appointed by the court, but he failed
to file lis pendens notice with respect to the property placed in receivership. A dispute later arose between the receiver and an innocent purchaser of the property at a foreclosure sale that was conducted by the
trustee of a deed of trust upon default by the spouse holding record
title. The supreme court concluded that a receiver need not file lis
pendens notice in order to protect his purchaser but recommended that
the legislature enact such a requirement. 31
PropertySettlement Agreements
Regardless of the amounts of property involved, the overburdened
courts strongly urge the parties to settle their differences with respect
to property division by entering into property settlement agreements.8 2
25.

Id. at 503.

The cases relied on by the Waco court were those which prompted

the enactment of the lis pendens statute in 1905.
26. Fannin Bank v. Blystone, 424 S.W.2d 626, 627 (Tex. 1968).
27. 538 S.W.2d 454 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1976, no writ).
28. Id. at 458.

29. See McKnight, Matrimonial Property, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 22 Sw. L.J.
129, 138-39 (1968).
See also McKnight, Matrimonial Property, Annual Survey of
Texas Law, 23 Sw. L.J. 44, 52 n.53 (1969).
30. 533 S.W.2d 339 (Tex. 1976).

31. Id. at 343.
32. See O'Benar v. O'Benar, 410 S.W.2d 214, 217 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas. 1966,
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Parties are free to enter into such agreements to settle their property
interests as they deem advisable. For many years the courts of civil
appeals have struggled with the question of whether or not these agreements, made in anticipation of divorce and regardless of whether the
petition has been filed, affect assets acquired pending divorce, but
which after the date of the agreement would be community assets in the
absence of such an agreement. Five decisions have been rendered on
3s3
this issue with three of them holding that such agreements are valid .
Jernigan v. Scott 4 dealt with a situation in which an agreement was
entered into, 'but no divorce followed although the spouses lived apart
for the succeeding twenty years. The San Antonio Court of Civil
Appeals held that the spouses' agreement with respect to subsequent
acquisition of what would have been community property was, nonetheless, binding though there was no ultimate division on divorce. 5
The problem is essentially a conceptual one: If the Texas Constitution defines separate property and, therefore, by exclusion community
property, 6 can spouses vary the nature of their marital property by
agreement or contact3 7 and, if so, can such a change be effected prior
to the acquisition of the property? Historically, the answer to this question has been associated with answers to similar inquiries concerning
the validity of prospective spouses' contracts purporting to establish the
nature of property to be acquired during marriage"8 and of agreements
between married couples partitioning community property as separate
property. 9 Partition in anticipation of divorce is merely a species of
writ dism'd) (agreement entered into in open court and transcribed by court reporter).
For an instance in which a foreign property settlement was before a court, see Dicker v.
Dicker, 434 S.W.2d 707, 714 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1968, writ ref'd n.r.e.). Each
party should, of course, be represented by independent counsel, but lack of counsel does

not necessarily vitiate the agreement.

See notes 334-36 infra and accompanying text.

33. See McKnight, MatrimonialProperty, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 26 Sw. L.J.
31, 32 (1972); McKnight, Matrimonial Property, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 22 Sw.

L.J. 129, 134 n.36 (1968).
34. 518 S.W.2d 278 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
35. Id. at 284.
36. TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 15; see TEX. FAbnLY CODE ANN.

§ 5.01 (1975)
(definition in more precise terms); McKnight, Texas Community Property Law-Its
Course of Development and Reform in ESSAYS IN THE LAW OF PROPERTY PRESENTED TO
CLYDE EMERY 30, 43-44 (Southern Methodist University 1975). See also McKnight,
Matrimonial Property, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 26 Sw. L.J. 31, 35 (1972).

37. Either may, of course, do so by gift. But a transaction overtly couched as an
agreement or contract will not be construed as a gift. Hilley v. Hilley, 161 Tex. 569,
576, 342 S.W.2d 565, 569 (1961).
38. See McKnight, Texas Community Property Law-Its Course of Development

and Reform in

EssAYs IN THE LAW OF PROPERTY PRESENTED TO CLYDE EMERY

30, 45-48

(Southern Methodist University 1975). See also Castro v. Illies, 22 Tex. 479 (1858).
39. See McKnight, Texas Community Property Law-Its Course of Development
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community property partition, a practice established beyond question
since the Rains v. Wheeler4" decision in 1890. But partition of
community property under ordinary marital conditions was condemned
until sanctioned by constitutional amendment in 1948.41 Partitions of future acquisitions have, however, given rise to some judicial uneasiness.

As long as the rule allowing a partition of community property in anticipation of divorce was itself an exception' to the general rule forbidding
partition,42 it may have seemed to strain the exception too much to
allow a partition of future acquisitions.4" But in 1948 the general rule
was disposed of by constitutional amendment. Although the general
rule forbidding partitions was abolished, a further uncertainty was introduced by the language of the amendment specifically authorizing par-

titions of "existing community property. '4 The inference may therefore be drawn that a partition of nonexistent community property is forbidden. Nonetheless, the weight of authority allows such partitions. 45
Consequently, the doctrine of Rains v. Wheeler4" has achieved the

status of a rule of law independent of the now-superseded rule to which
it was originally attached as an exception. Partitions in anticipation of
divorce do, however, seem to fall within the purview of the constitutional amendment and section 5.42 of the Family Code,47 both of which
48
require that such agreements be in writing.

and Reform in .ESSAYS IN THE LAW OF PROPERTY PRESENTED TO CLYDE EMERY 30, 46

n.110 .(Southern Methodist University 1975) (on converting community property to
separate property). Concerning the conversion of separate property to community, see
Tittle v. Tittle, 148 Tex. 102, 110, 220 S.W.2d 637, 642 (1949); Weaver v. Citizens Nat'l
Bank, 490 S.W.2d 887, 891 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1973, no writ), discussed in
McKnight, Family Law, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 28 Sw. L.J. 66, 74 (1974).
40. 76 Tex. 390, 395, 13 S.W. 324, 326 (1890).
41. TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 15.
42. Other arguments than the constitutional one were made for invalidity of partitions in general: (1) an inherent fraud on creditors who might look to the whole corpus
of the community to seek satisfaction for debt; (2) the suspicion of fraud being
perpetrated on the wife; and (3) the wife's former disability of coverture under which she
would lack ability to contract. See McKnight, Texas Community Property Law-I-ts
Course of Development and Reform in ESSAYS IN THE LAw OF PROPERTY PRESENTED TO
CLYDE EMERY 30, 45-48 (Southern Methodist University 1975).
43. Some conceptual uneasiness may be perceived in the difficulty of conceiving of a
partition of an expectancy. But the Supreme Court of Texas long ago rejected that
argument with respect to the assignment Or sale of an expectancy. Hale v. Hollon, 90
Tex. 427, 429, 39 S.W. 287, 288 (1897).
44. See T.x. CONST. art. XVI, § 15.
45. See note 33 supra.
46. 76 Tex. 390, 13 S.W. 324 (1890).
47. See TEX. CONST. art. XVI, § 15; TEX. FAMILY CODE ANN. § 5.42(a) (1975).
48. Amarillo Nat'l Bank v. Liston, 464 S.W.2d 395, 399 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo
1970, writ ref'd n.r.e.). See also Wilson v. Wilson, 507 S.W.2d 916 (Tex. Civ. App.Houston [1st Dist.] 1974, no writ) (semble). Prior to the Liston decision it was
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The negotiations attending the formulation of the partition agree-

ment must not involve fraud or misrepresentation since an agreement
tainted with fraud is subject to being set aside. 49

Only infrequently

will a court refuse to enter an order based on a property settlement
agreement; however, if it is shown that fraud or misrepresentation may

have attended the agreement, the court may refuse to give effect to
the spouses' purported settlement.50 Moreover, a party to such an
agreement cannot seek rescission of it following divorce without first
offering to restore the benefits received under it or making a sufficient

explanation for failure to do so."

A decree based on a property settle-

ment agreement is not subject to later modification because of the
changed financial circumstances of the parties. 2
Regardless of the amount of the spouses' income, federal tax conse-

quences should be a major consideration in reaching any property
settlement on divorce.5. In United States v. Mooney5" the spouses had
agreed in a divorce settlement that a tax refund would be split between
generally agreed that such agreements need not be in writing. See Callicoatte v.
Callicoatte, 417 S.W.2d 618, 621 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1967, writ ref'd n.r.e.),
discussed in McKnight, Matrimonial Property, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 22 Sw. L.J.
129, 136 (1968).
See also Goetz v. Goetz, 534 S.W.2d 716, 719 (Tex. Civ. App.Dallas 1976, no writ), where the court held that admission of evidence of an oral
partition constituted error.
49. See, e.g., McFarland v. Reynolds, 513 S.W.2d 620, 626 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus
Christi 1974, no writ); Myers v. Myers, 503 S.W.2d 404, 406 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston
[14th Dist.] 1973, writ dism'd); Bell v. Bell, 434 S.W.2d 699, 700-01 (Tex. Civ. App.Beaumont 1968, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Eldridge v. Eldridge, 259 S.W. 209, 214 (Tex. Civ.
App.-San Antonio 1924, no writ); Swearingen v. Swearingen, 193 S.W. 442, 450 (Tex.
Civ. App.-San Antonio 1917, writ ref'd). For an instance of a foreign property
settlement allegedly involving fraud concerning Texas land, see Cole v. Lee, 435 S.W.2d
283, 286-87 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1968, writ dism'd). See also notes 305-07 infra
and accompanying text.
50. See Myers v. Myers, 503 S.W.2d 404, 406 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 1973, writ dism'd).
51. Guion v. Guion, 475 S.W.2d 865, 869 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1971, writ ref'd
n.r.e.).
52. Cocke v. Cocke, 408 S.W.2d 348, 350 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1966, writ
dism'd). But inability to make periodic payments agreed and ordered (as opposed to
refusal to pay when able to do so) cannot lead to imposition of sanctions for civil
contempt.
53. See generally Bailey, Tax Aspects of Texas Divorce, 6 Hous. L. REv. 148
(1968); Vaughan, Texas Divorce: Planning the Tax Results, 38 TEx. B.J. 1035 (1975).
See also McKnight, Family Law, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 30 Sw. L.J. 68, 87
nn.139-42 (1976); McKnight, Family Law, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 29 Sw. L.J.
67, 78 n.79, 83 nn.123-26 and accompanying text (1974). Of course, the spouses are
not capable of binding the federal government by their agreement.
54. 400 F. Supp. 98 (N.D. Tex. 1975). See also Lange v. Phinney, 507 F.2d 1000
(5th Cir. 1975); McKnight, Family Law, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 28 Sw. L.J. 66,
77 n.79 (1974).
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them even though their earnings differed widely since the wife had a

much larger taxable income than the husband. This agreement did not
affect the Internal Revenue Service in pursuing the husband, who had
produced the disproportionately smaller amount of earnings for the
past year. 55 In order to avoid future dispute, 50 the possibility of the

assessment of a tax deficiency, as well as a refund, should be anticipated.
If one spouse is to be obligated to pay the tax liability of the other

with respect to community income, the mode of computation should
be specifically agreed upon.5 7
Other problems which must be taken
into consideration when dividing property on divorce are tax-free ex-

changes and the question of whether future periodic payments constitute alimony under the Internal Revenue Code.

8

Section 3.59 of the Texas Family Code, an enactment which dates
from 1841, only provides for court-ordered temporary alimony.5 9 At

least initially, then, Texas' failure to provide for permanent alimony was
not a consequence of the community property doctrine. Texas is,
however,

the

only community

property

state which

does

not

make some provision for permanent alimony. Texas law in this regard
is a consequence of interpretation of the statutory language in accordance
with the maxim inclusio unius est exclusio alterius: only temporary
alimony may be awarded under the statute and, therefore, permanent

alimony may not.60

Nevertheless, spouses may contract for future

periodic payments by one spouse to the other;8 1 their agreement is
referred to as "contractual alimony" and is commonly incorporated in

the divorce decree. The judicial effect of such incorporation is not,
however, altogether clear. It has been said that an ex-wife who has
55. United States v. Mooney, 400 F. Supp. 98, 99 (N.D. Tex. 1975).
56. See Adwan v. Adwan, 538 S.W.2d 192, 197 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1976, no
writ).
57. Rudberg, Enforcing Divorce Judgments and Property Settlement Agreements in
Texas, 5 TEx. TECH L. REV. 645 (1974). "[S]everal methods of computation are
available. Assuming that the obligee has noncommunity income, is the tax on community income to be computed before taking the other into consideration, after taking the
other into consideration, or by yet some third method? The result can vary substantially
and the intensity of the dispute generated is directly proportional to the variance." Id. at
651. See also McKnight, Family Law, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 28 Sw. L.J. 66, 77
n.79 (1974); McKnight, Matrimonial Property, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 27 Sw.
L.J. 27, 37 nn.81-83 and accompanying text.
58. See Rev. Rul. 76-83, 1976 CUM.: BULL, 9. See aiso McKnight, Matrimonial
Property, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 26 -Sw. L.J.. 31 n.4 (1972);. Note, 28 Sw.
L.J. 1073 (1974).
59. TEx. FAMILY CODE ANN. § 3.59 (1975).
60. See McKnight, Book Review, 11 Sw. L.J. 272, 274 (1957).
61. Francis v. Francis, 412 S.W.2d 29, 33 (Tex. 1967); see McKnight, Commentary
to the Texas Family Code, Title 1, 5 Tax. TECH. L. REV. 281, 341-42 (1974).

https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol8/iss3/2

10

McKnight: Division of Texas Marital Property on Divorce.

1976]

DIVISION OF MARITAL PROPERTY

not received alimony payments under a property settlement is left to
her contractual remedy,6 2 but some courts now seem to treat decrees
incorporating such agreements as virtually equivalent to decrees en-

tered by consent.6 " It was recently concluded that a husband's assertion of a contractual defense in a suit for failure to pay contractual alimony constituted a collateral attack on the prior decree.6 4 Often the
spouses will agree that the husband make periodic payments to the

wife, for example, when a business enterprise or other property is
agreed to be awarded to the husband. In such instances an award to
the wife in accordance with the agreement does not constitute permanent alimony but is merely an agreed means by which the property
division can be reasonably and fairly achieved. 65 If the contract is not
62. Francis v. Francis, 412 S.W.2d 29, 33 (Tex. 1967), discussed in McKnight,
Matrimonial Property, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 22 Sw. L.J. 129, 136-38 (1968).
See also Republic Nat'l Bank v. Beaird, 475 S.W.2d 344 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont
1971, writ ref'd). The wife must, of course, prove the amount in arrears in order to
recover a money judgment.
63. See McKnight, Family Law, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 30 Sw. L.J. 68, 86
n.138 (1976); cf. O'Benar v. O'Benar, 410 S.W.2d 214, 217 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas
1966, writ dism'd) (a pre-Franciscase involving a property settlement agreement entered
into in open court, transcribed by court reporter, and approved by the trial court). See
also Rudberg, Enforcing Divorce Judgments and Property Settlement Agreements in
Texas, 5 TEx. TEcH L. REV. 645, 648, 653-55 (1974); notes 111, 348-50 infra and
accompanying text.
64. Peddicord v. Peddicord, 522 S.W.2d 266, 267 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1975,
writ ref'd n.r.e.), discussed in McKnight, Family Law, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 30
Sw. L.J. 68, 86 (1976).
65. Francis v. Francis, 412 S.W.2d 29, 33 (Tex. 1967); Griffin v. Griffin,
535
S.W.2d 42, 43 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1976, no writ); In re Marriage of Jackson, 506
S.W.2d 261, 266 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1974, writ dism'd); Miller v. Miller, 463
S.W.2d 477, 479 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1971, writ ref'd n.r.e.); cf. In re Parnass, No.
BK 3-3473F (N.D. Tex., Oct. 24, 1974) (bankruptcy case).
See also Gregory v.
Gregory, 404 S.W.2d 657 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1966, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (preFrancis case).
Unless it is specifically provided that periodic payments will cease on the death of the
payee (or that of the payor), the contractual right to receive such payments extends
beyond the payee's death (or that of the payor) and constitutes an asset of the payee's
estate. McKnight, Family Law, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 24 Sw. L.J. 49, 53-54
(1970).
Two recent cases have distinguished periodic payments of "alimony" from elements of
a property division as those payments not referable to property in existence at the
time of divorce. In re Marriage of Long, 542 S.W.2d 712, 715-16 (Tex. Civ. App.Texarkana 1976, no writ); Benedict v. Benedict, 542 S.W.2d 692, 699 (Tex. Civ. App.Fort Worth 1976, writ dism'd). But such a formulation is merely a restatement of the
old distinction between that which is a spouse-support agreement independent of the
property division and a periodic payout based on marital property division (including
rights of reimbursement which may have arisen from past dealings in marital property).
It seems unduly restrictive of the spouses' contractual powers to require that enforceable
periodic payments be referrable to liquidation of particular assets on hand at the time
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a part of a property settlement agreement, as when there is-no property

to divide, the court would lack jurisdiction to make an order with
regard to future payments. But such a situation is more theoretical
than real since the courts have been unusually liberal in finding consideration to support such contracts, however thinly demonstrated. 6
In this regard the El Paso Court of Civil Appeals has found the wife's
acceptance of a division as requested by the husband to be sufficient
consideration for a binding agreement.6 7 The husband has also been
said to be estopped to attack the decree on the ground that the con-

sideration was the cost of "buying the divorce" since such an argument
would show that he had worked a fraud on the trial court.68
In drafting the terms of a property settlement, very precise and clear

language must be used. In order to take advantage of the means available to enforce the agreement in the future, the spouses must agree

on matters relating to transfers of specific property, division and disposition of present and future assets, and payment of liabilities. These
terms must be set out precisely in the agreement, despite the good
intentions of the spouses to abide by the general terms of any such
agreement. 69 The court should be called upon to make a determinaof divorce or income from such assets which may somehow represent a part of the value
or those assets at divorce.
It must be noted that merely calling an award "alimony" in the property settlement
agreement to beguile the Internal Revenue Service is not sufficient to cause it to be
treated as such as a matter of state law. Nordstrom v. Nordstrom, 515 S.W.2d 14, 19
(Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.). For another situation in which tax
considerations were involved in the interpretation of a property settlement agreement, see
Motheral v. Motheral, 514 S.W.2d 475, 478 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1974, writ
ref'd n.r.e.).
66. See Leopold, Contracts for Support of a Spouse After Divorce, The Question of
Consideration, TEx. TRIAL LAW. F., Vol. 6, No. 1, at 11, 34-35 (July-Dec. 1971).
See also Mahrer v. Mahrer, 510 S.W.2d 402 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1974, no writ);
Lampkin v. Lampkin, 480 S.W.2d 35 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1972, no writ); Miller v.
Miller, 463 S.W.2d 477 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1971, writ ref'd n.r.e.). The authorities
are discussed in McKnight, Family Law, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 29 Sw. L.J. 67,
77-78 (1975); McKnight, Matrimonial Property, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 27 Sw.
L.J. 27, 37 (1973); McKnight, Matrimonial Property, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 26
Sw. L.J. 31-32 (1972); McKnight, Family Law, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 24 Sw.
L.J. 49, 53-54 (1970).
Like any other contract a property settlement agreement is subject to judicial interpretation. See, e.g., Morgan v. Morgan, 406 S.W.2d 347, 350 (Tex. Civ. App.--San Antonio
1966, no writ) (with respect to a provision for the payment of debts), discussed in
McKnight, Matrimonial Property, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 22 Sw. L.J. 129, 143-44
(1968).
67. Lampkin v. Lampkin, 480 S.W.2d 35, 37 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1972, no
writ).
68. Andrews v. Andrews, 441 S.W.2d 244, 247 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1969,
writ ref'd n.r.e.).
69. See generally Lifson v. Dorfman, 491 S.W.2d 198 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland
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don of any point upon-which the parties cannot agree, and such determination should be spelled out with equal clarity in the decree approving and embodying all the terms of the agreement. If the community
family home is not to be awarded to one spouse, the terms of its main-

tenance and future sale should be carefully provided for in the
70
agreement.
Contractual provisions for the payment of debts inter se 71 and fixing
obligations for child support may also be entered into as incidents of
the property settlement.

In spite of such a contract, the court should

make its award for child support only after hearing the evidence and
making a finding of what is reasonable under the circumstances even
though the result might coincide with the agreement of the parties.

Whether or not the court enters such an order for payment of child
support, the parties are still bound by their contract. 7 As an exercise
1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Dauray v. Gaylord, 402 S.W.2d 948 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas
1966, writ ref'd n.r.e.)
Further guidance is given in Rudberg, Enforcing Divorce Judgments and Property
Settlement Agreements in Texas, 5 TEx. TEcH. L. REV. 645 (1974), where he states that
the terms of the settlement agreement
must be comprehensive and take into consideration the nature of assets involved.
Typical examples are transfers of title to real estate, transfer of title to chattels
registered under certificate of title acts, transfer of securities, and transfer of life
insurance policies. In those instances where cooperation in effectuating appropriate
transfers can be relied upon, collateral documents such as special warranty deeds,
deeds of trust, stock powers with signatures guaranteed, change of beneficiary and
.change of ownership forms will ordinarily be used. Otherwise, the [agreement]
itself must contain specific [undertakings] as to such documents which are to be executed. Good practice [in that case] would dictate the reproduction of the form of
such document within the [agreement] ....
id. at 650. A number of other useful suggestions are made by Mr. Rudberg such as
spelling out specifically the time of performance for certain acts to be performed. Id. at
648-51. Some further pitfalls to be avoided in drafting are suggested by Adwan v.
Adwan, 538 S.W.2d 192, 196-97 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1976, no writ) (attorney's
overlooking some notes and stocks and a joint tax refund); Brooks v. Brooks, 515 S.W.2d
730, 733 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (overlooking wife's
separate income tax obligation); Dessommes v. Dessommes, 505 S.W.2d 673, 678-79
(Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (overlooking a pension plan).
70. See Starkey v. Holoye, 536 S.W.2d 438, 441 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Miller. v. Two Investors, Inc., 475 S.W.2d 610, 612 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Dallas 1971, writ ref'd n.r.e).
71. But such an agreement will not affect the rights of creditors in the absence of a
novation. See also McKnight, Family Law, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 29 Sw. L.J.
67, 83 nn.123, 125 and accompanying text (1975).
72. Lee v. Lee, 509 S.W.2d 922, 926 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1974, writ ref'd
n.r.e.); cf. In re MeLemore, 515 S.W.2d 356, 359 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1974, no
writ). Both cases are discussed in McKnight, Family Law, Annual Survey of Texas
Law, 29 Sw. L.J. 67, 107-08 (1975). See also Adwan v. Adwan, 538 S.W.2d 192 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Dallas 1976, no writ); Doss v. Doss, 521 S.W.2d 709 (Tex. Civ. App.Houston [14th Dist.] 1975, no writ). In Doss, the court pointed out that unless a
property settlement agreement so provides, it is improper for the court to order a formula
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of its continuing jurisdiction of the parent-child relationship, the court
may change the amount of its award in light of future changed circumstances. Reduction of the amount ordered to be paid, however, will
only affect the power of the court to order enforcement by contempt
and will not in any way affect the right of the obligee-spouse to sue
71
for a higher amount under the contractual terms of the settlement.
Since a suit to enforce contractual terms for child support under a property settlement agreement is not a matter of the parent-child relationship under the Family Code, the divorce court does not have continuing
jurisdiction of such a suit.14 But in an order to enforce the decree's
terms as those of a contract, the agreement must so provide.7
DIvIsIoN OF PROPERTY ON DIVORCE

Interests Not Subject to Division
On a case-by-case basis the courts have attempted to develop a definable category of property not susceptible to division on divorce. Once
that species of property is defined, the remaining property is more.
easily dealt with. The test used in many past instances has been one
of determining whether an interest is "vested" as opposed to "unvested." The most common subject matter in issue has been retirement benefits. The supreme court's analysis of such interests in
Cearley v. Cearley7" provides a new test. The court held that while
mere expectancies are not divisible on divorce, there are interests,
such as contingent benefits under both public and private retirement
for child support based on a fixed percentage of the parent's gross income.

521 S.W.2d

at 713.
What is said with respect to the precision of language in the decree in McKnight,
Family Law, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 28 Sw. L.J. 66, 93 nn.207-210 and
accompanying text (1974), is equally applicable to the wording of an agreement. See
also McKnight, Family Law, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 30 Sw. L.J. 68, 105 n.302

(1976).
73. Clark v. Clark, 496 S.W.2d 659, 662 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1973, no writ);
Alford v. Alford, 487 S.W.2d 429, 433 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1972, writ dism'd);

Myrick v. Myrick, 478 S.W.2d 859, 860-61 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1972,
writ dism'd); see Walley, Contractual Aspects of Child Support Agreements, 36 TEX.
B.J. 107, 108 (1973). See also Kolb v. Kolb, 479 S.W.2d 81, 83 (Tex. Civ. App.Dallas 1972, no writ), to the effect that no alteration may be had in the terms of the
agreement with respect to which parent may claim the children as dependents for federal
income tax purposes.
74. TEx. FAMILY CODE ANN. § 14.06(d) (1975); see Adwan v. Adwan, 538 S.W.2d
192, 194-95 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1976, no writ).
75. TEx. FAMILY CODE ANN. § 14.06(d) (1975).
76. 544 S.W.2d 661 (Tex. 1976).
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schemes, which amount to more than mere expectancies and are subject
to division. 77 Independent of this analysis, there are other definable
aspects of property interests with connotations of value, which are nonetheless treated as beyond the power of the divorce courts to divide.
The enactment of the Pension Reform Act of 197478 will cause us
to encounter with less frequency than in the past claims for pension
and retirement benefits that have not accrued to the employee
because of his short period of employment. In recent years, however,
such contingent rights have been before the courts on a number of
occasions, and it was concluded that if the requisite time of employment
had not been satisfied, the interest was not vested for purposes of division between the spouses. 79 This conclusion has been reached in spite
of the fact that there were other contingencies to absolute vestingthe possibility of termination of employment causing loss of benefits
which might be determined by the employer or the employee or by
the latter's death prior to accrual or maturation of benefits. In Herring
V. Blakeley ° the supreme court held *that retirement benefits, accrued
but not yet payable, constituted a: community property interest divisible
on divorce. This conclusion With respect to the nature of the interest
was reiterated in Busby v. Busby,8 which concerned vested pension
rights undivided on divorce and thus subject to partition. In Cearley
v. Cearleys2 the supreme court rationalized the test for divisibility of
such interests by shifting the emphasis from vesting to a recognition of
unaccrued benefits as contingent property interests earned as a form
of deferred compensation on a month-to-month basis. 88
77. Id. at 665-66.
78. See Employee Retirement Income Security Program, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001, 10511061 (Supp. V, 1975); Ray, Trusts and Pensions, in TEXAS FAMILY LAW

AND COMMUNI-

183 (J. McKnight ed. 1975) (including effects of Pension Reform Act of
1974). But since we will less frequently encounter unvested pension rights as a result of
the act, we must be more mindful of the earned ones so that they will not be overlooked
on division and, if community property, become tenancies in common on divorce by
operation of law. Cearley v. Cearley, 544 S.W.2d 661, 666 (Tex. 1976); Busby v.
Busby, 457 S.W.2d 551, 554 (Tex. 1970). Federal and religious pension plans are,
however, exempt from coverage by the act. See generally 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001, 1002(32)
(33) (Supp.V, 1975).
79. Bright v. Bright, 531 S.W.2d 440 (Tex. Civ. App.--San Antonio 1975, no writ);
Lumpkins v. Lumpkins, 519 S.W.2d 491, 493 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1975, writ ref'd
n.r.e.); Davis v. Davis, 495 S.W2d 607, 613. (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1973, writ
dism'd).
80. 385 S.W.2d 843, 846-48 (Tex. 1965).
81. 457 S.W.2d 551, 554 (Tex. 1970).
82. 544 S.W.2d 661, 666 (Tex.1976).
83. The concept of vested rights may still be a useful one in some context, however.
For example, if pension rights are vested when the prospective pensioner is single, and
TY PROPERTY
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In reaching its decision in Cearley, the Texas Supreme Court relied

heavily on a similar conclusion reached by the California Supreme
Court." This decision was reached despite underlying fundamental
differences in approach in Texas and California with respect to prop-

erty division on divorce.8 5 But Texas courts must be particularly mindhe thereafter marries, they constitute separate property. McCurdy v. McCurdy, 372
S.W.2d 381-, 383-84 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1963, writ ref'd) (acquisition of insurance
policy while single). But to characterize military disability retirement benefits as separate property as they were in Ramsey v. Ramsey, 474 S.W.2d 939, 941 (Tex. Civ. App.
-Eastland
1971, writ dism'd), is misguided. See McKnight, Matrimonial Property,
Annual Survey of Texas Law, 27 Sw. L.J. 27, 31 (1973); cf. Martin v. General Elec.
Co., Civil No. 7487 (E.D. Tex., Nov. 27, 1973), discussed in McKnight, Family Law,
Annual Survey of Texas Law, 28 Sw. L.J. 66, 71-72 (1974). Separate and community
elements of personal injury recovery were there delineated for the purpose of division on
divorce. See also In re Marriage of Butler, 543 S.W.2d 147 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana
1976, no writ); Marshall v. Marshall, 511 S.W.2d 72 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [list
Dist.] 1974, no writ), commented on in McKnight, Family Law, Annual Survey of
Texas Law, 29 Sw. L.J. 67, 75 (1975); Dominey v. Dominey, 481 S.W.2d 473 (Tex. Civ.
App.-El Paso), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1028 (1972).
The favorable federal income tax treatment to which a recipient of federal disability
payments is entitled does not appear to have been considered in making a division on
divorce in any reported case. See ImT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 104(a) (4), 105(d), 122;
Treas. Reg. §§ 1.122-1(b)-(d) (1970).
For an example of computation see 1 CCH
1976 STAND. FED. TAX REP. I 1197B.
84. In re Marriage of Brown, 126 Cal. Rptr. 633, 634-35 (1976). In a sense, the
California approach is to .treat unvested pension rights as equivalent to vested rights
subject to divestiture on occurrence of a condition subsequent in traditional real property
parlance.
85. Contrary to Texas practice, permanent alimony may be awarded in California.
Recent California legislation directs equal division of the community. CAL. Cirv. CODE §
4800 (Deering 1972); see Comment, Division of Marital Property on Divorce: A
Proposal to Revise Section 3.63, 7 ST. MARY's L.J. 209, 220-21 (1975).
In Texas
community property is subject to discretionary division absent any constitutional impediment requiring equal division of the community. See McKnight, Commentary on the
Texas Family Code, Title 1, 5 TEx. TECH L. REV. 281, 337, 351-53 (1974); McKnight,
Matrimonial Property, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 27 Sw. L.J. 27, 38-39 (1973). See
also Comment, Division of Marital Property on Divorce: A Proposal to Revise Section
3.63, 7 ST. MARY's L.J. 209, 218-19 (1975). In California the legislation referred to
does not allow division of separate real or personal property, whereas, in Texas separate
personalty has been generally regarded as subject to discretionary division in spite of the
constitutional argument alluded to which would prohibit divestiture of title to any
separate property. By a literal interpretation of the term "estate of the parties" in TEx.
FAMILY CODE ANN. § 3.63 (1975), the court's discretionary power of division is limited
to the community estate of the spouses because that is the only "estate" they share. See
McKnight, Commentary on the Texas Family Code, Title 1, 5 TEx. TEcH L. REv. 281,
338 (1974); See also Comment, Division of Marital Property on Divorce: A Proposal
to Revise Section 3.63, 7 ST. MARY's L.J. 209, 216-17 (1975).
An even more radical view has also emanated from California: federal pension rights
are not, or should not be, characterized as community property at all. Goodman, A
Community Property Citizen's Plea to Congress, 61 A.B.A.J. 1495, 1497 (1975); Goldberg, Is Armed Services Retired Pay Really Community Property?, 48 CAL. ST. B.J. 12
(1973). But though the doctrine of federal supremacy may be asserted to support that
argument, the Supreme Court of the United States seems to have backed away from its
earlier espousal of the supremacist point of view as exemplified by Free v. Bland, 369
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ful of the powerful argument which militates against immediate division
of a property right to be fixed (if ever) in the future since that argument is founded on the nature of the court's 'equitablepowers to divide
the property. Since the court cannot know what the situation of the
parties may be at that future time when there may be a property interest to divide, the court cannot very well exercise its present equitable
discretion concerning the matter. 6 The Texas Supreme Court, therefore, indicated a clear preference for the "if-and-when" decree in dealing with unaccrued retirement benefits, and that approach is equally
appropriate to the division of any interest not absolutely vested since
the risk of ultimate non-vesting is divided equally between the
parties.8 7
A right in real property which will ripen by adverse possession seems
beyond the scope of Cearley. The division of such an unaccrued interest seems beyond the power of a divorce court although the issue has
never been presented for appellate review. This conclusion follows
whether the claim is based on color of title or naked trespass, even
though the two situations are treated differently in applying the
inception of title doctrine to determine the separate or community character of the property.88 The "property interest" involved seems too
fragile to support an "if-and-when" order relating to what is not yet
vested, regardless of whether vesting ultimately relates back to a time
while the marriage subsisted. But in this and similar instances involving contingent interests, the Texas divorce court's division of community property is discretionaryand its equitable authority should be exerU.S. 663, 666 (1962), and Wissner v. Wissner, 338 U.S. 655, 659 (1950). See United
States v. Yazell, 382 U.S. 341, 352 (1966); Yiatchos v. Yiatchos, 376 U.S. 306, 309
(1964). In Yazell Mr. Justice Fortas made this striking comment:
Both theory and the precedents of this Court teach us solicitude for state interests,
particularly in the field of family and family-property arrangements. They should
be overridden by the federal courts only where clear and substantial interests of the

National Government, which cannot be served consistently with respect to such state
interests, will suffer major damage if the state law is applied.

United States v. Yazell, 382 U.S. 341, 352 (1966). See also Sage, Military Retired Pay
in Texas: A New Outlook, 7 ST. MARY'S L.J. 28 (1975).

86. See McKnight, Matrimonial Property, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 27 Sw. L.I.
27, 29-31 (1973).
87.

Cearley v. Cearley, 544 S.W.2d 661, 664 (Tex. 1976), quoting In re Marriage

of Brown, 126 Cal. Rptr. 633.(1976).
98. See Strong v. Garrett, 148 Tex. 265, 271-72, 224 S.W.2d 471, 474 (1949);
McKnight, Commentary on the Texas Family Code, Title 1, 5 TEXAS TECH L. REV. 281,

349 (1974).
More difficult problems of characterization are encountered with respect to realty in
other jurisdictions. See Tirado v. Tirado, 357 S.W.2d 468, 471 (Tex. Civ. App.Texarkana 1962, writ dism'd); notes 215-17, 337-44 infra and accompanying text.
.
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cised cautiously. California courts, on the other hand, divide
community property equally on divorce. 9 Hence, California courts are
sometimes forced to make hard judgments as to characterization and

division which'Texas courts may avoid. Thus when cited as "convincing authority," many California cases dealing with division of marital
property on divorce must be treated with great wariness by Texas
courts. 90

Mere expectations of any kind are very difficult to deal with on
divorce, although for certain purposes expectancies are properly the
subject matter of present jural relationships." It would rarely, if ever,
be appropriate for a divorce court to deal with an anticipated interest;
however, in a few instances courts have alluded to an expectancy as one
of several factors supporting an unequal division of community property.9 ' In In re Rister9 s the court concluded that a divorce court could
not consider the anticipated increase in amount of pension benefits due
to an employee's continued employment after divorce; 4 likewise, the
possibility of future unemployment is not properly a factor to be considered.95
Undistributed income subject to a discretionary trust for the benefit
89. CAL. CIV. CODe § 4800 (Deering 1972).
90. For an instance of caution on the part of California courts in this area, see In re
Marriage of Skaden, 132 Cal. Rptr. 524 (Ct. App. 1976); cf. In re Marriage of Freiberg,
127 Cal. Rptr. 792 (Ct. App. 1976).
91. Hale v. Hollon, 90 Tex. 427, 429, 39 S.W. 287, 288 (1897) (expected inheritance might be subject matter of present sale).
92. Whittenburg v. Whittenburg, 523 S.W.2d 797, 798 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin
1975, no writ). The propriety of considering an expectancy such as an anticipated
inheritance seems dubious at best. In Garrett v. Garrett, 534 S.W.2d 381, 382-83 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1976, no writ), the appellate court appears to have
approved the trial court's considering the possibility that realty awarded to the husband
would appreciate in value, although the court may have been alluding to speculative value
as a factor in determining present value of the realty. In Horlock v. Horlock, 533
S.W.2d 52 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1975, writ dism'd), the appellate
court said that "the [trial] court may consider the fact that the parties' estate primarily
consists of equitable interests in real property, much of which is unimproved, and the
fact that the prevailing economic conditions constitute a threat to the community estate
as an entirety." Id. at 61 (emphasis added). In Means v. Means, 535 S.W.2d 911, 915
(Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1976, no writ), contingent liabilities were regarded. as.
properly considered along with other factors in making an equitable division. See also
Horlock v. Horlock, 533 S.W.2d 52, 61 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 14th Dist. 1975,
writ dism'd) (contingent liabilities).
93. 512 S.W.2d 72 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1974, no writ). The court can- only
consider earned value of pension interest at date of divorce.
94. Id. at 74.
95. Thomas v. Thomas, 525 S.W.2d 200, 202 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.]
1975, no writ). But the prospect of increased earning power is a proper factor to
consider in fixing child support payments. Goren v. Goren, 531 S.W.2d 897, 900 (Tex
Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1975, writ dism'd)..
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of one spouse is another factor that may not be considered. 6 In Currie v. Currie97 undistributed income of a trust was accumulated and
added to the corpus in which the spouse would share on the death of
the life tenant. The court defined this interest as "contingent" in
applying the test of vested interests then regarded as subject to division.9 8 It may also be said that income is but part of the subject matter
of the gift of the settlor of the trust and, therefore, is separate property.
If by the terms of the trust, income not subject to distribution is added
to and becomes a part of the corpus, it is corpus when received by the
beneficiary and, therefore, his separate property.99 But spendthrift
provisions by which an interest is protected from the claims of creditors
does not constitute a bar to division of the interest, 100 and it seems generally agreed that interests subject to other restraints on alienation are,
nevertheless, subject to division on divorce. 1°1 Gillis v. Gillis'0 2 dealt
96. Buckler v. Buckler, 424 S.W.2d 514, 516 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1967,
writ dism'd).
97. 518 S.W.2d 386 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1974, writ dism'd).
98. Id. at 390. For a criticism of this conclusion see McKnight, Family Law,
Annual Survey of Texas Law, 29 Sw. L.J. 67, 76-77 (1975).
In Currie the settlor of
another trust directed that net income of the trust become part of the corpus of the trust
for the benefit of one of the spouses. The trustee had full discretion to determine what
constituted net income. The settlor also empowered the trustee to pay estate taxes on
the estate of the settlor, as well as expenses of trust administration, from the income of
the trust. The beneficiary's spouse asserted that the community was entitled to reimbursement for income so expended by the trustee. This contention was rejected on the
ground that the trustee's expenditures were made before any interest accrued to the
beneficiary and, hence, that there was no community interest in the funds expended.
Currie v. Currie, 518 S.W.2d 386, 390 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1974, writ
dism'd).
99. See In re Marriage of Long, 542 S.W.2d 712, 71718 (Tex. Civ. App.Texarkana 1976, no writ).
100. Angott v. Angott, 462 S.W.2d 73, 74 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1970, no writ);
see Rudberg, Enforcing Divorce Judgments and Property Settlement Agreements in
Texas, 5 TEx. TECH L. REV. 645, 652 (1974).
101. Interests subject to anti-assignment statutes or other prohibitions against transfer
have received some attention from the courts. Allen v. Allen, 363 S.W.2d 312, 314-15
(Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1962, no writ) (Railroad Retirement Act a federal statute
that would deprive the court of power to assign or to partition the anticipated benefits), discussed in McKnight, Matrimonial Property, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 23
Sw. L.J. 44, 44-45 (1969), represented the prior view that division was improper. Cf.
Phillipson v. Board of Administration Pub. Employees' Retirement Sys., 89 Cal. Rptr. 61,
68 (1970); Berg v. Berg, 115 S.W.2d 1171, 1172 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1938,
writ dism'd).
But the Allen case was distinguished in Mora v. Mora, 429 S.W.2d 660, 662 (Tex. Civ.
App.-San Antonio 1968, writ dism'd). The Mora case was later explicitly approved in
Busby v. Busby, 457 S.W.2d 551, 554 (Tex. 1970), and represents the present view. See
McKnight & Raggio, Family Law, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 25 Sw. L.J. 34, 40
(1971); McKnight, MatrimonialProperty, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 23 Sw. L.J. 44,
44-45 (1969).
102. 435 S.W.2d 171 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1968, writ dism'd), discussed in
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with contracts to manage mutual insurance companies which by statute
are not transferable. Despite this fact, it was shown that such contracts
are often transferred and that they represent substantial interests in
property although not, strictly speaking, property interests themselves.
The court determined that their worth should be assessed at a fair
market value and taken into consideration in making a division of prop0
erty on divorce.'1
Other examples of non-property interests are not readily classified.
In Nail v. Nail'14 the Supreme Court of Texas held that the goodwill
of a professionalpractice was not a property interest subject to division,
but one must not assume that all types of goodwill shall be so treated.
The goodwill of a legal practice should fall within the rule in Nail, but
not that of an ordinary business. In Miguez v. Miguez1 5 the Beaumont
court held that a federal agricultural allotment was not property subject
to actual division but that the divorce court could order the spouse controlling the allotment to dispose of it as directed by the court.' ° 6 There
is no Texas case dealing specifically with intellectual property in the
context of division on divorce although the question was considered and
inconclusively treated in Rose v. Hatten.107 How such matter will be
considered when brought before a divorce court is still an open question. Guidance regarding such matters as patents, copyrights, musical
scores, half-finished novels, and similar interests is, however, found in
08
academic sources.1
McKnight, Family Law, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 24 Sw. L.J. 49, 52 (1970); see
Tax. INS. CODE ANN. art. 14.39 (1963).

103. Gillis v. Gillis, 435 S.W.2d 171, 173-75 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1968, writ
dism'd).
104. 486 S.W.2d 761, 764 (Tex. 1972).
105. 453 S.W.2d 514 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1970, no writ).
106. Id. at 517-20. The court leaves a clear inference that the trial court's contempt
powers are available to enforce its order. In the context of federal agricultural
allotments the courts have displayed a breadth of ambivalence not ordinarily encountered
in a narrow subject matter. See In re Adams, 357 F. Supp. 1184, 1187 (S.D. Tex. 1973)
(interest treated as property for purposes of bankruptcy). But see Babb v. United States,
349 F. Supp. 792, 794 (S.D. Tex. 1972) (like interest not so treated for estate tax
purposes).

With respect to an airplane subject to control of a federal agency, see Goodwin v.
Goodwin, 451 S.W.2d 532, 534 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo), rev'd on other grounds, 456
S.W.2d 885 (Tex. 1970).

107. 417 S.W.2d 456, 458 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1967, no writ), noted in
McKnight, Matrimonial Property, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 22 Sw. L.J. 129, 139-

140 n.55 (1968).
108. Davis, A Consideration of Separate and Community Property Aspects of Inventions and Patents in ESSAYS IN THE LAW OF PROPERTY PRESENTED TO CLYDE EMERY 1
(Southern Methodist University 1975); McKnight, Dealing With Unique Marital Proper-
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Division as the Court Deems Just and Right
A.

Criteria, Standards, and Devices

The power of the divorce court to divide the estate of the parties
"as the court deems just and right" is originally found in the language

of the 1841 statute. 109 It is important to remember that our present
constitutional definitions of separate and community property were not
adopted until 1845.110 Thus, the fact that statutory provisions for divi-

sion of property on divorce antedate the constitutional definitions of
separate and community property may have some bearing on the meaning of those provisions."'
Prior to the introduction of no-fault divorce through the enactment
of the Family Code in 1969,112 the courts had long held-and in some

instances today still hold-that in making a division of property it is
proper to consider the following factors: the guilt or innocence of the
spouses,"' the benefits an innocent spouse might derive from the
continuation of marriage,"

4

the disparity of earning power of the

spouses and their ability to support themselves,"' comparative conditions of health," 16 the value of a particular asset to a particular
ty Rights in INSTrrUTE ON TEXAS FAMILY LAW AND COMMUNITY PROPERTY 12, 17-18 (J.
McKnight ed. 1973). See also Batle, El Derecho de Autor y la Sociedad de Gananciales in 1 Es'rTuDIos Jutmicos EN HOMENAJE AL PROFESOR FEDERicO DE CASTRO 137
(Madrid 1976).
109. Tex. Laws 1841, An Act Concerning Divorce and Alimony § 4, at 20, 2 H.
GAMMEL, LAWS OF TEXAS 484 (1898).
110. TEx. CONST. art. VII, § 19 (1845).
111. See TEx. FAMILY CODE ANN. § 3.63 (1975), which provides that "[i]n a decree
of divorce or annulment the court shall order a division of the estate of the parties in a

manner that the court deems just and right, having due regard for the rights of each
party and any children of the marriage."
112. There were two no-fault grounds for divorce prior to 1970-living apart and
confinement in a mental hospital. These are still provided for, respectively, in somewhat
altered form, in TEx. FAMILY CODE ANN. §§ 3.06, 3.07 (1975).
See McKnight,
Commentary on the Texas Family Code, Title 1, 5 TEx. TECH. L. REv. 281, 322-23
(1974).
113. Hooper v. Hooper, 403 S.W.2d 215, 217 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1966, writ
dism'd).

114. Hedtke v. Hedtke, 112 Tex. 404, 409, 248 S.W: 21, 22 (1923); Hopkins v.
Hopkins, 540 S.W.2d 783, 787 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1976, no writ) (medical
benefits which would be lost).
115. Means v. Means, 535 S.W.2d 911, 914 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1976, no
writ); Garrett v. Garrett, 534 S.W.2d 381, 383 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [ist Dist.]
1976, no writ); Cravens v. Cravens, 533 S.W.2d 372, 375 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso
1975, no writ); Merrell v.'Merrell, 527 S.W.2d 250, 255 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1975,
writ ref'd n.r.e.). In Roberts v. Roberts, 535 S.W.2d 373, 374 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler
1976, no writ), the court attached some significance to the fact that the wife was more
than twenty years older than the husband.
116. Fitts v. Fitts, 14 Tex. 443, 451 (1855); Dobbs v. Dobbs, 449 S.W.2d 119, 120
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spouse,"1 7 the liabilities of the spouses, 118 the spouse to whom custody
of the children is granted," 9 and the needs of the children of the

marriage. 2

Courts have continued to consider these factors even

though fault is no longer asserted as a ground for divorce' 2' and the

pleadings do not allege fault as a ground for an unequal division of the
community estate or a divestiture of title to separate property.

It is

certainly better practice, however, that pleadings allege fault with
22
respect to property division, if only out of an abundance of caution.1
(Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1969, no writ). Comparative age and condition of health
should be considered as mere elements in determining the spouses' ability to support
themselves.
117. Goren v. Goren, 531 S.W.2d 897, 900 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.]
1975, writ dism'd) (dealing with husband's interest in his medical practice); see note 131
infra and accompanying text.
118. Means v. Means, 535 S.W.2d 911, 917 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1976,
no
writ); Horlock v. Horlock, 533 S.W.2d 52, 56-58 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
1975, writ dism'd); Goren v. Goren, 531 S.W.2d 897, 900 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston
[1st Dist.] 1975, writ dism'd).
119. Boriack v. Boriack, 541 S.W.2d 237, 243 (Tex.Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1976,
writ
dism'd).
. 120.
Rice v. Rice, 21 Tex. 58, 60-61 (1858); McKnight v. McKnight, 535
S.W.2d
658, 661 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso), rev'd on other grounds, 543 S.W.2d 863 (Tex.
1976); Horlock v. Horlock, 533 S.W.2d 52, 54-55 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 1975, writ dism'd). Until the recent McKnight case, the reference in TEx.
FAMILY CODE ANN. § 3.63 (1975) to "the rights of . . .any children of the marriage"
was viewed merely as the last vestige of Texas forced heirship statute repealed in 1856.
See McKnight, Texas Community Property Law-Its Course of Development and
Reform in

ESSAYS

IN

THE LAw

OF

PROPERTY PRESENTED

TO CLYDE EMERY

30, 46

(Southern Methodist University 1975). But in McKnight the provision is given substantive effect. See note 135 infra and accompanying text. See also Comment, Division of
Marital Property on Divorce: A Proposalto Revise Section 3.63, 7 ST. MARY'S L.J. 209,
219 n.72 (1975).
121. The trial court commits error in striking fault allegations. Bell v. Bell, 540
S.W.2d 432, 436 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1976, no writ). The error was,
however, deemed harmless in that instance.
122. Even if fault is not alleged as a ground for divorce, the court should be advised
of the "cause of the parties' inability to live together as husband and wife, or conduct
that contributed to the divorce." Harrington v. Harrington, 451 S.W.2d 797, 800 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1970, no writ). General allegations in the pleadings
rather than specific terms should suffice.
In drafting the decree the same care must be taken as in drafting the pleadings or a
property settlement agreement. See notes 53-72 supra and accompanying text. In his
article Mr. Rudberg said that
[tihe judgment must be specific to the extent that the subject matter of the decree
can be determined, either from the recitals of the judgment itself or by reference to
other portions of the record. Better practice dictates that the subject matter be
clearly determinable from the . . .judgment itself without the necessity of resorting to other portions of the record. Where there must be resort to matters outside
the record for identification of property, the judgment . .. is totally ineffectual
and may be'subject to reversal.
Rudberg, Enforcing Divorce Judgments and Property Settlement Agreements in Texas, 5
TEX. TECH L. Rnv. 645, 648-49 (1974). See also Constance v. Constance, 537 S.W.2d
488 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin), rev'd, 544 SW.2d 659 (Tex. 1976).
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In 'the vast majority "ofcases today, the no-fault ground of insupportability is alleged as the sole 'gr6und for dissolution of the marriage; thus,
it has been questioned whether the old standards associated with fault
divorces are still suitable for dealing with division of property in a nofault scheme. 123 In Cooper v. Cooper124 the court pointed out that the
wife's attorney's fees need not be assessed against the husband, nor
should the court attempt to equalize the wealth of the spouses in achieving a division of property.12 1 It has been cogently argued, however,
that it is inappropriate in a case of no-fault divorce to divide the
community property unequally or to award any of the separate property
26
'to one other than its owner.
Since the standard for dividing property is one based on equitable
considerations and the trial court has had the benefit of hearing the evidence presented, appellate courts are most reluctant to find an abuse
of discretion on, the part of the trial court in exercising its equitable
powers to effect a division of the marital property. 27 To find an abuse
of discretion, the appellate court must find that the award of the trial

court was "manifestly unjust and unfair."'12 8 Only rarely has such a

finding been made. , An, older case illustrative of this point is
Reasonover v. Reasonover 29 where the trial court made a disproportionately large award in favor of the wife and the appellate court found
123.' McKnight, Family Law, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 29 Sw. L.J. 67, 80
(1975); McKnight, Matrimonial Property, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 27 Sw. L.J. 27,
36-37 (1973). But see Goren v. Goren, 531 S.W.2d 897 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st

Dist.] 1974, writ dism'd).
124. 513 S.W.2d 229 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [list Dist.] 1974, no writ).
125. Id. at 234.
126. See McKnight, Family Law, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 29 Sw. L.J. 67, 80
nn.104-06 and accompanying text (1975); McKnight, Matrimonial Property, Annual
Survey of Texas Law, 27 Sw. L.J. 27, 36-37 nn.72-73 and accompanying text (1973);
.McKnight & Raggio, Family Law, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 25 Sw. L.J. 34, 42-43
(1971). See also In re Williams, 199 N.W.2d 339 (Iowa 1972).
.The court concluded in Thomas v. Thomas, 525 S.W.2d 200, 202 (Tex. Civ. App.Houston [1st Dist.] 1975, no writ), that the possibility of lack of future earning power
should not be considered in making a division of property. This conclusion suggests that
fault bases for property division are in the course of reexamination.
•127. Hedtke v. Hedtke, 112 Tex. 404, 411, 248 S.W. 21, 23 (1923); McKnight v.
McKnight, 535 S.W.2d 658, 659 (Tex. Civ. App.-E Paso), rev'd on other grounds,
543 S.W.2d 863 (Tex. 1976); Edwards v. Edwards, 534 S.W.2d 740, 742 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Austin 1976, no writ). Stated a little differently, there is "a presumption on
appeal that the trial court correctly exercised its discretion." Roberts v. Roberts, 535
S.W.2d 373, 374 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1976, no writ). See also Williams v. Williams,
537 S.W.2d 107, 109 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1976, no writ).
128. Thomas v. Thomas, 525 S.W.2d 200, 202 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [list Dist.]
1975, no writ); see Bell v. Bell, 513 S.W.2d 20, 22 (Tex. 1974).
129. 59 S.W.2d 887 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1933, no writ):
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nothing in the record to justify the decree. 8 ' Such a conclusion is
unusual, but there are a few recent cases in which similar results have
been reached. For example, in Hooper v. Hooper'8 ' the appellate
court found that the record demonstrated no sound reason for award-

ing the wife eighty-five percent of the marital property. In Thomas

v. Thomas" 2 a disproportionately large award was made to the
husband. The court determined that the possibility that the husband
might lose his job and have difficulty finding another one of the same

type did not justify such an award. 8 More recently, the Dallas Court
of Civil Appeals held that it was an abuse of discretion to divide the
property in a way that left one spouse with substantial federal income
tax liabilities and no assets with which to pay them.18 4 In that instance,
the award was disproportionately large in favor of the husband on the
assumption that he would pay the taxes; however, both husband and wife
were liable for payment of the taxes. In McKnight v. McKnight 3 5 the

El Paso court held that the rights of the children, including those over
eighteen years of age, had been infringed by the court's order, which

stripped their father of all his cash and his working capital and left him
36

burdened with debt.'
The appellate courts have usually sustained the finding of the trial
court if they find some legitimate basis in the record to support the division.' 3 7 A Tyler court case, Dobbs v. Dobbs,! "s is a useful example.
The division of property was disproportionately large in favor of the
130. Id. at 887-88.
131. 403 S.W.2d 215, 217 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1966, writ dism'd). See also
Dietz v. Dietz, 540 S.W.2d 418, 420 (Tex. Civ. App.-E1 Paso 1976, no writ), where
99% of the community property was awarded to the husband without good cause.
132. 525 S.W.2d 200 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [list Dist.] 1975, no writ); cf.
Boriack v. Boriack, 541 S.W.2d 237, 242-43 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1976, writ
dism'd).
133. Thomas v. Thomas, 525 S.W.2d 200, 202 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.]
1975, no writ).
134. Cole v. Cole, 532 S.W.2d 102, 105 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1975, no writ).
135. 535 S.W.2d 658 (Tex. Civ. App.-E1 Paso ), rev'd on other grounds, 543
S.W.2d 863 (Tex. 1976).
136. Id. at 660. For other instances of deprivation of livelihood, see Edwards v.
Edwards, 534 S.W.2d 740, 742 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1976, no writ), and the
authorities there cited. See also Means v. Means, 535 S.W.2d 911, 914 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Amarillo 1976, no writ).
137. When there are no findings of fact or conclusions of law, the appellate court
must consider the evidence and all reasonable inferences that may be drawn therefrom in
a light most favorable to the appellee. Bishop v. Bishop, 359 S.W.2d 869, 871 (Tex.
1962). See also Scoggins v. Scoggins, 531 S.W.2d 245 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1975, no
writ) (with respect to whether there were findings of fact).
138. 449 S.W.2d 119 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1969, no writ).
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wife, but the record disclosed good reasons for the difference. The
husband was awarded $3,000 in cash, whereas the wife received

$27,000 in cash, a duplex, and an automobile. The cash award in favor
of the wife, in large part, represented a recovery by her in a prior proceeding 3 9 while the husband had previously relinquished all claims to
the house and the automobile. Even if a trial court has made errors in

evaluating property' 4 ° or errors of law in characterizing property as
separate or community, 141 such errors may not justify reversal if the
division is otherwise fair.
As a rule, the pleadings to support a division of property on divorce
need only 'be in general terms since a prayer for general relief is sufficient to empower the court to make a complete division of the marital

estate.' 42 It is better practice, however, to plead specifically as well
as generally. 148 A jury verdict with regard to property division is
merely advisory,"' and most trial courts do not even submit an issue
relating to property division although a jury has been empaneled to
make other findings of fact. The facts underlying the property division, however, are within the province of the jury.'4 5 Consequently,
139. Id. at 120.
140. See Preston v. Preston, 453 S.W.2d 389, 391-92 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1970,
no writ). See also Fuqua v. Fuqua, 541 S.W.2d 228, 229 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1976,
no writ); McGee v. McGee, 537 S.W.2d 94 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1976, no writ)
(dictum). But see Freeman v. Freeman, 497 S.W.2d 97, 101 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston
[14th Dist.] 1973, no writ) (substantial error may be grounds for reversal).
141. Law v. Law, 517 S.W.2d 379, 384 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1974, writ dism'd);
Wilkerson v. Wilkerson, 515 S.W.2d 52, 54 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1974, no writ);
Gaulding v. Gaulding, 503 S.W.2d 617, 618 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1973, no writ);
Marks v. Marks, 470 S.W.2d 83, 85 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1971, writ ref'd n.r.e.). For
harmless evidentiary errors, see Cravens v. Cravens, 533 S.W.2d 372, 376 (Tex. Civ.
App.-El Paso 1975, no writ) (harmless error as to polygraph examination and basing
division of property thereon); Merrell v. Merrell, 527 S.W.2d 250, 256 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Tyler 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (dictum) (harmless error in that wife was capable
of paying attorneys' fees, but husband required to pay).
142. See Schreiner v. Schreiner, 502 S.W.2d 840, 846 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio
1973, writ dism'd); Zaruba v. Zaruba, 498 S.W.2d 695, 698 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus
Christi 1973, writ dism'd). In Bell v. Bell, 540 S.W.2d 432, 436 (Tex. Civ. App.Houston [lst Dist.] 1976, no writ), striking fault allegations was said to be error, but
harmless error under the circumstances. Fact finding was also erroneously referred to a
master, but all findings of the master adverse to the complainant could have been
submitted to a jury should the complainants have desired to do so.
143. With respect to attorney's fees pending appeal, more precise pleading may be
required. See Carson v. Carson, 528 S.W.2d 308, 309 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1975, no
writ).
144. Cockerham v. Cockerham, 514 S.W.2d 150, 156-57 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco
1974), rev'd on other grounds, 527 S.W.2d 162 (Tex. 1975) (affirmed in this respect).
See also Goetz v. Goetz, 534 S.W.2d 716 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1976, no writ).
145. Cockerham v. Cockerham, 527 S.W.2d 162, 173 (Tex. 1975), rev'g 514 S.W.2d
150 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1974).
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if the jury is called on to make a determination that property was
acquired before marriage and is, therefore, separate property, that is
a fact determination and is binding on the court. Similarly, matters of
fact with respect to attorney's fees may be submitted to a jury, but
whether attorney's fees are awarded to either party is in the sole discre46
tion of the court.'
The courts use numerous devices and standards in making orders
that are "just and right." Property of one kind may be awarded to one
spouse and that of a different kind to the other,' 4 7 or all of a particular
type of property may be awarded to one of the spouses. 4
There is
no need to divide particular property by awarding a part to one
and a part to the other, but the court may order a sale of property not
susceptible of being partitioned-in-kind in order to achieve a partition. 49 In some instances the courts have partitioned corporate stock
even though the result has been to leave the spouses competing for corporate control.' 50 Frequently, a money judgment is awarded to one
spouse to equalize shares,' and a lien may be imposed on particular
assets for the discharge of such an obligation.' 5 2 Courts have also
required one spouse to execute a note in favor of the other' or to
make periodic payments of fixed sums with or without interest in order
146. Hopkins v. Hopkins, 540 S.W.2d 783, 788 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi

1976, no writ).
147. See Mercer v. Mercer, 503 S.W.2d 395, 396-97 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi
1973, no writ).
148. Elrod v. Elrod, 517 S.W.2d 669, 674 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1974, no
writ).
149. Ellis v. Ellis, 225 S.W.2d 216, 218-19 (Tex. Civ. App.--San Antonio 1949, no
writ); Lewis v. Lewis, 179 S.W.2d 594, 596-97 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1944, no

writ); Scannell v. Scannell, 117 S.W.2d 538, 547 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1938, no
writ).
150. Braswell v. Braswell, 476 S.W.2d 444, 448 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1972, writ
dism'd); Brown v. Brown, 191 S.W.2d 814, 817 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1945, no writ).

A minority stockholder is entitled to the usual remedies in case of discriminatory
treatment.
151.

In re Marriage of Jackson, 506 S.W.2d 261, 267 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo

1974, writ dism'd); Weaks v. Weaks, 471 S.W.2d 454, 455 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont

1971, writ dism'd); Kirkham v. Kirkham, 335 S.W.2d 393, 394 (Tex. Civ. App.-San

Antonio 1960, no writ).
152. Moor v. Moor, 63 S.W. 347, 352 (Tex. Civ. App. 1901, writ ref'd). See also
Peterson v. Peterson, 502 S.W.2d 178, 180 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1973,
no writ) (award of money judgment to wife to be paid out of husband's business). Care

must be observed so that improper liens are not imposed on homestead property.

See

notes 282 and 348 infra. With respect to imposing liens on separate property, see notes

202-05 infra and accompanying text.
153. Womble v. Womble, 502 S.W.2d 886, 889 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1973,

no writ).
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to facilitate division of the property."5 4 This kind of order should not
be confused with permanent alimony.

55

For example, if there were

a $100,000 business not susceptible to partition-in-kind and the spouses
would not be able to operate it together as a result of their attitudes

toward each other, the court might order the business to be turned over
to the husband who has been running it all along. Since there would
probably not be enough cash available for the husband to compensate
the wife for her community interest in the business, the husband might
be ordered to make, over a period of years, periodic payments of
$5,000 or $10,000 plus interest. 156 The court in In re Marriage of
5 7 best expressed this proposition when it said that "Is]o long as
Jackson"

the division was referable to the rights and equities of the parties in and
to properties at the time of dissolution of the marriage, such division
should not be regarded as. an allowance of permanent alimony in
violation of established public policy.'. 5 8
In some cases all of the community property has been awarded to

one spouse as compensation for prior waste of the community by the
other. In Reaney v. Reaney 50 all the remaining community property,
as well as a money judgment, was awarded to the wife to compensate
her for the husband's culpable dissipation of the community estate. 160
Some trial courts have taken the equities of expenditure into considera-

tion in making its division of property, thereby avoiding making a more
precise determination of the issues of reimbursement.' 6'

The term

154. Garrett v. Garrett, 534 S.W.2d 381, 383 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [lst Dist.]
1976, no writ); Goren v. Goren, 531 S.W.2d 897, 900 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st
Dist.] 1975, writ dism'd); Forney v. Jorrie, 511 S.W.2d 379, 385 (Tex. Civ. App.-San
Antonio 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
155. See note 65 supra.
156. Unless it is specifically provided that periodic payments will cease on the death
of the payee, as well as that of the payor, the right to receive such payments would seem
to survive the payee as a debt owed to the payee's estate. Cf. TEX. FAMILY CODE ANN. §
14.05(d) (1975), with respect to the obligation to pay child support as commented on in
Eggemeyer v. Eggemeyer, 535 S.W.2d 425, 428 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1976, writ
granted on other grounds).

157. 506 S.W.2d 261 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1974, writ dism'd).
158. Id. at 266; accord, Benedict v. Benedict, 542 S.W.2d 692, 699 (Tex. Civ. App.Fort Worth 1976, writ dism'd). But see In re Marriage of Long, 542 S.W.2d 712, 71516 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1976, no writ).
159. 505 S.W.2d 338 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1974, no writ). See also Collins v.
Collins, 540 S.W.2d 497, 498 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1976, no writ).
160. Reaney v. Reaney, 505 S.W.2d 338, 340 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1974, no
writ); cf. Roye v. Roye, 404 S.W.2d 92, 95 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1966, no writ),
where the husband was awarded a debt owed the community by his paramour whose
security he had released pendente lite.
161. See, e.g., Bums v. Burns, 541 S.W.2d 280, 281-82 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio
1976, writ dism'd); Means v. Means, 535 S.W.2d 911, 916-17 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo

Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2022

27

St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 8 [2022], No. 3, Art. 2

ST. MARY'S LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 8:413

reimbursement, though, cannot be said to describe this process of rough
justice; it is, perhaps, better described as an "equitable adjustment."
Although courts have sometimes tended to overlook the distinction,
there are two very different situations concerning division of property
(especially retirement benefits) with which the courts must continue
to deal:

(1) division on divorce and (2) division after divorce. If

community property is left undivided on divorce, the result is a tenancy
in common between the former spouses. 162

When the divorce court

divides property, it makes an equitable division utilizing its discretionary powers. Division after divorce, on the other hand, does not involve
the exercise of the court's discretion.
The handling of retirement benefits on divorce provides a useful

example of the process of division since it has given rise to so much
difficulty in the past. As in the case of other property, the division
of such benefits is always the second step in a two-step process: the
court must initially make an evaluation of what is usually prospective
retirement benefits in terms of property interest, and then the court

must determine how to dispose of the interest. In evaluating any interest, the task is complicated, and the court's equitable discretion is

notably impaired by the fact that there are contingencies affecting the
ultimate enjoyment under consideration. In Cearley v. Cearley 63
the Texas Supreme Court borrowed language from the Supreme

Court of California commenting on this situation:
In dividing nonvested pension rights as community property the
court must take account of the possibility that death or termina1976, no writ); Horlock v. Horlock, 533 S.W.2d 52, 56, 58 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston
[14th Dist.] 1975, writ dism'd); Carson v. Carson, 528 S.W.2d 308, 309 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Waco 1975, no writ) (semble); Fulwiler v. Fulwiler, 419 S.W.2d 251, 252
(Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1965, no writ), discussed in McKnight, Matrimonial Property, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 23 Sw. L.J. 44, 46 (1969); Hartman v. Hartman, 253
S.W.2d 480, 483 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1952, no writ) (dictum). See also Burns v.
Burns, 541 S.W.2d 280, 281 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1976, writ dism'd).
162. Busby v. Busby, 457 S.W.2d 551, 554 (Tex. 1970). If a spouse controlling
particular community property fears it will not be divided equally, this rule of law may
encourage him to secrete it. His inclination may be further fueled by his hope that
secreting the property may result in its never being found at all. The other spouse's
counsel may combat these motives by insistence on an order that any other community
property not dealt with by the court be awarded to his client.
A suggested ultimate solution to the problem is to give the divorce court continuing
jurisdiction over community property not dealt with at the time of the divorce. But such
power, provided by statute, would allow the court to consider facts that occur after the
divorce. Nevertheless, this solution may have fewer drawbacks than the prevailing law.
See McKnight & Raggio, Family Law, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 25 Sw. L.J. 34, 40
(1971).
163. 544 S.W.2d 661 (Tex. 1976).
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tion of employment may destroy those rights before they mature.
In some cases the trial court may be able to evaluate this risk in
determining the present value of those rights. . . . But if the
court concludes that because of uncertainties affecting the vesting
or maturation of the pension that it should not attempt to divide
the present value of pension rights, it can instead award each
spouse an appropriate portion of each pension payment as it is
paid. This method of dividing the community interest in the pension renders it unnecessary for the court to compute present value
of the pension rights, and divides equally the risk that the pension will fail to vest. 164
In Cearley the court had before it what by the old formulation of
applicable principles would have been termed a case of unvested
pension rights. In such instances the court indicates 66 a strong preference for the "if-and-when" order for the division of prospective benefits. But the division of benefits as they are received by the pensioner
is also an appropriate means of dividing accrued or even matured
interests, 16 6 thereby allowing the court to avoid the arduous task of
giving the interest a present value and the temptation of making a
monetary lump-sum award to the other spouse' 6 -- a practice that has
given rise to some difficulty in other jurisdictions.16 It is not suggested
that the court should always, or even usually, divide the future payments between the spouses. An exercise of the court's equitable judgment is always required. Although retirement benefits are properly
characterized as a form of deferred compensation for services and are,
therefore, community property interests (though in many instances contingent ones), a significant purpose in instituting such benefits is also
that of providing for the future maintenance of the pensioner. After
carefully weighing the situation in issue, the court may award the
prospective pensioner the full right in the interest based on its present
equity-value rather than on a lesser amount, the court's determination
being dependent upon certain conditions such as premature termina164. Id. at 664, quoting In re Marriage of Brown, 126 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1976).

See

also DeRevere v. DeRevere, 491 P.2d 249 (Wash. Ct. App. 1971); Thiede, The
Community Property Interest of the Non-Employee Spouse in Private Employee Retirement Benefits, 9 U. SAN. FRAN. L. REv. 635, 654 (1975).

165. Cearley v. Cearley, 544 S.W.2d 661, 664 (Tex. 1976).
166. See notes 177-78 infra and accompanying text.
167. See Maddox v. Maddox, 489 S.W.2d 392-93 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st

Dist.] 1973, no writ) (husband awarded mortgaged property and was required to pay
money payments to the wife rather than selling -the property and dividing proceeds).
168. See Comment, Lump-Sum Division of Military Retired Pay, 12 IDAHO L. REV.

197 (1975), reprintedwith modifications in 3 COMM. PROP. J. 135 (1976).
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Alternatively, the court may

consider the remoteness of the receipt of prospective benefits 170 or it
may apportion the benefits subject to a credit to the pensioner for
income taxes which the recipient must later pay.' 7' Furthermore, if
the value of the interest reflects the fact of its acquisition over a period
during which the spouses were not married or were married and living
in non-community property states, the court may also consider these
factors. 7 2 On the other hand, the court may simply divide the future
payments to be received equally between the spouses 73 and designate
the recipient a constructive trustee of the benefits received, ordering
payment of a portion of them to the other former spouse.' 74 The court
may also award the interest in the retirement benefits wholly to the
employee and award other property to the other spouse 7 1 or the other

spouse can be awarded a money judgment in compensation for the
community interest lost. 176 The prospective pensioner may even be
required to withdraw from a pension plan so that his interest may be
divided.1

77

169. Maddox v. Maddox, 489 S.W.2d 391, 392 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.]
1973, no writ).
170. Freeman v. Freeman, 497 S.W.2d 97, 100-01 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 1973, no writ).
171. Troutenko v. Troutenko, 503 S.W.2d 686, 687-88 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston
[1st Dist.] 1973, no writ).
172. E.g., Gaulding v. Gaulding, 503 S.W.2d 617, 618 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland
1973, no writ); In re Marriage of McCurdy, 489 S.W.2d 712, 718 (Tex. Civ. App.Amarillo 1973, writ dism'd); Marks v. Marks, 470 S.W.2d 83, 85 (Tex. Civ. App.Tyler 1971, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Webster v. Webster, 442 S.W.2d 786, 788 (Tex. Civ.
App.-San Antonio 1969, writ dism'd); Mora v. Mora, 429 S.W.2d 660, 662 (Tex. Civ.
App.-San Antonio 1968, writ dism'd); Kirkham v. Kirkham, 335 S.W.2d 393, 394
(Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1960, no writ).
173. Gaulding v. Gaulding, 503 S.W.2d 617 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1973, no
writ); Daniels v. Daniels, 490 S.W.2d 862 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1973, writ
dism'd).
174. Marshall v. Marshall, 511 S.W.2d 72, 75 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.]
1974, no writ).
175. Mercer v. Mercer, 503 S.W.2d 395, 397 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1973,
no writ).
Regardless of whether retirement benefits for a married pensioner vest as a result of
age, time of service, or disability, the benefits are presumed to be community property.
Busby v. Busby, 457 S.W.2d 551, 554 (Tex. 1970). The court was therefore in error in
Ramsey v. Ramsey, 474 S.W.2d 939, 941 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1971, writ dism'd),
when it construed disability-retirement benefits as separate property. See McKnight,
MatrimonialProperty, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 27 Sw. L.J. 27, 31 (1973). But
the appellate court could have treated the error as a harmless one under the circumstances. See note 141 supra and accompanying text.
176. Maddox v. Maddox, 489 S.W.2d 391, 392-93 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st
Dist.] 1973, no writ).
177. Taylor v. Taylor, 449 S.W.2d 368, 370 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1969, no
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. Contractual obligations incurred by the spouses with third persons
cannot be altered by the divorce court without a showing of fraud or

mistake, even though the third person to whom the debt is owed is a
party to the proceedings. 178

If, for example, the wife incurred a con-

tractual obligation during marriage, the contracting third party may
intervene in the divorce proceeding and take the claim to judgment.
The usual reason for intervention in such an instance is to show that
the wife's obligations were incurred while she was acting as an agent
of necessity for the husband. 179 Hence, though she herself may have
been a principal, she was also acting as the husband's agent, and there-

fore, he would be liable too. Should the court order the husband to
pay the debt, the wife would not be released from her obligation under
the contract.18 0 The court may order one spouse to pay a debt for
which the other is also obligated for the purpose of achieving a just
and fair division of property. The objective is to relieve one of the

spouses of a particular obligation and to exonerate his property from

seizure for satisfaction of debts.' 8 ' Such an objective, however, can
only be achieved if the spouse who is ordered to pay does, in fact,
pay since, as pointed out by the Texarkana court in Dorfman
v. Dorfman,12 the creditor's rights against any spouse who is already
writ), discussed in McKnight & Raggio, Family Law, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 25
Sw. L.J. 34, 42 (1971).
178. Broadway Drug Store, Inc. v. Trowbridge, 435 SW.2d 268, 270 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1968, no writ).
179. See Cockerham v. Cockerham, 527 S.W.2d 162 (Tex. 1975), where the wife's
trustee in bankruptcy intervened in the divorce proceeding to establish the husband's
liability as well as that of the wife with respect to certain contractual obligations. No
objection appears to have been raised with respect to the standing of the trustee to assert
these claims against the husband. The court concluded that liabilities incurred by the
wife in operating a dress shop were also those of the husband by application of the
doctrine of "holding-out" and ratification within the law of agency. Id. at 171-74. See
also McKnight, Family Law, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 30 Sw. L.J. 68, 91-92
(1976).
180. Goren v. Goren, 531 S.W.2d 897, 900 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [lst Dist.]
1975, writ dism'd).
181. See Mangum v. Mangum, 184 S.W.2d 338, 339 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio
1944, no writ); Hughes v. Hughes, 259 S.W. 180, 182 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1924,
writ dism'd); Hubbard v. Hubbard, 38 S.W. 388 (Tex. Civ App. 1896, no writ). For an
extended discussion of these and related authorities see McKnight, Family Law, Annual
Survey of Texas Law, 30 Sw. L.J. 68, 82-84 (1976).
182. 457 S.W.2d 417, 423 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1970, no writ). If the
order is spelled out with precision, it would seem that it would have all the means of
enforcement of any other order involving property division, at least if payment is ordered
to be made through the registry of the court. See Ex parte Sutherland, 526 S.W.2d 536,
539 (Tex. 1975), to the effect that a citation for civil contempt for failure to pay part of
periodic retirement benefits into the registry of the court pursuant to an order dividing
marital property on divorce did not constitute imprisonment for debt. See McKnight,
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obligated cannot be affected by such an order. Recently, in Walker
v. Walker,'8 3 it was pointed out that the court's order should contain
a provision for the liability of one ex-spouse to the other should the
other discharge a joint obligation ordered to be paid by one who fails
to do so.18 If, however, there are tax liabilities to be paid, specific
provisions concerning their payment should be included in the order
since an order to pay "community debts" has been construed as not
necessarily encompassing all tax liabilities.'8 5
B.

The Scope of Section 3.63 with Respect to Separate Property

There is an ongoing dispute concerning the scope of section 3.63,
which authorizes the court to make a division of marital property on
divorce. 186 There are four general options: (1) no division of any
separate property and equal division of the community, (2) no division
of any separate property but division of the community in the court's
discretion, (3) no division of separate realty but division of separate
personalty and the community in the court's discretion, or (4) division
of both separate and community property as the court deems "just and
right."' 7 The first option rests on the constitutional definition of
separate and community property and the inability of the legislature,
the courts, or spouses to abrogate it.' s8 The second option is supported
by a literal interpretation of the word "estate" in the statute. 89
Most recent litigation has centered on the third and fourth options
and the extent of the jurisdiction of the divorce court to divest title to
Family Law, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 30 Sw. L.J. 68, 86-87 n.138 (1976);
Rudberg, Enforcing Divorce Judgments and Property Settlement Agreements in Texas, 5

TEx. TEcH L. REv. 645, 653, 656-57 (1974).

See also note 62 supra and notes 349-50

infra and accompanying text.
183. 527 S.W.2d 200 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1975, no writ).

184. Id. at 204 (concurring opinion); see Forney v. Jorrie, 511 S.W.2d 379, 386 (Tex.

Civ. App.-San Antonio 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.)

(discharge of debt owed to a third

person). See also Moor v. Moor, 63 S.W. 347, 352 (Tex. Civ. App. 1901, writ ref'd).
185. Brooks v. Brooks, 515 S.W.2d 730, 733 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1974, writ
ref'd n.r.e.).

See also Cole v. Cole, 532 S.W.2d 102, 104-05 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas

1975, no writ).

For other authorities relating to tax consideration see McKnight,

Family Law, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 30 Sw. L.J. 68, 87 (1976); McKnight, Family
Law, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 29 Sw. L.J. 67, 83 (1975); Rudberg, Enforcing
Divorce Judgments and Property Settlement Agreements in Texas, 5 TEx. TECH L. REV.

645, 651 (1974) (specificity of decree to include tax liabilities).
186. TEX. FAMILY CODE ANN. § 3.63 (1975).
187. See Comment, Division of Marital Property On Divorce: A Proposal to Revise Section 3.63, 7 ST. MARY's L.J. 209, 219-21 (1975) (an analysis of the outlook of

the eight community property states in this regard).
188. See note 85 supra and authorities there cited.
189. See note 85 supra and authorities there cited.
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separate realty. In DePuy v. DePuy'9 0 it was said that "[g]enerally,
separate [real] property will be restored to its owner. Where personal
property is involved, the court is vested with wide discretion in making
disposition whether it be separate or community."'' 1 This observation
is derived from a long line of cases antedating the enactment of section
3.63 of the Family Code. When that statute's progenitor was enacted
in 1841,192 the statute went on to say that the divorce court would never
divest title to realty. Judicial interpretation of the statute construed the
prohibition against divestiture of title to apply only to separate realtyas the statute's draftsmen certainly intended. 19 3 The statute of 1841
remained in effect until January 1, 1970, at which time it was reenacted
as part of title 1 of the Family Code.'
But in the reenactment the
sentence referring to divestiture of title to realty was omitted even
though the commentary presented to the legislature stated that the statute was unchanged. This legislative history has, therefore, given rise
to considerable controversy as to the meaning of the statute as it now
stands.'l 1 Since section 3.63 simply provides that the court shall order
a division of the estate of the parties in a manner that the court deems
just and right, the Tyler and Dallas courts have held that the broad
power to divide as may be deemed just and right includes the power
to divide separate real property.'9 6 There are obiter dicta to the same
effect in several other cases though those cases did not actually involve
a division of separate realty. 9 7 The Corpus Christi court, however,
190. 483 S.W.2d 883, 888 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1972, no writ) (concurring opinion).
191. Id. at 888.
192. Tex. Laws 1841, An Act Concerning Divorce and Alimony § 4, at 20, 2 H.
GAMMEL, LAws OF TExAs 484 (1898).
193. Hailey v. Hailey, 160 Tex. 372, 376, 331 S.W.2d 299, 303 (1960)

article 4638, another predecessor of section 3.63 of the Family Code).

(referring to

See McKnight,

Matrimonial Property, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 27 Sw. L.J. 27, 38-39 (1973).

194. Compare Tex. Laws 1841, An Act Concerning Divorce and Alimony § 4, at 20,
2 H.

GAMMEL, LAWS OF TEXAS

484 (1898), with TEx.

FAMILY CODE ANN.

§ 3.63 (1975).

For an application of that statute prior to codification, see Holmes v. Holmes, 447
S.W.2d 423, 424 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1969, no writ).
195. For a more detailed history of the enactment of section 3.63, see McKnight,
MatrimonialProperty, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 27 Sw. L.J. 27, 38-39 (1973).

See

also Comment, Division of Marital Property on Divorce: A Proposal to Revise Section
3.63, 7 ST. MARY'S L.J. 209 (1975).
196.

Baxla v. Baxla, 522 S.W.2d 736, 739-40 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dalas 1975, no

writ); Wilkerson v. Wilkerson, 515 S.W.2d 52, 56-57 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1974, no
writ).
197. In re Marriage of Butler, 543 S.W.2d 147, 149 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana
1976, no writ); Burns v. Burns, 541 S.W.2d 280, 282 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio

1976, writ dism'd); Dietz v. Dietz, 540 S.W.2d 418, 420 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1976,
no writ); Merrell v. Merrell, 527 S.W.2d 250, 255 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1975, writ
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after carefully considering the legislative history of the statute, concluded that section 3.63 of the Family Code was intended to mean that

title to separate realty could not be divested.' 98 The Austin court has
agreed with this conclusion, 9' and the Tyler court appears to have

withdrawn from its earlier position. 00°

These holdings, however, do

not appear to affect a long line of cases dating from 1855, which allow

the imposition of a trust on separate realty for the support of the other
201
spouse or of the minor children.
If it is impermissible to divest title to separate property (or some of
it), it would seem to follow that a lien cannot be put on separate property to guarantee payment of a monetary award, because the lien is an
interest in the property itself and foreclosure of the lien would constitute complete divestiture of title. Nevertheless, a series of civil appeals
cases sustains orders fixing liens on separate estates for the discharge
of payments to the former spouse by the owner of the property.20 2
Though the language of these cases is imprecise

203

and unsupported

by a reasoned analysis, reliance may also be put on an early holding.
of the Texas Supreme Court to support the same conclusion.20 4 It may
also be argued that such a lien is no more than a tentative divestiture
ref'd n.r.e.); Harrison v. Harrison, 495 S.W.2d 1, 3 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1973, no
writ); In re Marriage of McCurdy, 489 S.W.2d 712, 717 (Tex. Civ App.-Amarillo 1973,
writ dism'd); Medearis v. Medearis, 487 S.W.2d 198, 200 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1972,
no writ).
198. Ramirez v. Ramirez, 524 S.W.2d 767, 768-69 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi
1975, no writ).
199. Eggemeyer v. Eggemeyer, 535 S.W.2d 425, 428 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1976,
writ granted).
200. Spiller v. Spiller, 535 S.W.2d 683, 684 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1976, writ
dism'd) (dictum).
201. Ex parte Scott, 133 Tex. 1, 14, 123 S.W.2d 306, 313 (1939); Fitts fV.Fitts, 14
Tex. 443, 447-48, 453 (1855); Eggemeyer v. Eggemeyer, 535 S.W.2d 425, 428 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Austin 1976, writ granted); Pape v. Pape, 35 S.W. 479, 480 (Tex. Civ. App.
1896, writ dism'd); Comment, Division of Marital Property on Divorce: A Proposal to
Revise Section 3.63, 7 ST. MARY'S L.J. 209, 212-13 (1975).
202. Bell v. Bell, 540 S.W.2d 432, 441 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1976i
no writ); In re Marriage of Jackson, 506 S.W.2d 261, 267 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo
1974, writ dism'd); Mea v. Mea, 464 S.W.2d 201, 206 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1971, no
writ); Mozisek v. Mozisek, 365 S.W.2d 669, 670 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1963,
writ dism'd); Smith v. Smith, 187 S.W.2d 116, 120-21 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth
1945, no writ); Hursey v. Hursey, 165 S.W.2d 761, 765 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1942,
writ dism'd).
203. Bell, Jackson, Mea, Mozisek, and Hursey all refer to the imposition of an
"equitable lien" in these instances. In Hursey the court goes on to say that "[tihe effect
of the recital was merely to make the amount a charge against Hursey's separate estate,
until paid." Hursey v. Hursey, 165 S.W.2d 761, 765 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1942, writ
dism'd).
204. Simons v. Simons, 23 Tex. 344, 349 (1859).
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since ultimate divestiture by foreclosure is essentially voluntary in that
20 5
it may be precluded by compliance with the court's order to pay.
Problems which are essentially those of characterization of property,
as either separate or community are encountered by the courts in dividing property produced by the efforts of a particular spouse in developing separate property. Similar problems arise in dividing property produced by the income from separate property and in dividing corporate
2 6
interests that are closely held or solely owned. Norris v. Vaughan 1
did not concern division on divorce, but the principles of characterization exemplified there are applicable to the problems encountered on
divorce. At marriage the husband owned certain producing gas leases
and certain partnership interests. During marriage the partnerships
acquired other gas leases (including the Hill and Cantrell leases) and
interests in gas leases under farmout agreements that were paid for in
part with the husband's separate property and that of his partners. The
labor and talents of the husband and that of his partners also contributed to the acquisition of those profitable interests. Wells were drilled
on these leases at the expense of the husband's separate property and
that of the partnership. On the wife's death her heirs sought to show
that some of the property was community property. The Supreme
Court of Texas analyzed the situation largely in favor of the community
claimants: (1) separate property, so long as it can be traced and identified, remains separate property; (2) no community interest was shown
as to gas produced from wells which were drilled prior to marriage and
which required little of the husband's attention during marriage except
to provide upkeep out of separate property, since community character
will not be impressed on separate property by virtue of the husband's
activities relating solely to production and maintenance; (3) income
from the partnership "which bought and sold gas" was community property though the partnership interests themselves remained separate
property; and (4) such interests as the husband obtained in wells
drilled on gas leases acquired during marriage, which acquisitions were
in part due to the husband's labor and talents and in part to that of
his partners and therefore attributable to him, were community property with a right of reimbursement in favor of the husband's separate
property for money spent for acquisitions, drilling costs, and his share
205. See Smith v. Smith, 187 S.W.2d 116, 121 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1945, no

writ).
206. 152 Tex. 491, 260 S.W.2d 676 (1953).
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Hence, once the character of the property

has been determined, the ordinary rules of property division may be
applied.20 " It must be borne in mind, however, that Norris concerned
a partnership situation at a time before the enactment of the Uniform
Partnership Act when Texas still adhered to the aggregate rather than
the entity theory of partnership acquisitions.20 9
The problem of the division of a spouse's closely-held corporate interest (an interest analogous to that of a partnership interest under the

entity theory of the Uniform Partnership Act) has been considered by
several courts of civil appeals. All have reached the conclusion that
a separate interest in a closely-held corporate endeavor is treated as

though it is community property for purposes of division on divorce.210
The Supreme Court of Texas recently considered a somewhat similar
question in Bell v. Bell.21 ' There the court sidestepped the apparent

issue of separate property divestiture by holding that the trial court
properly considered the separate property corporate interest in awarding it solely to the husband and did not award it to him without con-

sidering it as part of the marital property division as a whole. 212 At
the very least, Bell holds that it is proper-perhaps required 21 8-that the
207. Id. at 495-503, 260 S.W.2d at 679-83.
208. Care must be taken not to generalize the holding in Norris too far. It may be
asserted that the court's refusal to apportion acquisitions between the separate and
community estate, thereby relegating the right of the separate claimant to that of
reimbursement, results from the difficulty of assigning a proportionate value to labor
and talent (attributable to the community) and capital expenditure (which is provided by
the separate estate). At least in the case of a speculative acquisition, such as a mineral
interest, the court chose to attribute the entire ownership interest to labor and talent,
thereby classifying it as community.
209. See McKnight v. McKnight, 535 S.W.2d 658, 661 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso),
rev'd, 543 S.W.2d 863 (Tex. 1976). TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6132b §§ 24, 26, 27,
28-A, 28-B (1970) are particularly relevant to division of partnership interests on
divorce.
210. Uranga v. Uranga, 527 S.W.2d 761, 765 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1975,
writ dism'd); Mea v. Mea, 464 S.W.2d 201, 204-06 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1971, no
writ); Dillingham v. Dillingham, 434 S.W.2d 459, 461-62 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth
1968, writ dism'd). Note, however, that the yet unresolved constitutional issue with
respect to divestiture of the separate estate in general also bears on this question. See
text accompanying note 85 supra. If the separate corporate interest is so closely held as
to constitute the alter ego of a spouse, the division of the interest in favor of the other
spouse is justified. In Wells v. Hiskett, 288 S.W. 2d 257 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana
1956, writ ref'd n.r.e.), the court by way of dicta stated that if a spouse fraudulently
expands separate corporate assets at the expense of the community, the divorce court
may properly treat the expanded assets as community property. Id. at 262.
211. 5113 S.W.2d 20 (Tex. 1974).
212. Id. at 22.
213. See In re Marriage of Butler, 543 S.W.2d 147, 149 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana
1976, no writ).
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divorce court consider all of the separate personal property holdings of
the spouses in making the division on divorce, and it is perfectly proper
to confirm the ownership of all separate personalty in its owner.
C. Foreign Realty
If on divorce the husband possesses realty in another state which he
purchased during the marriage using community property, does the
Texas divorce court, using whatever means it has at its disposal, have
power to divide that realty? May the court order the husband to convey all or a portion of that realty to his wife in a manner that is fair
and just, or does the court wholly lack jurisdiction to deal with this property other than merely taking it into consideration in making a division
of the Texas property? Texas courts have denied themselves jurisdiction to make any sort of direct division.214 The closest Texas courts
have come to dealing with this problem is to hold that the divorce court
may consider investments in foreign realty when dividing other property. 215 No Texas appellate case has dealt with a dispute concerning
an in personam order to convey foreign realty.216 With respect to such
orders, there are certain inherent problems which involve characterization of the interest in law, the type of conveyance required, and possible
interests of third persons. There are, however, instances of Texas
courts approving orders of foreign divorce courts with respect to Texas
217
realty.
D. Reimbursement
Reimbursement is one of the most difficult subjects in the entire
division process. The right of reimbursement arises only on dissolution
214. Kaherl v. Kaherl, 357 S.W.2d 622, 624 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1962, no writ)

(division on divorce). See also Moor v. Moor, 255 S.W. 231, 235 (Tex. Civ. App. 1900,
writ denied) (division after divorce). However, personal property located in another
jurisdiction presents no jurisdictional problems of division if the court has jurisdiction of
the spouse having ownership or control of the property. Moor v. Moor, 63 S.W. 347,
351 (Tex. Civ. App. 1901, writ ref'd) (mobilia sequuntur personam).
215. Deger v. Deger, 526 S.W.2d 272, 274 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1975, no writ);
Walker v. Walker, 231 S.W.2d 905, 906 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1950, no writ).
216. But see discussion in Estabrook v. Wise, 506 S.W.2d 248, 253 (Tex. Civ. App.Tyler) (division after divorce), dism'd as moot per curiam, 519 S.W.2d 632 (Tex. 1974).

See also notes 338-44, 414-15 infra and accompanying text.
217. McElreath v. McElreath, 162 Tex. 190, 207-08, 345 S.W.2d 722, 733 (1961);
Forman v. Forman, 496 S.W.2d 243, 244-45 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
1973, no writ). See also Allis v. Allis, 378 F.2d 721 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S.
953 (1967),

commented on in McKnight, Matrimonial Property, Annual Survey of

Texas Law, 22 Sw. L.J. 129, 138 n.50 (1968).
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of the community.2 18 Such a dissolution may be caused by the death
of a spouse, severance of the marriage bonds by divorce or annul-

ment,219 or by a spouse's bankruptcy when at least part of the
community may be dissolved. 22 It is an equitable right achieved
through the exercise of the court's discretionary powers. The right of
reimbursement of 'one marital estate for the benefit of another is not
absolute; the court may deny or reduce the claim of reimbursement for

reasons of fairness. The Texas Supreme Court has held that such a
situation exists when the spouse claiming reimbursement for investment
of his separate funds in particular property has the right of occupancy
of the property or income from the property.2 2' The right of reimbursement is sometimes spoken of as one in the nature of an equitable

charge on the property of the spouse benefited in favor of the claimant

furnishing the benefit. 22 2 The right rests on the benefit contributed

and is not affected by the claimant's failure to show a partitionable
interest in the property benefited. 2 3 Since the right is based on a contribution to property interests, living expenses paid for with separate
funds are not reimbursable.224
To establish a right of reimbursement for the enrichment of one
marital estate by another, the amount contributed to the benefit of the
other estate must be proved. Courts have not always required an
accounting for every dollar in the sense of tracing investments to par-

ticular assets for purposes of characterization, but investment in the
218. See Gonzales v. Gonzales, 117 Tex. 183, 187, 300 S.W. 20, 22 (1927). Though
the point is not likely to be relevant to division on divorce, the two or four-year statutes
of limitation are applicable to the claim for reimbursement depending on whether the
transaction is based on a writing. Burton v. Bell, 380 S.W.2d 561, 565 (Tex. 1964). The
lapse of time, however, is relevant to division after divorce.
219. The rules of reimbursement, like those of division of marital property, seem
inapplicable to the situation of the putative marriage. See McKnight, Commentary to
the Texas Family Code, Title 1, 5 TEX. TECH L. REV. 281, 310, 340 (1974). See also
McKnight, Family Law, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 29 Sw. L.J. 67, 68 n.5 (1975).
But the ordinary rules governing unjust enrichment are applicable to that situation.
220. See Collins v. Bryan, 88 S.W. 432, 433 (Tex. Civ. App. 1905, no writ).
221. Dakan v. Dakan, 125 Tex. 305, 317-18, 321, 83 S.W.2d 620, 627, 629 (1935).
222. Id. at 319-20, 83 S.W.2d at 628.
223. Contra, Aman v. Cox, 164 S.W.2d 744, 748-49 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1942,
no writ). In this case the court's error stems from its confusing reimbursement (an
equitable right in personam) with a real property interest.
224. Norris v. Vaughan, 152 Tex. 491, 503, 260 S.W.2d 676, 683 (1953); Henderson
v. Henderson, 425 S.W.2d 363, 365 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1968, writ dism'd);
Gaulding v. Gaulding, 256 S.W.2d 684, 688 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1953, no writ);
McKnight, Matrimonial Property, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 23 Sw. L.J. 44, 46-47
(1969). But see Cooper v. Cooper, 120 S.W.2d 269, 271 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo
1938, no writ). It may be argued, however, that the second sentence of TEX. FAMILY
CODE ANN. § 4.02 (1975) changes the rule enunciated in the text.
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property benefited must be shown.225 Except for a sometimes less
demanding standard as to amount, the evidentiary process of showing
how much separate property was used to improve community property
is virtually the same as that used to trace mutations of separate

property.22 6 The reason for the slight difference in approach is explained by the rule that tracing of separate funds demonstrates ownership of the ultimate mutation (with the benefits of appreciation in value
that ownership entails), whereas the contribution of a benefit merely
gives rise to a right of reimbursement in a monetary amount. Merely

showing a substantial separate estate at marriage will not establish a
right of reimbursement from a large community estate in favor of a
depleted separate estate without showing how the separate estate benefited the community. 227 Nor will it suffice to demonstrate a benefited separate estate by showing depleted community earnings. 22 In
each instance, the manner of benefit to the other marital estate must

be shown. 29
The measure of reimbursement depends on the nature of the
benefit. The cases may be classified into three categories: (1) reim-

bursement for improvements, (2) reimbursements for benefits received other than improvements, and (3) cases involving fluctuating
funds. If funds of one estate are used for the improvement of another,
the measure of reimbursement is the cost or enhancement in value,
225. Younger v. Younger, 315 S.W.2d 449, 452 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1958, no
writ), quoting Edsal v. Edsall, 240 S.W.2d 424, 430 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1951, no
writ).
226. Burns v. Bums, 541 S.W.2d 280, 281 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1976, writ
dism'd).
227. Moor v. Moor, 255 S.W. 231, 235 (Tex. Civ. App.-1900, writ denied). The
showing of substantial losses must have also militated against reimbursement in that case.
228. Cf. Duncan v. United States, 247 F.2d 845 (5th Cir. 1957) (tracing case). In
order to show the amount of federal estate tax due from separate property as opposed to
community property, the court allowed the IRS to show a depleted community income.
Although the original separate assets were not traced, it was surmised that an original
substantial separate estate had survived. Id. at 850-52. This method of "proof" will not
suffice in Texas law either for purposes of characterization or for those of reimbursement. See Meshwert v. Meshwert, 543 S.W.2d 877, 879 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont
1976, writ granted) (dicta); In re Greer, 483 S.W.2d 490, 493-94 (Tex. Civ. App.Amarillo 1972, writ dism'd) (characterization case). See also Uranga v. Uranga, 527
S.W.2d 761, 765 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1975, writ dism'd).
229. There is no right of reimbursement for contributing to the benefit of an
expectancy. Since the expectancy by its nature is not a present marital estate, that
which is contributed to it is for the benefit of someone outside the marital partnership.
Hence, the deprived spouse must assert a right arising from the perpetration of actual or
constructive fraud. Raulston v. Raulston, 531 S.W.2d 683, 684-85 (Tex. Civ. App.Texarkana 1975, no writ).
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whichever is less;230 hence, both elements must be proved.23 ' If, for
example, community property is used to build a barn on the wife's
separate property or to repair a house on the husband's separate property, showing present replacement value of the improvement or repair
is a factor in proving enhancement. The rationale for the rule that the
right of reimbursement is in the lesser amount of cost or enhancement
is based on the assumption that the estate rendering the benefit to the
other estate receives a compensating benefit for its contribution during
the marriage, as when the community benefits a separate estate which

is productive of community income or marital enjoyment.

Where

separate property is used to improve community property, the reason
for the rule is based on the voluntariness of the expenditure. But what-

ever the rationale of the rule, its strict application may produce results
of dubious justice, regardless of whether the marriage has existed during a period of economic inflation or depression. The chances of an
inequitable result are enhanced if the marriage was of a relatively short
duration. But since division of property on divorce, as well as the
process of reimbursement, is one for the exercise of the trial judge's
discretion, adjustments may be made in division of properties as the
equities demand.

If funds of one estate are used for the benefit of another for purposes
other than improvement, the measure of reimbursement is the amount
expended. 2 2 Some common examples are discharges of encumbran230. Lindsay v. Clayman, 151 Tex. 593, 600, 254 S.W.2d 777, 781 (1952). The
court clearly requires proof of amount expended and enhancement in value. There seems
to be an underlying assumption that enhancement would be less than the amount
expended. In Dakan v. Dakan, 125 Tex. 305, 320, 83 S.W.2d 620, 628 (1935), the
court said that "in case of reimbursement for improvements, the amount of recovery is
limited to the amount of enhancement of the property at the time of partition by virtue
of the improvements placed thereon." In Girard v. Girard, 521 S.W.2d 714 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1975, no writ), it was pointed out that if the court errs in
making its award for reimbursement, the spouse in whose favor the error runs has no
basis for complaint on appeal. id. at 717-18. See also Bazile v. Bazile, 465 S.W.2d 181,
182 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1971, writ dism'd); Harris v. Royal, 446
S.W.2d 351, 352 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1969, writ ref'd n.r.e.), discussed in McKnight
& Raggio, Family Law, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 25 Sw. L.J. 34, 44 (1971).
231. E.g., Lindsay v. Clayman, 151 Tex. 593, 600, 254 S.W.2d 777, 781 (1952);
Newland v. Newland, 529 S.W.2d 105, 109-10 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1975, writ
dism'd) (dictum). See also Williams v. Williams, 537 S.W.2d 107, '110 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Tyler 1976, no writ) (where claimant failed to prove either element).
232. Parson v. United States, 460 F.2d 228, 233 (5th Cir. 1972); Colden v.
Alexander, 141 Tex. 134, 147, 171 S.W.2d 328, 334 (1943); Bazile v. Bazile, 465 S.W.2d
181, 182 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [ist Dist.] 1971, writ dism'd); Higgins v. Higgins,
458 S.W.2d 498, 500-01 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1970, no writ); McCurdy v.
McCurdy, 372 S.W.2d 381, 384 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1963, writ ref'd). But see
Jackson v. Jackson, 524 S.W.2d 308, 3:12 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1975, no writ). The
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ces, payment of interest on purchase-money notes, payment of taxes,

and (in any area quite distinct from interests in realty or tangible personalty) payment of premiums on life insurance policies. Expenditures for making separately owned land productive have been handled
in this way233 although it seems that such benefits are more in the
nature of improvements. Although the measure of reimbursement in
these instances is the amount actually expended, the right is, again, only
an equitable one with the right of recovery of a lesser amount (or none
at all) based on the circumstances of the benefit rendered as weighed
against interim compensation received by the spouse whose interest
rendered the benefit.
A single supreme court case, Schmidt v. Huppman,2 34 forms the basis

for the measure of reimbursement concerning fluctuating funds, stocks
of merchandise, herds of livestock, or similar properties. In these
instances, the measure of reimbursement is the opening or lowest

balance. If the initial balance of the fund can be shown and it is
proved that the fund was always maintained at that level through the
marriage, the court speaks of allowing "reimbursement" for that initial
or minimum balance.23 5 But, as is readily seen by this analysis and
that of related cases, 236 this situation is more properly described as one

of "characterization." In this context it has been argued that if the
business has been operating at a loss, there is nothing to divide and,
therefore, no right of reimbursement.23 7 This argument, however,
seems to confuse liabilities and property interests.
Some courts have applied these rules of reimbursement rather
loosely and have sometimes given them little more than passing notice

court apparently applied the test of enhancement in this case. Although it did not
discuss the equities of the situation, the court's treatment of the problem indicates that
there is some confusion in the application of the rule. See also Comment, Retirement
Benefits and the Right to Reimbursement, 11 Hous. L. REV. 960 (1974).
233. Cone v. Cone, 266 S.W.2d 480, 483-84 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1953, writ
dism'd); see Comment, Development of a Separate Property Oil and Gas Lease with
But improvement of the
Community Funds, 27 BAYLOR L. REV. 743, 743-45 (1975).
land's surface, as in the case of urban real estate development for sale would likely be
termed enhancement.
234. 73 Tex. 112, 11 S.W. 175 (1889) (stock of merchandise).
235. See id. at 116, 11 S.W. at 176. See generally Smoak v. Smoak, 525 S.W.2d 888,
890 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1975, writ dism'd), commented on in McKnight,
Family Law, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 30 Sw. L.J. 68, 77 (1976).
236. See Hartman v. Hartman, 253 S.W.2d 480, 482-83 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin
1952, no writ) (dictum); Farrow v. Farrow, 238 S.W.2d 255, 257 (Tex. Civ. App.Austin 1951, no writ).
237. Fyke v. Fyke, 463 S.W.2d 242 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1971, no writ) (a
division after divorce case); cf. Gifford v. Gabbard, 305 S.W.2d 668, 671 (Tex. Civ.
App.-El Paso 1957, no writ).

Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2022

41

St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 8 [2022], No. 3, Art. 2

ST. MARY'S LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 8:413

while making a general equitable division on divorce. 288 Though the
term reimbursement is used in these cases to describe this process, it
is nothing more than an adjustment of equities. The most striking
instance of this "casual reimbursement" occurred in Horlock v. Horlock28 where the court at one point applied proper reimbursement
principles with respect to a separate benefit received at community
expense2 40 but, at another point, abandoned all adherence to the rules
in favor of achieving an equitable adjustment of interests.2 4 ' In spite
of a brief flirtation with the minimum balance principle, the court
seemed to treat "reimbursement" as a technique in division of property
rather than the application of rules of law.
Regardless of the type of reimbursement utilized, the measure is one
of not more than the measuring amount,242 subject to reduction in
accordance with the equities of the situation. Furthermore, in no
instance is the claimant entitled to interest.2 48 Consequently, if during
the marriage one spouse had advanced a sum of money to the other
or allowed the other to use property of a particular amount or value,
the right of reimbursement, even over a long term of years, is limited
to the amount advanced. One means of avoiding this result is to term
the transaction a loan rather than an.advancement. In the past when
the husband was manager of both the separate and community estates,
it was difficult to conceive of loans between husband and wife. 244 But
now that each spouse has full contractual capacity, it is reasonable to
conceive of each spouse as a borrower or a lender. In Padgett v.1
Padgett2 45 there was a question whether the wife, in the course of the
238. Means v. Means, 535 S.W.2d 911, 916-17 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1976, no
writ); Horlock v. Horlock, 533 S.W.2d 52, 56, 58 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 1975, writ dism'd); Carson v. Carson, 528 S.W.2d 308, 309 (Tex. Civ. App.Waco 1975, no writ); Fulwiler v. Fulwiler, 419 S.W.2d '251, 252 (Tex. Civ. App.Eastland 1965, no writ); Hartman v. Hartman, 253 S.W.2d 480, 483 (Tex. Civ. App.Austin 1952, no writ) (dictum); see note 161 supra and accompanying text.
239.

533 S.W.2d 52 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1975, writ dism'd).:

240. Id. at 59-60.
241. Id. at 56, 58.
242. The measurements restated are: (1) reimbursement for improvements-the
lesser of expenditure or enhancement; (2) reimbursement for expenditures other than
improvements-expenditure; and (3) fluctuating fund cases-minimum balance.
243. Dakan v. Dakan, 125 Tex. 305, 320, 83 S.W.2d 620, 628 (1935); Padgett v.
Padgett, 487 S.W.2d 850, 852 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1972, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Collins
v. Bryan, 88 S.W. 432, 433-34 (Tex. Civ. App.-1905, no writ).
244. Sparks v. Taylor, 99 Tex. 4.11, 425, 90 S.W. 485, 489 (1906). But see Ryan v.
Ryan, 61 Tex. 473, 474, 476 (1884) (loan between husband and wife).
245. 487 S.W.2d 850 (Tex. Civ. App.--Eastland 1972, writ ref'd n.r.e.), discussed in
McKnight, Matrimonial Property, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 27 Sw. L.J. 27, 34-35
(1973) (origin of present analysis found herein).
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marriage, had lent money to her husband or had simply allowed him
to use her separate property by way of advancement. On dissolution
of the community by death of the husband, the wife sued the husband's
estate alleging that her separate property was the subject matter of a
loan and claimed interest against her husband's estate from the time the
loan was allegedly made. The court stated that if she had merely advanced money to her husband, the interest would run only from his
death.2" 6 The court concluded, however, that she had made a loan and
2 47
interest would run from the date of maturity of the indebtedness.
Although construing such transactions as loans rather than advancements provides recovery of the full sum with interest, thereby circumventing the stern strictures of the rules of reimbursement, there are two
obvious.pitfalls in this approach: first, proof of the loan and its terms;
and second, the statute of limitations. If the first of these barriers is
overcome, one must always consider the latter unless it can be proved
that the loan was not to become due until a repayment was demanded
or until the community is dissolved.14s The claimant-spouse may,
therefore, plead in the alternative for recovery of the loan with interest
or for reimbursement.
E.

Attorney's Fees

Although not specifically provided for in the Family Code, a claim
for the wife's attorney's fees has long been treated as a distinct element
in the divorce process, regardless of whether it is viewed as an incident
to the division of property under section 3.63249 or as a term of a property settlement agreement or mistakenly treated as an element of costs
under section 3.65.250 Prior to 1963 any contract made by a feme
covert providing for necessaries of the marriage was construed as that
246. Padgett v. Padgett, 487 S.W.2d 850, 852 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1972, writ
ref'd n.r.e.).
247. Id. at 852.
248. In Padgett, the transaction occurred prior to 1968 when Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat.
Ann. art. 5535 (1925) tolled the statute of limitation with respect to claims of married
women, and the husband had also acknowledged the indebtedness in his will. As of
January 1, 1968, the statute of limitation is no longer tolled by coverture. Tex. Laws
1967, ch. 309, § 3, at 740, as amended, Tax. REv. Crv. STAT. ANN. art. 5535 (Supp.

1976).
249. See Tx. FAMILY

CODE ANN. § 3.63 (1975); McKnight, Family Law, Annual
Survey of Texas Law, 29 Sw.L.J. 67, 80-82 (1975).

250. See TEx.

FAMILY CODE ANN.

§ 3.65 (1975); McKnight, Commentary to the

Texas Family Code, Title 1, 5 TEx. TECH L. REv. 281, 343 (1974). See also Chapman
v. Chapman, 172 S.W.2d 127 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1943, writ dism'd); Jacks v.

Teague, 136 S.W.2d 896 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1940, writ dism'd).
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of the husband because of the wife's contractual incapacity caused by
coverture. 251 Thus, the wife acted as the husband's agent of necessity
in contracting for necessary services of an attorney.25 2 Since the husband was liable for such contractual obligations as a principal, all community property subject to his control and all his separate property were
thus available to satisfy the obligation. Although the award of her
attorney's fees has juristic antecedents in the law of contracts, such an
award to either spouse is now treated as an element of equitable property division insofar as the burden of paying the attorney's fees of one
spouse is shifted to the other.2 55 Occasionally, however, a court will
still refer to the old doctrine of necessaries in discussing an attorney's
fees. 254 For example, in Cearley v. Cearley255 the court of civil appeals
approved of the trial court's finding that the attorney's fees of the wife
were both reasonable and necessary and sustained an order that each
spouse should bear the expense of his or her legal fees.256 It was argued
in Lipshy v. Lipshy257 that the 1972 addition of the Equal Rights
251. See Archer v. Griffith, 390 S.W.2d 735, 739 (Tex. 1964) (wife's general
incapacity to contract during coverture). See also United States v. Yazell, 382 U.S. 341
(1966).
252. Attorney's fees in a divorce action are deemed "necessary" when it is shown that
the wife has prosecuted a bona fide suit, based on valid grounds, in good faith and upon
probable cause. Werlein v. Bishop, Docket No. 1173 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] Oct. 29, 1975) (unreported). But whether a contract was to provide necessaries
must be established as a matter of fact. That conclusion does not arise merely as a
consequence of the marriage. See Moody v. Sondock, Docket No. 16,385 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Houston [ist Dist.] Nov. 21, 1974) (unreported). For a general discussion of
agency of necessity in this context, see McKnight, Family Law, Annual Survey of Texas
Law, 30 Sw. L.J. 68, 84-85 (1976); McKnight, Family Law, Annual Survey of Texas
Law, 29 Sw. L.J. 67, 80-82 (1975); McKnight, Matrimonial Property, Annual Survey of
Texas Law, 27 Sw. L.J. 27, 3940 (1973) (wife's incapacity to contract with attorney or
anyone else under old law).
253. Carle v. Carle, 149 Tex. 469, 474, 234 S.W.2d 1002, 1005 (1950); accord,
Williams v. Williams, 537 S.W.2d 107, 111 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1976, no writ);
Cearley v. Cearley, 536 S.W.2d 96, 99 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin), rev'd on other grounds,
544 S.W.2d 661 (Tex. 1976); Cole v. Cole, 532 S.W.2d 102, 105-06 (Tex. Civ. App.Dallas 1975, no writ); Brown v. Brown, 520 S.W.2d 571, 578-79 (Tex. Civ. App.Houston [14th Dist.] 1975, no writ). See also Comment, Award of Attorney's Fees in
Divorce Litigation in Texas, 13 Hous. L. REv. 1016 (1976).
In a separate suit after divorce by an attorney whose services were terminated prior to
divorce, liability must rest on principles of contract law. See Werlein v. Bishop, Docket
No. 1173 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] Oct. 29, 1975) (unreported). See
also In re Marriage of Parr, 543 S.W.2d 433 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1976, no
writ) (suit for divorce dismissed after death of wife).
254. See Braswell v. Braswell, 476 S.W.2d 444, 446 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1972,
writ dism'd).
255. 536 S.W.2d 96 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin), rev'd on other grounds, 544 S.W.2d
661 (Tex. 1976).
256. Id. at 99.
257. 525 S.W.2d 222, 226 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1975, writ dism'd).
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Amendment to theTexas Constitution precluded the award of attorney's
fees to the wife.2" 8 The court concluded, however, that there is no constitutional bar to recovery of attorney's fees since either spouse may be

entitled to attorney's fees under Texas law.2"9 This conclusion is unexceptionable if the award of attorney's fees rests on exercise of the
court's just discretion, 6 ° but if it rests on the doctrine of necessaries,
the opinion is not so easily defended since the standard of the duty of
support under the statute26' is strikingly unequal.2 62 In Pennsylvania
such awards have been declared unconstitutional under provisions

similar to those of the Texas Constitution.2 63
Since married women now have full contractual capacity,2 6 4 there is
far less reason to burden the husband with the wife's legal fee.2 65 The
258. TEx. CONST. art. I, § 3(a) (Pamp. Supp.). See also McKnight, Matrimonial
Property, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 26 Sw. ULJ.31, 46-50 (1972); Comment, The
ERA and Texas MaritalLaw, 54 TExAs L. REV. 590 (1976).
259. Lipshy v. Lipshy, 525 S.W.2d 222, 227 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1975, writ
dism'd). For a brief discussion of an equal protection argument under the fourteenth
amendment to the Constitution of the United States, see Werlein v. Bishop, Docket No.
1173 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] Oct. 29, 1975) (unreported). See also
Comment, The ERA and Texas Marital Law, 54 TEXAS L. REv. 590, 591-92 (1976).
260: But see Comment, Division of Marital Property on Divorce: A Proposal to
Revise Section 3.63, 7 ST. MARY'S L.J. 209, 221-22 (1975).
261. TEX. FAMILY CODE ANN. § 4.02 (1975). If the second sentence of that statute
should be declared unconstitutional, however, along with the correlative provisions of
TEX. FAMILY CODE ANN. § 3.59 (1975), the duty of each spouse to support the other (if
any) would be equal and the impediment to awarding attorney's fees as a function of the
doctrine of necessaries would be removed.
262. See Comment, The ERA and Texas Marital Law, 54 TExAs L. REV. 90, 595-96
(1976).
263: See DeRosa v. DeRosa, 60 Pa. D. & C.2d 71 (1972); Kehl v. Kehl, 57 Pa. D. &
C.2d 164 (1972). Compare TEX. CONST. art. I, § 3(a) (Pamp. Supp.), with PA. CONST.
art. I, § 28. See also Wiegand v. Wiegand, 310 A.2d 426 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1973), rev'd,
337 A.2d 256 (Pa. 1975) (remanded to trial court to hear the issue because superior
court sua sponte raised the issue and exceded it's appellate jurisdiction). It is also
striking that the Texas and Pennsylvania Supreme Courts have construed their constitutional amendments similarly with respect .to 'the wife's recovery in tort in areas which
were previously restricted to recovery by the husband. See McKnight, Family Law,
Annual Survey of Texas Law, 30 Sw. L.J. 68, 70 (1976).
But see Hendricks v.
Hendricks, 535 S.W.2d 668, 670 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 1976, writ ref'd
n.r.e.) (regarding constitutionality of the alimony statutes of other states).
264. Bellah v. First Nat'l Bank, 474 S.W.2d 785, 786-87 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland
1971, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Kitten v. Vaughn, 397 S.W.2d 530, 532 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin
1965, no writ); McKnight, Matrimonial Property, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 21 Sw.
L.J. 39, 45-46 (1967).
See also United States v. Yazell, 382 U.S. 341 (1966);:
McKnight, Matrimonial Property, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 27 Sw. L.J. 27, 39-40
(1973); McKnight, Family LawO, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 24 Sw. L.J. 49, 54
(1970); McKnight, MatrimonialProperty, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 23 Sw. L.J. 44,
54 (1969); Mcknight, Matrimonial Property, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 22 Sw. L.J.
129, 142-43 (1968).
265. For recent instances of a court's refusal to award the wife some or all of
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wife is capable of entering into contractual relations with her attorney
as a principal and thus is personally responsible for such undertakings.
The court may deal with the wife's attorney's fee as an incident of division of property or leave each party to discharge his or her contractual
obligations in this regard. If third parties are involved in the proceeding, it may be necessary to determine how much of the attorney's fees
are properly attributable to the various aspects of the case.2 66 The
decision to award attorney's fees should be based upon a two-step
inquiry. Initially, the court must decide whether it will award attorney's fees as part of the division of marital property. At the second
step, the amount of the award and the manner of payment must be
determined. 2 7 The court may conclude, with respect to the first
inquiry, that there may be no justification for charging the expense of
one spouse's attorney's fees against the interest of the other spouse.2 68
In cases of no-fault divorce,2 69 the arguments advanced against an any
but equal division of the community, along with allocation of separate
property to its owner are even stronger with respect to awards of attorney's fees in such cases. This is especially true when the no-fault
proceeding is instituted by a wealthy petitioner against a respondent
who opposes the divorce.27 ° In such a situation there is very strong
reason for leaving each spouse to discharge his or her attorney's fees
out of his or her share of the marital estate. In no-fault cases as a
further alternative to ordering the husband to pay the wife's attorney's
fees (as was the case when divorce was based on fault and the old
necessaries rule prevailed), the attorney's fees of both spouses may be
treated as reasonable and necessary expenses of winding up the
her attorney's fees, see Boriack v. Boriack, 541 S.W.2d 237, 243 (Tex. Civ. App.Corpus Christi 1976, writ dism'd); Hopkins v Hopkins, 540 S.W.2d 783, 788 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Corpus Christi 1976, no writ).
266. See Hopkins v. Hopkins, 539 S.W.2d 242, 249 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth
1976, no writ).
267. McKnight, Family Law, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 30 Sw. L.J. 68, 84-85
(1976).
268. In Cooper v. Cooper, 513 S.W.2d 229 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [Ist Dist.]

1974, no writ), where both spouses had substantial separate estates, as well as a
substantial community estate, the court suggested there might be no justification for
charging the wife's attorney's fees against the husband's marital property interest. Id. at
234.
269. See text accompanying notes 117-20 supra; In re Williams, 199 N.W.2d 339, 348

(Iowa 1972); McKnight, Matrimonial Property, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 27 Sw.
L.J. 27, 36-37, 39-40 (1973). See also McKnight, Family Law, Annual Survey of Texas
Law, 29 Sw. L.J. 67, 80 (1975).
270. McKnight, Family Law, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 29 Sw. L.J. 67, 81
(1975).
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marriage and thus payable from the community estate prior to its division.2 7 ' Further, since the award of attorney's fees is merely an incident in the general division of property, it was pointed out by one court
that in dividing property the trial court must always be mindful of the
fact that the husband is liable for his own attorney's fees.2 72 With
respect to contingent fees (as in the case of fixed fees), the wife as
maker of the contract with her attorney is clearly bound as a principal.
It is an open question, however, whether the husband should be bound
against his interest on the wife's contingent fee contract.2 73 It is a question that is also distinct from that of fitting the award for the wife's attorney's fees into the context of the contingent fee contract entered into
between the wife and her attorney.
For the determination of attorney's fees and resolving any disputes
that may arise from such agreements, attorneys who participate in the
trial, although not actual parties to the suits, are bound by a settlement
agreement in which the attorney's fees are fixed. 74 In Carter v.
Leiter2 75 the wife's attorneys were actual parties to the suit for divorce
and were awarded a joint and several judgment of their fees against
the husband and the wife. 270 In the attorneys' subsequent suit against
271. See McKnight, Family Law, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 30 Sw. L.J. 68, 85
(1976); McKnight, Family Law, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 29 Sw. L.J. 67, 81
(1975).
Such an approach would tend to ensure more adequate compensation for
the husband's counsel, while also keeping the wife's attorney's fees within reasonable
bounds.
272. Cooper v. Cooper, 513 S.W.2d 229, 235 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.]
1974, no writ).
273. No appellate court in Texas has addressed itself to the pernicious aspects of
contingent fees in divorce matters, but the Ethical Considerations appended to the
Disciplinary Rules of The State Bar of Texas clearly state that "[blecause of the human
relationship involved and the unique character of the proceedings, contingent fee
arrangements in domestic relation cases are rarely justified." State Bar of Texas, Rules
and Code of Professional Responsibility; EC 2-20 (1973). But see Moody v. Sondock,
Docket No. 16,385 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] Nov. 21, 1974) (unreported)
(suit by attorney whose services had been terminated by wife on reconciliation with
husband).
But chicanery between ex-spouses to defeat a court order to
pay attorney's fees must
be effectively restrained. Myers v. Myers, 515 S.W.2d 334, 334-35 (Tex. Civ. App.Houston [ist Dist.] 1974, writ dism'd), noted in McKnight, Family Law, Annual Survey
of Texas Law, 29 Sw. L.J. 67, 82-83 (1975).
274. Mullinax, Wells, Mauzy & Collins v. Dawson, 478 S.W.2d 121, 122-23 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Dallas 1972, writ ref'd n.r.e.), discussed in McKnight, Matrimonial Property,
Annual Survey of Texas Law, 27 Sw. L.J. 27, 40 (1973). But in Ex parte Harvill, 415
S.W.2d 174 (Tex. 1967), an enjoined attorney for a third party defendant in a divorce
proceeding was held not to be a party for purposes of citation for contempt. Id. at 177.
But see Tax. R. Crv. P. 683; Ex parte Browne, 543 S.W.2d 82, 85 (Tex. 1976). See also
Ex parte Wright, 538 S.W.2d 483 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1976, no writ).
275. 476 S.W.2d 461 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1972, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
276. Id. at 462. The Ethics Committee of the State Bar of Texas has since issued an

Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2022

47

St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 8 [2022], No. 3, Art. 2

ST. MARY'S LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 8:413

thehusband -for recovery of the fees, the court -concluded that the di-

vorce court's decree was res judicata to the subsequent suit. 27 7 In some
instances a money judgment may be awarded to an attorney for his
fee.2 7 s But a mere direction on the part of the divorce court that both

spouses will pay their own attorney's fees does not constitute a judgment'in favor of the attorneys.27 9 If an award for only a portion of
the wife's attorney's fees is made against the husband, in a subsequent
suit the attorney may recover the balance of his fee from the ex-wife.28 °

While the process of contempt is a last resort in payment of attorney's
fees in matters of child support, it is not available for enforcement of
attorney's fees awarded on divorce. 281 A money judgment, however,
2 2
may be granted to one of the spouses to cover the attorney's fees.
The' decision to award attorney's fees is made by the divorce

judge. 2 3 In fixing the amount of the fee, evidence must be heard on
28
the value of the services rendered and a finding made on that basis; 1
opinion that it is improper for a lawyer to secure a judgment for legal fees against his
client in the same suit as that in which he is representing that client. State Bar of
Texas, Comm. on Interpretation of the Code of Professional Responsibility, opinion 374
(1974).
277. Carter v. Leiter, 476 S.W.2d 461, 462 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1972, writ ref'd
n.r.e.). In Merrell v. Merrell, 527 S.W.2d 250 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1975, writ ref'd
n.r.e.), a spouse's former attorney intervened in the divorce proceeding to recover his fee
after having filed a separate suit for the same purpose. The spouse's plea in abatement
was sustained as to the suit in intervention. Id. at 253. See also Bonilla v. Parr, S.W.2d - (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1976, no writ); Dickson v. McWilliams, 543
S.W.2d 868 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1976, no writ).
278. Goldberg v. Goldberg, 392 S.W.2d 168, 170-71 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth
1965, no writ). The wife's attorneys were actual parties to the proceeding by virtue of
the fact that they had sought injunctive relief against the husband and another.
279. Douthit v. Anderson, 521 S.W.2d 127, 130 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1975, no
writ).
280. Masters v. Stair, 518 S.W.2d 439, 441 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1975, no
writ), discussed in McKnight, Family Law, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 29 Sw. L.J. 67,
82 (1975), along with an earlier inconclusive appeal in the same case. Presumably the
divorce court's order was ambiguous and therefore could not constitute an order to the
wife to pay the amount in addition to that which the husband was ordered to pay.
281. See Wallace v. Briggs, 162 Tex. 485, 488-89, 348 S.W.2d 523, 525-26 (1961)
(dictum). See also note 350 infra.
282. Brunel) v. Brunell, 494 S.W.2d 621, 623 (Tex Civ. App.-Dallas 1973, no writ).
But a lien may not be put on a homestead for their payment. Id. at 623. See also
Peterson v. Peterson, 502 S.W.2d 178 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 1973, no
writ).
283. Prewitt v. Prewitt, 459 S.W.2d 720, 722-23 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1970, no
writ); see Smith, Family Law, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 26 Sw. L.J. 51, 54 (1972).
284. Hopkins v. Hopkins, 539 S.W.2d 242, 249 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1976,
no writ); Huntley v; Huntley, 512 S.W.2d 767, 771 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1974, no
writ). In Reaney v. Reaney, 505 S.W.2d 338, 341 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1974, no
writ), there presumably was evidence in the record sustaining the value of the attorney's
time and services. See Webster v. Webster, 442 SW.2d 786 (Tex. Civ. App.-San
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judicial notice of minimum fee schedules or the judge's past experience
in such matters is insufficient to establish the fee.

The standard that

is applied in fixing the fee is that of reasonableness under the circumstances.2" 5 Before. the disabilities of coverture were removed, the wife
contracted for attorney's fee as her husband's agent of necessity. This
resulted in the wife's attorney's fee, as a "necessary", being fixed in a

reasonable amount in order to protect the principal from any imposition
that might have been perpetrated on the agent. But today, the judicial
determination of a reasonable amount is to achieve an equitable

division of the marital property.2" 6

To preclude disputes between the attorney and his client subsequent

to divorce, it is essential that the attorney reach a firm fee arrangement

with his client at the beginning of the suit.28 7 The client should be

advised that the attorney's fees may include fees for appraisers,

actuaries, accountants, and other experts in the capacity of witnesses.288
Finally, the attorney must be careful in drafting the pleadings to state

the prayer for attorney's fees in sufficiently general terms so that
necessary appeal costs will be included.

F.

9

Disputes Involving Third Persons

A property dispute between the spouses may also affect the

interests of third persons. In order to deal conclusively with all the
rights of others, divorce courts290 may join the third persons inAntonio 1969, no writ). See also Meshwert v. Meshwert, 543 S.W.2d 877 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Beaumont 1976, writ granted); Ramirez v. Ramirez, Docket No. 1173 (Tex. Civ.
App.-San Antonio, Dec. 4, 1974) (unreported), noted in TEX. LAw. WEEKLY DIG. Vol.
11, No. 49, at 3 (Dec. 18, 1974); Annot., 59 A.L.R.3d 152 ('1974).
285. For a not altogether current approach, see Boenker v. Boenker, 405 S.W.2d 843,
849 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1966, writ dism'd); cf. Hale v. Hale, 336 S.W.2d 934, 936
(Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1960, no writ).
• 286. McKnight, Family Law, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 29 Sw. L.J. 67, 81 n.112
(1975). But such an amount is also limited by the amount agreed between the wife and
her attorney. Carson v. Carson, 528 S.W.2d 308, 309 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1975, no
writ).
287. See McKnight, Family Law, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 29 Sw. L.J. 67, 82
(1975).
. 288. See Currie v. Currie, 5,18 S.W.2d 386, 390-91 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio
1974, writ dism'd). For comments on a receiver's commission, see Huntley v. Huntley,
512 S.W.2d 767, 770 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1974, no writ).
289. See Carson v. Carson, 528 S.W.2d 308, 309 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1975, no
writ), discussed in McKnight, Family Law, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 30 Sw. L.J. 68,
85 (1976). In Dietz v. Dietz, 540 S.W.2d 418, 422 (Tex. Civ, App.-El Paso 1976, no
writ), the appellate court affirmed the trial court's award of attorney's fees without
prejudice to the appellant in seeking further attorney's fees on remand.
290.. Courts of special jurisdiction may adjudicate disputes involving third parties in
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volved. 29 ' In some instances the venue statute may make effective
adjudication of these rights impossible, 292 but the third party may waive
his objection to venue by intervening or by instituting an original proceeding. 293 The severance of disputes involving third persons may
also result in defeating the purposes of the joinder.294
Unless they control or participate in the proceeding, third persons
are not bound by the divorce decree; 295 however, non-parties who are
not bound by the judgment may still be factually prejudiced. A
spouse's partner may be affected by the terms of a divorce decree as
a practical matter,296 and in anticipation of such a problem, the partners
may seek dissolution of the partnership. 97 A minor child's beneficial
interests in a fund of which a spouse is trustee cannot be affected without joinder of the child. 298 But constructive fraud in the creation of
a trust for a child may be put in issue for the purpose of adjusting interests in other property without joinder of the beneficiary as a party.299
But minor children are parties to the consolidated suit affecting the
parent-child relationship under section 3.55 of the Family Code."' 0
suits for divorce. Hopkins v. Hopkins, 539 S.W.2d 242, 246 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort
Worth 1976, no writ); McKnight, Matrimonial Property, Annual Survey of Texas Law,
22 Sw. L.J. 129, 139-40 (1968).
291. See Couch Mortgage Co. v. Hughes, 536 S.W.2d 70, 72 (Tex. Civ. App.Houston [1st Dist.] 1976, no writ).
292. See TEX. REv. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 1995(16) (Supp. 1976); Schulz v. Schulz,,
478 S.W.2d 239, 244 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1972, no writ).
293. Cf. May v. Little, 473 S.W.2d 632, 633-34 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1971, writ
ref'd n.r.e.) (plaintiff waived right to be sued in county of residence where intervention
action arose out of action initiated by him).
294. For the kinds of disputes which might have been consolidated had they been
initiated simultaneously, see Teas v. Teas, 469 S.W.2d 918 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1971,
no writ) (divorce); Teas v. Republic Nat'l Bank, 460 S.W.2d 233 (Tex. Civ. App.Dallas 1970, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (suits by wife to set aside fraudulent conveyances),
commented on in McKnight & Raggio, Family Law, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 25
Sw. L.J. 34, 46-47 (1971).
295. See Benson v. Wanda Petroleum Co., 468 S.W.2d 361, 363 (Tex. 1971)
(judgment binds only those who are'either parties to suit or in privity with party).
See generally Cooper v. Texas Gulf Indus., Inc., 513 S.W.2d 200 (Tex. 1974); Hazard,
Indispensable Party: The Historical Origin of a Procedural Phantom, 61 COLUM. L.
REV. 1254 (1961); Note, 52 TEXAs L. REV. 1410 (1974).
296. See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6132b, §§ 27, 32(2) (1970).
297. See Gaines v. Gaines, 519 S.W.2d 694, 696-97 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st
Dist.] 1975, no writ); McKnight, Family Law, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 30 Sw. L.J.
68, 88 (1976).
298. See Ex parte Fleming, 532 S.W.2d 122, 123 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1975, no
writ)' (semble).
299. See In re Marriage of McCurdy, 489 S.W.2d 712, 717-18 (Tex. Civ. App.Amarillo 1973, writ dism'd), discussed in McKnight, Family Law, Annual Survey of
Texas Law, 28 Sw. L.J. 66, 75 n.65 (1974).
300. TEx. FAMILY CODE ANN. § 3.55 (1975). See McKnight, Commentary on the
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Further, third parties must be joined for the purpose of setting aside
a fraudulent transfer allegedly made by a spouse. 01
Intervention is an effective method for a third person to protect his
rights. He may intervene for any number of reasons, but the most

common is to estabish a debt owed by one of the spouses.
Intervention must be timely.303

02

The intervening creditor does not

jeopardize his standing as a contractual creditor since the divorce court
lacks the power to absolve either spouse of contractual liability.30 4 Nor
is the creditor jeopardized by his failure to intervene as long as the
former community estate is not dissipated, for it has long been estab-

lished that a division of marital property on divorce does not prejudice
the rights of creditors to reach property partitioned to the noncontracting spouse.3 0 5
Texas Family Code, Title 1, 5 TEX. TECH L. REV. 281, 332-33 (1974).

See also Becknal

v. Atwood, 518 S.W.2d 593 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1975, no writ), discussed in
McKnight, Family Law, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 30 Sw. L.J. 68, 89-90 (1976).
301. Gabriel v. Mendez, 517 S.W.2d 447, 449 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1974,
writ ref'd n.r.e.). See also Davis, Hiding, Diverting and Snarling Marital Assets in
Anticipation of Divorce-And What Can Be Done About It in INSTITUTE ON TEXAS
FAMILY LAW AND COMMUNITY PROPERTY 73 (J. McKnight ed. 1973). With respect to
the burden of proving a community interest when property stands in the name of, or is
possessed by, the other spouse or a third person, see McGee v. McGee, 537 S.W.2d 94,
96 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1976, no writ); Harris v. Harris, 174 S.W.2d 996, 999
(Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1943, no writ). With respect to the quantum of proof, see
Newland v. Newland, 529 S.W.2d 105, 107 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1975, writ
dism'd), discussed in McKnight, Family Law, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 30 Sw. L.J.

68, 77 (1976).
302. See Broadway Drug Store v. Trowbridge, 435 S.W.2d 268, 270 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1968, no writ). See also note 182 supra and notes 361-66
infra and accompanying text. In Cockerham v. Cockerham, 527 S.W.2d 162, 164 (Tex.
1975), a spouse's trustee in bankruptcy intervened to assert liability of marital assets
controlled by the other spouse, but there was no discussion of the trustee's standing to
intervene.
303. See Roberson v. Roberson, 420 S.W.2d 495, 499 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston
[14th Dist.] 1967, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (attempted intervention on part of alleged putative
wife of husband), discussed in McKnight, Matrimonial Property, Annual Survey of
See also McKnight & Dorsaneo,
Texas Law, 22 Sw. L.J. 129, 139-40 n.55 (1968).
Management and Liability of Community Property and Joinder of Spouses in Suits in
INSTITUTE ON TEXAS FAMILY LAW

F-1, F-10 to F-20 (State Bar of Texas 1976) (joinder

of parties generally under TEX. R. Clv. P. 39); McKnight, Family Law, Annual Survey
of Texas Law, 29 Sw. L.J. 67, 86-87 (1975).
304. Broadway Drug Store v. Trowbridge, 435 S.W.2d 268, 270 (Tex. Civ. App.Houston [14th Dist.] 1968, no writ). In attempting to show that a former husband is
liable for his ex-wife's purchase of necessaries during their marriage, their divorce
judgment is not admissible as a prior inconsistent statement to impeach the ex-wife's
testimony when the judgment did not reflect any statements of the wife, did not contain
any statements of her attorney at the prior trial, and the attorney was not called as a
witness. Gabel v. Blackburn Operating Corp., 442 S.W.2d 818, 819 (Tex. Civ. App.-,
Amarillo 1969, no writ).
305. Boyd v. Ghent, 93 Tex. 543, 547-48, 57 S.W. 25, 26 (1900); Dean v. First Nat'l
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PROCEEDINGS AFTER JUDGMENT

Finality of Decree and OrdersPending Appeal
A simple declaration of dissolution of the marriage without a recital
for whom and against whom it is ordered constitutes a divorce on nofault grounds.3 0 6 This no-fault decree is sufficient to support a division
of the marital property. When problems of division are difficult, the
court may grant an interlocutory dissolution of the marriage as peti-

tioned but may reserve judgment on property division before entering
its judgment on all matters in issue. 07 The judgment becomes final
and subject to appeal thirty days after rendition; 0 8 however, if circumstances warrant, the court on its own motion may withdraw or alter the
judgment within this thirty-day period. 0 9 Nevertheless, in Dunn v.
Bank, 494 S.W.2d 222, 226 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.); First Nat'l
Bank v. Hickman, 89 S.W.2d 838, 843 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1935, writ ref'd);
Grandjean v. Runke, 39 S.W. 945, 946 (Tex. Civ. App. 1897, no writ); McKnight,
Management, Control and Liability of Marital Property in TEXAS FAMILY LAW &
COMMUNITY PROPERTY 159, 180-82 (J. McKnight ed. 1975); McKnight, Family Law,
Annual Survey of Texas Law, 28 Sw. L.J. 66, 82 (1974). But see note 364 infra.
306. Law v. Law, 517 S.W.2d 379, 382-83 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1974, writ
dism'd); Blancas v. Blancas, 495 S.W.2d 597, 602 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1973, no
writ). But see TEx. R. Crv. P. 306.
307. Spiller v. Spiller, 535 S.W.2d 683, 684 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1976, writ
dism'd); Galvan v. Galvan, 534 S.W.2d 398, 399 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1976, writ
dism'd).
In Burleson v. Burleson, 419 S.W.2d 412 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1967,
no writ), after the husband filed suit for divorce in Texas, the wife brought suit in
Nevada. The petition was granted without any division of marital property. With the
sole issue of property division before it, the court apparently made a partition rather
than an equitable division on divorce. Id. at 416-17. It may be relevant that the husband had died in the meantime. Carter v. Burleson, 439 S.W.2d 381, 383 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1969, no writ). The earlier case is discussed in McKnight,
Matrimonial Property, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 22 Sw. L.J. 129, 138 n.50 (1968);
Rasor, Family Law, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 23 Sw. L.J. 60, 68 (1969); VanDercreek, Texas Civil Procedure, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 22 Sw. L.J. 174, 178
(1968), and both cases, in McKnight, Family Law, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 24
Sw. L.J. 49, 49-50 (1970). See also Bonilla v. Parr, - S.W.2d - (Tex. Civ. App.San Antonio 1976, no writ).
308. TEX. R. Crv. P. 329b (6); Ex parte Wagley, 530 S.W.2d 609, 611 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1975, no writ). In Scott v. Scott, 408 S.W.2d 135 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1966, writ dism'd), the appellate court ruled that the trial court's
alteration-of its decree to vest the wife with title to the cash surrender value of an
insurance policy on the husband's life, rather than a judgment for its value, involved a
matter of substance which could not be corrected by a nunc pro tunc order after the
decree became final. Id. at 136. A clerical error may, however, be corrected after the
judgment becomes final. Holway v. Holway, 506 S.W.2d 643, 646 (Tex. Civ. App.-El
Paso 1974, no writ).
309. See Law v. Law, 517 S.W.2d 379, 381 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1974, writ
dism'd), discussed in McKnight, Family Law, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 29 Sw. L.J.
67, 73-74 (1975). See also Means v. Means, 535 S.W.2d 911 (Tex. Civ. App.Amarillo 1976, no writ).
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Dunn, 1 ' where the husband died two days after the trial judge made

an oral award of divorce in favor of the wife and a division of the property, the supreme court held that the wife's motion to dismiss was properly overruled. 311 Pending appeal, further orders of the court are
necessary with respect to the subject matter of some temporary
orders." 2 An order granting a new trial, for example, does not automatically continue temporary alimony.8"8 On the other hand, it has
been concluded that an agreed order with respect to management of

marital property was not subject to change by the trial court.3 14
Direct and CollateralAttacks

Dissatisfaction with the division of property on divorce can result in
a direct attack on the judgment in three ways: an appeal from the
order of the trial court by alleging an error of law or abuse of discre310. 439 S.W.2d 830 (Tex. 1969), discussed in McKnight & Raggio, Family Law,
Annual Survey of Texas Law, 25 Sw. L.J. 34, 36 (1971). But see Deen v. Deen, 530
S.W.2d 913 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1975, no writ), discussed in McKnight,
Family Law, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 30 Sw. L.J. 68, 72-73 (1976), where the
husband also died before final disposition of the matter, but the wife was ultimately
successful in setting aside the husband's invalid default judgment for divorce. 530 S.W.2d
at 917. Hence, the wife's property rights were those of a widow unaffected by the
decree. Earlier proceedings in the same matter are discussed in McKnight, Family Law,
Annual Survey of Texas Law, 29 Sw. L.J. 67, 72-73 (1975). If, however, a spouse dies
while the divorce proceeding is pending, the court loses its power to make a discretionary
division of marital property. Pritchard v. Tuttle, 534 S.W.2d 946, 950 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Amarillo 1976, no writ).
With respect to the court's power to award attorney's fees after termination of a
divorce proceeding as a result of the death of a party, see Bonilla v. Parr, - S.W.2d -,
(Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1976, no writ); In re Marriage of Parr, 543 S.W.2d
433, 435 (Tex. Civ. App.--Corpus Christi 1976, no writ).
311. Dunn v. Dunn, 439 S.W.2d 830, 833-34 (Tex. 1969); TEx. R. CIV. P. 164.
In Echols v. Austron, Inc., 529 S.W.2d 840 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1975, writ ref'd
n.r.e.), the court held that a bonus paid to a spouse by his employer after rendition of
judgment, but before entry thereof, was not community property since "the rights of the
parties were fixed as of the time of the rendition of the judgment .... ." Id. at 846.
312. See Carson v. Carson, 528 S.W.2d 308, 309 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1975, no
writ), discussed in McKnight, Family Law, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 30 Sw. L.J. 68,
85 (1976) (pleadings sufficient to support an order for attorney's fees for appeal); Ex
parte Thompson, 510 S.W.2d 165, 168 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1974, no writ) (temporary alimony).
313. Ex parte Thompson, 510 S.W.2d 165, 168 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1974, no
writ).
314. Spiller v. Spiller, 535 S.W.2d 683, 685-86 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1976), writ
dism'd); Spiller v. Sherrill, 518 S.W.2d 268, 272-73 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1974,
no writ). The final judgment with respect to property disposition was, of course, an
appealable order. A temporary order with respect to marital property management not
involving injunctive relief is not an appealable order under article 4662, which authorizes
appeals from orders granting temporary injunctions. Dickson v. Dickson, 516 S.W.2d
28, 30 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1974, no writ); TEX. Rav. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4662
(1952).
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tion 815 a writ of error,8 16 or a bill of review."' 7 With respect to the
state. of' the record for purposes of appeal, a trial court sitting without
a jury is only required to make specific fact findings on ultimate, controlling issues."" If a party to a nonjury trial anticipates raising an
issue on appeal with respect to abuse of discretion in dividing the com-

munity estate, he should request a finding of fact as to the value of
the community estate. In Caldwell v. Caldwel119 the trial court failed
to make such a finding and merely granted the husband a specific dollar
amount as his portion of the community property. The appellate court
held that there was no error in the trial court's failure to find the total
value of the community because the husband, under rule 297 of the

Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, waived his right to such a finding by
not demanding it.820 Furthermore, if a case is withdrawn from the
jury, the trial court may not make such findings. 2 '
If the appellant was not present at the trial, certain responsibilities
315. See Currie v. Currie, 518 S.W.2d 386, 388 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1974,
writ dism'd). It was recently held that an intermediate appellate court may not render
judgment contrary to that of the trial court with respect to division of property without
remand. McKnight v. McKnight, 543 S.W.2d 863, 866 (Tex. 1976), rev'g, 535 S.W.2d
658, 661-62 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1976). The court in McKnight was careful to
distinguish remittitur cases such as Dietz v. Dietz, 540 S.W.2d 418, 420-21 (Tex. Civ.
App.-El Paso 1976, no writ), and Cooper v. Cooper, 513 S.W.2d 229 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 1974, no writ). But see Horlock v. Horlock, 533 S.W.2d 52
(Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1975, writ dism'd).
1 316. TEx. REv. Crv. STAT. ANN. arts. 2249, 2249a (1971); see Smith v. Smith, 535
S.W.2d 380, 383-84 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1976, writ granted); Roberts v. Roberts,
525 S.W.2d 268 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1975, no writ). In Roberts a default judgment
was entered against the wife who had failed to appear. The default, however, was
entered two days prior to the date on which the wife was cited to answer. The judgment
was set aside since default (or waiver of jury trial) cannot occur prior to the answer date.
Id. at 270. See also American Motorists Ins. Co. v. Box,, 531 S.W.2d 407, 410 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Tyler 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (explanation of difference between bill of review and writ-of error).
317. For examples of bills of review alleging the secreting of assets, see McFarland v.
Reynolds, 513 S.W.2d 620, 624-25 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1974, no writ);
Raney v. Mack, 504 S.W.2d 527, 533 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1973, no writ). A
party cannot seek rescission of an agreement, such as the one in McFarland, following
divorce without first offering to restore the benefits received under it or making a
sufficient explanation for failure to do so. Guion v. Guion, 475 S.W.2d 865, 869 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Dallas 1971, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
318. Goren v. Goren, 531 S.W.2d 897, 901 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [lst Dist.]
1975, writ dism'd).
319. 423 S.W.2d 140 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1967, no writ).
320. Id. at 142. See also Williams v. Williams, 537 S.W.2d 107, 111 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Tyler 1976, no writ). With respect to jury trials under TEX. R. Civ. P. 296, see
Boriack v. Borihck, 541 S.W.2d 237, 242 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1976, writ
dism'd).
321. See Spiller v. Spiller, 535 S.W.2d 683, 685 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1976, writ
dism'd).
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-with respect to the record devolved upon the appellee. In cases of
citation by publication it is very clearS22 that the parties must prepare
a: narrative statement of, the evidence for the record. In.Smith v.
Smith 2 ' the appellant (by way of writ of error) had not appeared at
the trial and a court reporter had not been present to record the evi-

dence.324 The appellee had not prepared a narrative of the evidence.
The appellant had been successful in his efforts to procure a statement

of the evidence from the judge who was unable to recollect it. The
Supreme Court of Texas held that the appellant who through no fault
of his own was unable to provide the record needed for the appeal was

3 25
entitled to a new trial.
But in other instances a successful appeal may be precluded. First, a
party is estopped to prosecute an appeal when he has enjoyed the fruits
of the property division.3 26 Second, the judgment of a trial court ordinarily will not be set aside for an attorney's inattention to his client's
8 27

affairs.

* 322. See McCarthy v. Jesperson, 527 S.W.2d 825, 826 (Tex. -Civ. App.-El Paso
1975, no writ); TEx. R. Civ. P. 244.
323. 544 S.W.2d 121 (Tex. 1976), rev'g 535 S.W.2d 380 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont
1976). The appellant had, nevertheless, filed an answer.
324. Effective May 27, 1975,. TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 2324 (Supp. 1976)
was amended to require a court reporter at a hearing only on request. See Bledsoe v.
Black, 535 S.W.2d 795, 796 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1976, no writ); Mills v. Mills,
:535 S.W.2d 713, 715 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland ;1976, no writ) (both cases involving
the parent-child relationship).
325. Smith v. Smith, 544 S.W.2d 121, 123 (Tex. 1976); Morgan Express, Inc. v.
Elizabeth-Perkins, Inc., 525 S.W.2d 312 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1975, writ ref'd) (answer not filed); Dugie v. Dugie, 511 S.W.2d 623 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1974,
no writ) (answer not filed, but appellant agreed to continuance and was advised of trial
setting). But see Englander Co. v. Kennedy, 428 S.W.2d 806, 807 (Tex. 1968); Scoggins v. Scoggins, 531 S.W.2d 245, 247 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1975, no writ) (question
whether record contained a statement of facts); Ducoff, v. Ducoff, 523 S.W.2d 264, 267
(Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1975, no writ) (appellant present at trial but
no reporter); Brown v. Brown, 520 S.W.2d 571 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
1975, no writ) (appellant not present at trial but statement of evidence and findings of
fact prepared by judge). See also Schwartz v. Jefferson, 520 S.W.2d 881, 885 (Tex.
,1975) (contempt an issue).
326. Carle v. Carle, 149 Tex. 469, 472, 234 S.W.2d 1002, 1004 (1950); McCartney v.
Mead, 541 S.W.2d 202, 205 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1976, no writ); Roye
v. Roye, 531 S.W.2d 242, 244 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1975, no writ); Trader v. Trader,
531 S.W.2d 189, 190-91 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1975, writ dism'd); cf. McFarland v. Reynolds, 513 S.W.2d 620, 623 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1974, no writ)
(bill of review). In Girard v. Girard, 521 S.W.2d 714 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st
Dist.] 1975, no writ), a reimbursement case, it was concluded that the spouse in whose
favor the trial court erred had no basis for complaint on appeal. Id. at 718. See also
Williams v. Williams, 537 S.W.2d 107 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1976, no writ); Spiller v.
Spiller, 535 S.W.2d 683 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1976, writ dism'd); Newland. v.
Newland,
529 S.W.2d 105 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1975, writ dism'd).
327.' See
Law v. Law, 517 S.W.2d 379, 381 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Austin 1974, writ
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The grounds for presenting an equitable bill of review8'2 are a meri-

torious defense to the cause of action;8 29 fraud, accident, or wrongful act of the other party in preventing the presentation of a defense
to the action;"' ° and lack of fault or negligence on the part of the
petitioner. 3 1 In McFarland v. Reynolds3 2 the court was sharply
divided with respect to the last element.

The ex-wife, who had

entered into an agreed judgment in 'the divorce action, brought her bill
of review to set aside all matters relating to the division of property,
but not the divorce itself. Her contention was that her agreement to
the judgment had been procured by the husband's fraudulent misrepresentation with respect to the assets and liabilities of the community
estate. A majority of the appellate court concluded that the wife's bill
of review should have been granted, but the dissenting judge discerned
fraud and negligence on her part. 3 3 No point was made with respect to

the extent to which the wife had acted on advice of counsel during the
negotiations with her husband.

In Crispin v. Crispin,83 4 a somewhat

similar case, at least part of the petitioner's predicament seems attributable to her failure to employ counsel.

It was demonstrated that the

ex-wife was quite familiar with such proceedings and fully capable of
procuring counsel. The court concluded that she was negligent in failing to make an accurate determination of the value of the property in
dism'd); Leonard v. Leonard, 512 S.W.2d 771, 773 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi
1974, writ dism'd); Swearingen v. Swearingen, 487 S.W.2d 784, 787 (Tex. Civ. App.San Antonio 1972, writ dism'd) (bill of review).
328. The equitable bill of review should not be confused with the statutory bill of
review which is a more restrictive procedural device available only to a defendant
allegedly served with process by publication. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 329. For a discussion
of the grounds for a statutory bill of review, see McCarthy v. Jesperson, 527 S.W.2d 825,
826-27 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1975, no writ).
329. See Alexander v. Hagedorn, 148 Tex. 565, 568, 226 S.W.2d 996, 998 (1950).
See also Ragsdale v. Ragsdale, 520 S.W.2d 839 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1975, no
writ).
330. McFarland v. Reynolds, 513 S.W.2d 620, 623 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi
1974, no writ). The former wife succeeded in her proceeding for a bill of review to set
aside a judgment incorporating an agreed judgment with respect to property, which
agreement was procured by the husband by fraudulent representations as to the value of
the community estate and outstanding debts for which it was liable.
331. Alexander v. Hagedorn, 148 Tex. 565, 569, 226 S.W.2d 996, 998 (1950);
Swearingen v. Swearingen, 487 S.W.2d 784, 786 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1972, writ
dism'd). But see Texas Indus., Inc. v. Sanchez, 525 S.W.2d 870 (Tex. 1975); Deen v.
Deen, 530 S.W.2d 913 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1975, no writ), discussed in
McKnight, Family Law, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 30 Sw. L.J. 68, 72-73 (1976).
332. 513 S.W.2d 620 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1974, no writ).
333. Id. at 628 (dissenting opinion). See also Boley v. Boley, 506 S.W.2d 934 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1974, no writ).
334. 529 S.W.2d 310 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1975, nu writ) (no fraud on part of
respondent was demonstrated).
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question.8 85 But oversights of counsel, which may occur in instances
such as these, are usually imputed to the client and result in the denial
of the bill of review.3" 6
A collateral attack may be made upon a judgment for division of
marital property for lack of jurisdiction over the person or the subject
matter.8 1 7 Estabrook v. Wise 3 8 was a dispute involving subject matter
jurisdiction over foreign realty, which had not been dealt with by the
divorce court.8 3 The court of civil appeals disagreed with respect to
whether the'thrust of the suit was in rem or in personam. 4 ° In those
rare instances when the issue has been presented to them, Texas appellate courts have denied the power of Texas divorce courts to characterize or divide foreign realty.8 41 Still, a Texas divorce court has considered the value of realty acquired in another jurisdiction in making an
equitable division of marital property, 42 though in granting in personam relief questions of title under foreign law are nonetheless to be
reckoned with.848 But the Texas Supreme Court has, as a matter of
comity, given effect to an in personam order of a foreign court with
335. Id. at 314-15.
336. Swearingen v. Swearingen, 487 S.W.2d 784, 787 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio
1972, writ dism'd), discussed in McKnight, Family Law, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 28
Sw. L.J. 66, 70 (1974), along with Blancas v. Blancas, 495 S.W.2d 597 (Tex. Civ. App.
-Texarkana 1973, no writ).
337. See Hodges, Collateral Attacks on Judgments, 41 TExAs L. REv. 163, 166-67
(1962). A collateral attack is ordinarily not an appropriate means of questioning
characterization of marital property divided on divorce. See Ex parte Sutherland, 526
S.W.2d 536, 538-39 (Tex. 1975). Nor is it an appropriate means of contesting the
validity of a property settlement agreement incorporated in a divorce decree. Peddicord
v. Peddicord, 522 S.W.2d 266, 267 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.);
Gregory v. Gregory, 404 S.W.2d 657, 659 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1966, writ ref'd
n.r.e.).
338. 506 S.W.2d 248 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler), writ dism'd as moot per curiam, 519
S.W.2d 632 (Tex. 1974).
339. Id. at 249.
340. Id. at 253.
341. Kaherl v. Kaherl, 357 S.W.2d 622 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1962, no writ)
(division on divorce); Moor v. Moor, 255 S.W. 231 (Tex. Civ. App. 1900, writ denied)
(division after divorce).
342. Deger v. Deger, 526 S.W.2d 272, 274 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1975, no writ);
Walker v. Walker, 231 S.W.2d 905, 906 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1950, no writ).
With respect to characterization of personal property acquired by Texans in another
jurisdiction, see In re Perry, 480 S.W.2d 893 (Mo. 1972), noted in McKnight, Matrimonial Property, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 27 Sw. L.J. 27, 32 (1973); Moor v. Moor,
63 S.W. 347, 351 (Tex. Civ. App. 1901, writ ref'd); cf. Tirado v. Tirado, 357 S.W.2d 468
(Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1962, writ dism'd) (Texans' interest in foreign realty in the
form of personalty).
343. See Estabrook v. Wise, 506 S.W.2d 248, 253 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler) (dissenting opinion), dism'd as moot per curiam, 519 S.W.2d 632 (Tex. 1974).
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respect to Texas realty, 844 and a foreign court might give a Texas order
the same treatment with regard to realty within its jurisdiction.
Enforcement

Money judgments awarded to achieve an equitable division of
property may be enforced by execution, and liens may be perfected and

foreclosed unless the realty on which they are to be imposed has
become exempt. In Spence v. Spence3" the husband was awarded a
tract of rural land and the wife was awarded a money judgment of
$40,000 against him to balance their interests. After the divorce the
former husband remarried and filed a voluntary designation of home-

stead in the county in which the rural property was located. 46 The
first wife then sought to impose and foreclose a lien on the tract to
344. McElreath v. McElreath, 162 Tex. 190, 195, 345 S.W.2d 722, 725 (1961). See
also Allis v. Allis, 378 F.2d 721 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 953 (1967), noted in
McKnight, Matrimonial Property, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 22 Sw. L.J. 129, 138
n.50 (1968); Forman v. Forman, 496 S.W.2d 243 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 1973, no writ), noted in McKnight, Family Law, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 28
Sw. L.J. 66, 75 (1974).
Cole v. Lee, 435 S.W.2d 283 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1968, writ dism'd), involved a
dispute between foreign ex-spouses with respect to a property settlement agreement
involving, inter alia, Texas realty. The Dallas Court of Civil Appeals concluded that the
settlement should first be rescinded before, an action for recovery of realty could be
brought, and the proper forum for rescission of the settlement contract under the forum
non conveniens doctrine was that of the domicile of the parties. Id. at 288. See
McKnight, Matrimonial Property, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 23 Sw. L.J. 44, 56-57
(1969).
For characterization of Texas realty acquired by out of state residents, see McKnight,
Matrimonial Property, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 22 Sw. L.J. 129, 129-30 (1968),
and authorities there cited. See also Patterson v. Metzing, 424 S.W.2d 255 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Corpus Christi 1967, no writ), commented on in McKnight, Matrimonial Property, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 23 Sw. L.J. 44, 47-48 (1969).
Final, foreign alimony decrees are enforceable in Texas under the doctrine of "full
faith and credit." Rumpf v. Rumpf, 150 Tex. 475, 478, 242 S.W.2d 416, 417 (1951);
Hendricks v. Hendricks, 535 S.W.2d 668, 670 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.]
1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.); see Vandervoort, Sams, Anderson, Alper & Post v. Vandervoort,
529 F.2d 424, 425 (5th Cir. 1976) (with respect to a money judgment and attorney's
fees granted by a Florida court). See also Layton v. Layton, 538 S.W.2d 642, 648 (Tex.
Civ. App.-San Antonio 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
345. 455 S.W.2d 365 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1970, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
346. Id. at 368. Under present law, remarriage would be unnecessary for achievement of the ex-husband's objectives, because single adults may now claim a homestead
exemption as well. TEx. CONST. art. XVI, §§ 50, 51. A single adult may, however,
only claim 100 rural acres as exempt as compared to 200 acres for a family. TEX. Ri.v.
Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 3833 (Supp. 1976). Personal property exemptions have also been
extended with respect to single adults although the aggregate amount that can be claimed
is only $15,000 in value for a single adult as compared to $30,000 for a family. Id. art.
3836; see McKnight, Family Law, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 28 Sw. L.J. 66, 84-86
(1974).
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secure her unsatisfied judgment.

Her efforts failed, however, as the

husband and his second wife had by that time built a dwelling on the
property and maintained it as their only home. Even if actual
occupancy had begun after the lien was seemingly perfected, the homestead character of the property would have been fixed by the couple's
prior acts evidencing an intention to make the property their home.
These evidentiary acts were buttressed by the subsequent home construction and occupancy. The -fact that the homestead was established
with the express intention of putting the property out of reach of the
former wife added to, rather than detracted from, the former husband's

argument.3 47 From the ex-wife's point of view, her position would have
been secure from the outset if the divorce court had imposed a lien
on the then nonhomestead property to secure payment of the money
judgment awarded. 348
If a money judgment is awarded that is to be paid in installments,
the doctrine of anticipatory breach seems applicable to its enforce-

ment. 49 If a division of property is adjudicated and money is ordered
to be paid as received, as in the case of pension or retirement bene-

347. Spence v. Spence, 455 S.W.2d 365, 369 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
1970, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
348. With respect to liens on separate property, see notes 198-201 supra and accompanying text.
In Rudberg, Enforcing Divorce Judgments and Property Settlement Agreements in
Texas, 5 TEx. TECH L. REV. 645 (1974), the author points out that "if the wife
relinquished her interest in existing assets for an unsecured promissory note from the
husband or for an agreement calling for periodic payments .

. . ,

she must consider that

in the event of default she will be relegated to an ordinary suit for breach of contract
.Id. at 648. Mr. Rudberg, citing Sayers v. Pyland, 161 S.W.2d 769 (Tex. 1942),
suggests that a lien can effectively be made to encumber any asset retained by the other
spouse, including the homestead. Id. at 648. This suggestion overstrains the authority
cited if a lien is sought to be put on homestead property to ensure payment of a note
given to facilitate partition of property other than that on which the homestead is
located. See John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Glasgow, 135 Tex. 470, 474, 141
S.W.2d 942, 943-44 (1940); Brunell v. Brunell, 494 S.W.2d 621, 624 (Tex. Civ. App.Dallas 1973, no writ) (court invalidated a lien on homestead property for payment of
attorney's fees). See also Goldberg v. Goldberg, 425 S.W.2d 830 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort
Worth 1968, no writ), discussed in McKnight, Matrimonial Property, Annual Survey of
Texas Law, 23 Sw. L.J. 44, 56 (1969).
For practical advice on utilizing the assistance of a federal agency in connection with
a lien fixed on an airplane, see Goodwin v. Goodwin, 451 S.W.2d 532, 535 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Amarillo), rev'd on other grounds, 456 S.W.2d 885 (Tex. 1970), summarized in
McKnight & Raggio, Family Law, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 25 Sw. L.J. 34, 41 n.53
(1971).
349. See Lee v. Lee, 509 S.W.2d 922, 926 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1974, writ
ref'd n.r.e.) (child support case). See also Forney v. Jorrie, 511 S.W.2d 379 (Tex. Civ.
App.-San Antonio 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.). Both cases are discussed in McKnight,
Family Law, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 29 Sw. L.J. 67, 107-08 (1975).
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fits, the contempt powers of the divorce court seem available for
enforcement of the obligation when the recipient of periodic payments
had been ordered to make payment into the registry of the court. 5 '
350. See Ex parte Sutherland, 526 S.W.2d 536, 539 (Tex. 1975) (confinement for
failure to pay retirement benefits as received does not constitute imprisonment for debt).
But in Ex parte Sutherland, 515 S.W.2d 137 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1974, writ
dism'd), the court had said that an order to pay interest on late payments of the ex-wife's
accruing share of property is not enforceable by contempt. Id. at 141; see notes 63 and
182 supra. See also Rudberg, Enforcing Divorce Judgments and Property Settlement
Agreements in Texas, 5 TEX. TEci L. REv. 645, 653-57 (1974). In Ex parte Anderson,
541 S.W.2d 286, 287-88 (Tex. Civ. App.---San Antonio 1976, no writ), the appellate
court held that the contempt power was available to coerce payment of periodic
retirement benefits ordered to be paid directly to the ex-spouse.
The court called upon to enforce its order by contempt may not, of course, make a
substantive change in the terms of its order with respect to division of property over 30
days after entry of the final order. Ex parte Wagley, 530 S.W.2d 609, 611 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1975, no writ). In the divorce decree the wife was
awarded one-half of the husband's retirement benefits. The court's later order directed
the ex-husband to deposit one-half the amount of his monthly retirement check in his
former wife's bank account, thereby substantively changing the original order. In Cocke
v. Cocke, 408 S.W.2d 348 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1966, writ dism'd), the court relied
upon principles of contract law in holding that the terms of a property settlement
agreement incorporated in a divorce decree were not subject to modification based on a
deterioration in the ex-husband's financial circumstances. Id. at 350.
It is also asserted that failure to pay attorney's fees cannot provoke a proper order for
contempt. Ex parte Werner, 496 S.W.2d 121, 122 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1973,
no writ) (semble). Sed quaere if they are ordered paid into the registry of the court and
constitute an integral part of the equitable division of property on divorce. See note 261
supra and accompanying text. See also Ex parte Myrick, 474 S.W.2d 767, 772 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 1971, no writ); text accompanying note 292 supra. If
the court applies a single sanction for the commission of several acts asserted to be
contemptuous and any one of those acts will not support the order, the citation for
contempt is void. Ex parte Harwell, 538 S.W.2d 667, 671 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1976,
no writ) (contempt will not lie for violation of an order to pay arrearages of temporary
alimony and child support ordered in final decree); Ex parte Werner, 496 S.W.2d 121,
122 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1973, no writ). In any case, contempt of an order
cannot issue except in violation of an order properly entered. Ex parte Valdez, 521
S.W.2d 724, 726 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1975, no writ). It may issue
where the contempt occurs out of the presence of the court only in violation of a prior
order in writing. Ex parte Spencer, 508 S.W.2d 698, 699 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana
1974, no writ). To withstand the attack of a writ of habeas corpus, the order must be in
clear and specific terms. See Ex parte Filemyr, 509 S.W.2d 731, 733 (Tex. Civ. App.Austin 1974, no writ). See also Ex parte Thompson, 510 S.W.2d 165 (Tex. Civ. App.Dallas 1974, no writ). Related cases involving contempt for violation of child support
orders are discussed in McKnight, Family Law, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 28 Sw.
L.J. 66, 93 (1974). A proper citation for contempt of a court's order must always run
from the court, and not the person of the judge, toward whom particular conduct of the
contemner is directed. If, for example, the judge of court B sits as the judge of court A
in which the divorce proceeding is filed, the judge may cite a party for contempt only in
his capacity as judge of court A and not as judge of court B. Ex parte Alvarado,
543 S.W.2d 144, 147 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1976, no writ); Ex parte Lowry, 518
S.W.2d 897, 901-02 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1975, no writ). The writ of habeas
corpus is ordinarily not the appropriate means of attacking the trial court's determination
that particular property constituted community property. Ex parte Sutherland, 526
S.W.2d 536, 538-39 (Tex. 1975).
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Whether an order to pay a money judgment that is payable in installments or an order incorporating a property settlement agreement to the
same effect is enforceable by contempt has not been conclusively
decided. 51 The law is settled, however, with respect to the enforcement of an order to pay a lump sum award. More than fifteen years
ago, the Texas Supreme Court held in Ex parte Preston 52 that such
an order was enforceable by contempt. The contempt power of the
trial court is also clearly available to enforce an order to deliver chattels
or to transfer property, tangible or intangible, 3 ' wherever located,

provided the court acquired personal jurisdiction over the recalcitrant
former spouse. 4 It is generally accepted that a divorce court may
decree a change in ownership of realty or personalty and proper recordation of such an order constitutes notice of the passing of title (to such
property as is affected by constructive notice) to those who may assert

acquisition of a subsequent interest in the property.355 Whether a writ
of possession may issue from the divorce court to give effect to its order
with respect to personalty as well as realty may be disputed.3 56
With the exception of garnishment of wages, 5 7 the writ of garnishment may generally be utilized to reach nonexempt property in the
351. See Ex parte Neff, 542 S.W.2d 268 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1976, no
writ); Ex parte Anderson, 541 S.W.2d 286, 287-88 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1976,
no writ), discussing Ex parte Yates, 387 S.W.2d 377 (Tex. 1965). But see McKnight,
Family Law, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 30 Sw. L.J. 68, 86-87 n.138 (1976).
352. 162 Tex. 379, 384, 347 S.W.2d 938, 940-41 (1961).
353. See Miguez v. Miguez, 453 S.W.2d 514, 520 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1970,
no writ) (concerning federal agricultural allotment), discussed in McKnight & Raggio,
Difficulties
Family Law, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 25 Sw. L.J. 34, 41 (1971).
encountered in enforcing a decree involving an award of shares in a corporation closely
held by the family of an ex-spouse are illustrated by Earthman's, Inc. v. Earthman, 526
S.W.2d 192 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1975, no writ). See also Echols v.
Austron, Inc., 529 S.W.2d 840 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
354. Davi v. Davi, 456 S.W.2d 238, 241 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1970, writ
dism'd) (child support case). See also Ex parte Limoges, 526 S.W.2d 707 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Austin 1975, no writ), commented on in McKnight, Family Law, Annual Survey
of Texas Law, 30 Sw.L.J. 68, 103-04 (1976).
355. See Rudberg, Enforcing Divorce Judgments and Property Settlement Agreements
Nonparty third persons should be
in Texas, 5 TEx. TECH L. REV. 645, 652 (1974).
given notice of any change in contractual rights involving such third persons. For
example, if some interest in an insurance policy on the life of one spouse is given to the
other, notice should be given to the insurer. Id. at 652. In Goodwin v. Goodwin, 451
S.W.2d 532 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo), rev'd on other grounds, 456 S.W.2d 885 (Tex.
1970), the court advised the ex-wife that her judgment lien on an airplane awarded the
ex-husband should be filed with the Federal Aviation Administration. Id. at 534-35.
356. See TEx. R. Civ. P. 310, 632, 633; Andrews v. Beck, 23 Tex. 455 (1859);
Crawford v. Southern Rock Island Plow Co., 77 S.W. 280 (Tex. Civ. App.-1903, writ
ref'd).
357. Tax. CONST. art. XVI, § 28; TEx. REV.CIV. STAT.-ANN. art. 4099 (1966).
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hands of third persons for the enforcement of money judgments. Public policy, however, "exempts from garnishment or execution departments of state that are performing governmental functions.""" 8 There
also seems to be no recourse against the federal government to insure
payment of federal retirement benefits. 859 Nor does the Social Ser-

vices Amendment Act of 1974 appear to give any aid in regard to
0
federal benefits6°
With respect to the rights of third persons established during

marriage against either spouse, it has long been established that a division of community property on divorce does not prejudice the rights
of such third persons to reach that property which might have been
reached during the marriage to satisfy a liability, regardless of whether

the property is awarded to a spouse who is not personally bound for
liability. 30 ' In Maryland Casualty Co. v. Schroeder"'2 a bonding company that had insured against the husband's fraud sued both former
spouses to recover money embezzled by the husband during marriage.

The embezzled funds were traced by the plaintiff (but not as to
amount) into various community assets that had been awarded to the
wife on divorce. The court held that this was a sufficient showing to
358. Addison v. Addison, 530 S.W.2d 920, 921 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [lst Dist.]
1975, no writ) (former wife sought to garnish Texas Southern University for judgment
indebtedness).
359. See United States v. Smith, 393 F.2d 318, 321 (5th Cir. 1968), discussed in
McKnight, Matrimonial Property, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 23 Sw. L.J. 44, 45-46
(1969); Arnold v. United States, 331 F. Supp. 42, 44 (S.D. Tex. 1971).
360. See Wilhelm v. Department of the Air Force, 418 F. Supp. 162, 164 (S.D. Tex.
1976); Morrison v. Morrison, 408 F. Supp. 315, 316-17 (N.D. Tex. 1976). See also
Maunder v. Maunder, 127 Cal. Rptr. 707 (Ct. App. 1976). See generally 42 U.S.C.
§ 653 (Supp. V, 1975), amending 42 U.S.C. § 301 et seq. (1970). Short of state action
in the federal courts, which may be achieved by administrative intercession of the Federal
Department of Health, Education and Welfare, the Social Services Amendments Act of
1974 offers Texas no more than federal assistance to locate former spouses who may not
have complied with court orders. Garnishment of wages from federal sources is not
available because that remedy under the federal act is dependent on its availability under
state law. See Crane v. Crane, 417 F. Supp. 38 (E.D. Okla. 1976). But it is argued
that because the federal government is under the act subject to garnishment in the same
way as any other debtor, state courts should be competent to direct federal agencies to
divide benefits arising under federal pension rights, if they do not constitute nongarnishable "wages." It has been suggested that a proceeding against a federal agency might
succeed if pursued in a state where there is no prohibition of wage garnishment. See
Baumgardner v. Southern Pac. Co., 177 S.W.2d 317, 319-20 (Tex. Civ. App.-E1 Paso
1943, no writ).
361. Boyd v. Ghent, 93 Tex. 543, 547, 57 S.W.25, 26-27 (1900); Dean v. First Nat'l
Bank, 494 S.W.2d 222, 226 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.); First Nat'l
Bank v. Hickman, 89 S.W.2d 838, 842 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1935, writ ref'd);
Grandjean v. Runke, 39 S.W. 945, 946 (Tex. Civ. App. 1897, no writ). But see
McKnight, Family Law, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 28 Sw. L.J. 66, 82 (1974).
362. 446 S.W.2d 117 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1969, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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fix a constructive trust on those properties and that, as trustee, it was

incumbent on the ex-husband to show which funds were not subject
to the trust.86 The court stated that it was irrelevant that the ex-wife
knew nothing of the embezzlement.36
The Texas Constitution precludes spouses from partitioning their
community estate to the prejudice of the rights of preexisting credi-

tors; a 85 spouses may, however, make gifts of community property to
each other, thereby precluding the donor's creditors' claim to it as long
as that gift does not constitute a fraudulent transfer.3 66 Nonexempt
property awarded to a spouse on divorce which thereafter becomes
exempt property would seem protected from all but secured claims

previously perfected against it. 36 7 At any rate, exempt property that
is the subject matter of an award on divorce and remains exempt by the
subsistence of the existing exemption3 68 or creation of a new one eo
instanti of the divorce 6 9 cannot be reached by preexisting creditors.
The United States Government as a creditor, however, need not be

overly concerned with exemptions and related doctrines asserted under
70
state law.1
363. Id. at 121.
364. Id. at 121. This case exemplifies the high watermark of applicability of the
rule. Arguments can be fashioned for curbing or even reinterpreting the rule. See
McKnight, Management, Control and Liability of Marital Property in TEXAs FAMILY
LAW & COMMUNITY PROPERTY 159, 182 (J. McKnight ed. 1975).
365. TEx. CONST. art. XVI, § 15.
366. See Henry S. Miller Co. v. Evans, 452 S.W.2d 426, 432 '(Tex. 1970), discussed
in McKnight & Raggio, Family Law, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 25 Sw. L.J. 34, 47-48
(1971); TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. §§ 24.02-.03 (1968). See also McKnight,
Matrimonial Property, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 27 Sw. L.J. 27, 43 (1973). With
respect to federal tax liability, see McKnight, Family Law, Annual Survey of Texas Law,
30 Sw. L.J. 68, 87, 93 (1976).
367. But if a creditor is willing to take the risk of liability for wrongful levy on land
and procures a writ of execution against such property, he need not provide the levying
officer an indemnity bond since the officer cannot suffer liability for wrongful levy. See
Henry S. Miller Co. v. Evans, 452 S.W.2d 426, 433 (Tex. 1970), discussed in McKnight
& Raggio, Family Law, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 25 Sw. L.J. 34, 47-48 (1971). But
with respect to a levy on personalty see TEX. ATr'Y GEN. Op. No. H-827 (1976).
368. Julian v. Andrews, 491 S.W.2d 721, 727 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1973,
writ ref'd n.r.e.), discussed in McKnight, Family Law, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 28
Sw. L.J. 66, 83 (1974); cf. Miller v. Two Investors, Inc., 475 S.W.2d 610, 612 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Dallas 1971, writ ref'd n.r.e.). See also McKnight, Matrimonial Property,
Annual Survey of Texas Law, 27 Sw. L.J. 27, 44 n.138 (1973).
369. Henry S. Miller Co. v. Shoaf, 434 S.W.2d 243, 244-45 (Tex. Civ. App.Eastland 1968, writ ref'd n.r.e.), discussed in McKnight, Family Law, Annual Survey of
Texas Law, 24 Sw. L.J. 49, 54-55 (1970). With respect to subsequent abandonment of a
homestead, see Burk Royalty Co. v. Riley, 475 S.W.2d 566, 567 (Tex. 1972), discussed
in McKnight, MatrimonialProperty, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 26 Sw. L.J. 31, 39-40
(1972).
370. See McKnight, Family Law, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 29 Sw. L.J. 67, 95
(1975). See also Stroman v. McCanless, 391 F. Supp. 1344 (N.D. Tex. ,1975).
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Resort to the bankruptcy court in an effort to discharge liability under
a property settlement agreement or awards on divorce has been generally unsuccessful. 7' In re Nunnally8 72 presented a situation where an

ex-wife, who had been awarded a money judgment on divorce either
for reimbursement or for repayment of a loan, intervened in her former

spouse's voluntary bankruptcy proceeding. The bankrupt asserted that
this claim, which was secured by a lien on that part of his naval
retirement benefits awarded to him, as well as the award to his ex-wife
of her attorney's fees, should be discharged. The court held for the
former wife and stated that the bankruptcy label of nondischargeable
"alimony '3 73 applied to the award rather than the Texas label of "property division. ' 3 74 The court pointed out that, although permanent alimony is not awarded on divorce by Texas courts, a property division
contains "a substantial element of alimony-substitute, support or maintenance, however termed,' ' 7 5 and therefore falls within the "alimony"
exception to debts dischargeable in bankruptcy. In a later unreported
case3 7 6 a property settlement agreement between the spouses was
approved and incorporated in a divorce decree in which the husband
agreed to pay the wife $56,000 at the rate of $300 a month. The
371. See In re Smith, No. BK3-2065 (N.D. Tex., July 2, 1973), discussed in
McKnight, Family Law, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 28 Sw. L.J. 66, 77-78 (1974). An
earlier stage of the proceeding is discussed in McKnight, Matrimonial Property, Annual
Survey of Texas Law, 27 Sw. L.J. 27, 42 (1973). But see In re Parnass, No. BK33473F (N.D. Tex., Oct. 27, 1974), noted in McKnight, Family Law, Annual Survey of
Texas Law, 30 Sw. L.J. 68, 89 n.155 (1976), where the court held that an award of
$200,000 as agreed in a property settlement and ordered by the divorce court "was void
because it was based on permanent alimony to be paid after divorce by court order."
372. 506 F.2d 1024, 1026 (5th Cir. 1975), discussed in McKnight, Family Law,
Annual Survey of Texas Law, 29 Sw. L.J. 67, 92 (1975).
373. See Bankruptcy Act, § 17(a), 11 U.S.C. § 35(a),(7) (1970), which provides:
A discharge in bankruptcy shall release a bankrupt from all of his provable debts,
whether allowable in full or in part, except such as
(7) are for alimony due or to become due, or for maintenance or support of wife
or child, or for seduction of an unmarried female or for breach of promise of marriage accompanied by seduction, or for criminal conversation ....
374. In re Nunnally, 506 F.2d 1024, 1027 (5th Cir. 1975); see McKnight, Family
Law, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 28 Sw. L.J. 66, 77-78 (1974); McKnight, Matrimonial Property, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 27 Sw. L.J. 27, 42 (1973). On behalf of the
bankrupt, the court treated his retirement pay as not passing to the trustee in bankruptcy
for the benefit of creditors. 506 F.2d at 1026; see Kokoszka v. Belford, 417 U.S. 642,
647-48 (1974). An interest "designed to function as a wage substitute at some future
period and, during that future period, to 'support the basic requirements of life for [the
debtors] and their families ....
"Idoes not pass to the debtor's trustee in bankruptcy.
Id. at 648, quoting Lines v. Frederick, 400 U.S. 18, 20 (1970).
375. In re Nunnally, 506 F.2d 1024, 1027 (5th Cir: 1975). See also In re Golden,
411 F. Supp. 1076 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 535 F.2d 213 (2d Cir. 1976) (per curiam).
376. In re Hodges, No. BK3-7472 (N.D. Tex., Nov. 17, 1975).
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banktuptcy court was concerned whether this payment constituted
"alimony-substitute."

Looking at the circumstances behind the de-

cree, the court concluded that one of the principal reasons that the
husband agreed to periodic payments was to provide for the support

and maintenance of his wife; consequently the indebtedness constituted
"alimony-substitute."

The bankruptcy

court's

conclusion is

that

in applying Nunnally, the court must determine whether a particular
indebtedness arising from a property settlement agreement or a divorce

court's decree constitutes "alimony-substitute" as a matter of fact."'
Property Undisposedof by Decree

Community property not affected by the divorce decree becomes a

tenancy in common between the former spouses. 78 No further
recourse may be had to the divorce court for division of the community;8 79 the former spouses who seek to divide the property must. resort

to partition. 8 0
Disputes with respect to property undivided on divorce usually occur
when counsel for both parties fail to recognize community assets as
such.181 The most common oversight has occurred with respect to
retirement benefits that have not matured to payment." 2 Care must
377. Cf. Nichols v. Hensler, 528 F.2d 304, 307-08 (7th Cir. 1976). See also In re
Parnass, No. BK3-3473F (N.D. Tex., Oct. 27, 1974).
378. Busby v. Busby, 457 S.W.2d 551, 554 (Tex. 1970).
379. See id. at 554-55. See also Scott v. Scott, 408 S.W.2d 135 (Tex. Civ. App.Fort Worth 1966, writ dism'd).
It has been suggested that statutory reform in
this respect may be in order. McKnight & Raggio, Family Law, Annual Survey of Texas
Law, 25 Sw. L.J. 34, 40 (1971).
As to separate property, however, its character is
undisturbed. See Cowart v. Cowart, 515 S.W.2d 359, 362 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont
1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
380. See Busby v. Busby, 457 S.W.2d 551, 554-55 (Tex. 1970); Smith v. Cooper, 541
S.W.2d 274, 276-77 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1976, no writ). As a preliminary step
to seeking partition, a declaratory judgment may be sought to determine whether there is
property to partition. See Dessommes v. Dessommes, 461 S.W.2d 525, 526-27 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Waco 1970, no writ). In Fyke v. Fyke, 463 S.W.2d 242, 245 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Fort Worth 1971, no writ), the court concluded, perhaps wrongly, that if there
were no net assets of the ex-spouses, there was no former community estate to divide.
See McKnight & Raggio, Family Law, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 25 Sw. L.J. 34, 41
(1971).
381. The severe consequences of malpractice in this regard are exemplified by Smith
v. Lewis, 118 Cal. Rptr. 621, 629 (1975). In that case the court upheld an award of
$100,000 in damages against an attorney who had failed to conduct adequate legal
research to determine that certain retirement benefits of the husband were community
property and subject to division on divorce. See TIME, Jan. 12, 1976, at 53.
382. Another common oversight on the part of counsel in the process of divorce is
failure to prepare a new will for a divorced spouse. Although section 69 of the Probate
Code may rectify some oversights, disputes can be better obviated by preparation of a
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A decree

stating that each spouse holds as separate property that which is in his
or her "possession" does not cover a spouse's interest in a retirement
fund.884 The division of property must be clearly indicated in the
decree" s ' and not merely supported by knowledge of counsel. 8 6 A
mere recital in the divorce decree that there is no community property

to divide has been said, however, not to bar a later proceeding to partition community property not disposed of on divorce.887
In Busby v. Busby ss the ex-wife asserted a tenancy in common in
the military disability retirement benefits of her ex-husband, which were
undisposed of on divorce. The supreme court held that regardless of
new will or codicil. See McFarlen v. McFarlen, 536 S.W.2d 590, 591 (Tex. Civ. App.Eastland 1976, no writ); Smith v. Smith, 519 S.W.2d 152, 154-55 (Tex. Civ. App.Dallas 1974, writ ref'd); TEx. PROB. CODE ANN. § 69 (1956).
383. The Texas Supreme Court stressed this point in Busby v. Busby, 457 S.W.2d
551, 555 (Tex. 1970), and reiterated it in Cearley v. Cearley, 544 S.W.2d 661, 666 (Tex.
1976).
384. Dessommes v. Dessommes, 505 S.W.2d 673, 676 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1973,
writ ref'd n.r.e.). The spouse's vested interest in the retirement fund gave him control of
an equitable interest in the fund through the exercise of various options including the
right to determine the time of retirement, to change the beneficiary of death benefits and
to convert the interest to a policy of insurance. "Possession," as that word was used in
the decree, could not properly be interpreted as "including such intangible contract rights
as these. The term is ordinarily understood as referring to property over which the
parties have physical control or, at least, a power of immediate enjoyment and disposition." id. at 676.
385. Constance v. Constance, 537 S.W.2d 488, 490 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin), rev'd,
544 S.W.2d 659 (Tex. 1976). The findings of the trial court recited that "'inasmuch
as no award is being made to Plaintiff for any portion of retired pay, the Court
finds that the sum of $200.00 per month for child support is reasonable and it is
accordingly ORDERED by the Court that the Defendant contribute the sum of $200.00
per month toward the support and maintenance of said minor children .... .'" Id. at
489. The decretal part of the judgment then dealt with the property settlement
agreement in which there was no mention of the respondent's retired pay and no residual
clause providing for community property not disposed of therein. In a subsequent suit
for partition of the retirement benefits, the court of civil appeals held that those benefits
had been undisposed of by the divorce decree. 537 S.W.2d at 489-90. In reversing this
holding the Texas Supreme Court said that "[iut is clear on the face of the decree in
question that the award of $200 per month for child support rested upon the decision of
the trial court to award the retirement benefits to the husband." 544 S.W.2d at 660.
386. Adwan v. Adwan, 538 S.W.2d 192, 196-97 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1976, no
writ); Wilson v. Wilson, 507 S.W.2d 916, 919 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [lst Dist.]
1974, no writ).
387. Clendenin v. Krock, 527 S.W.2d 471, 473 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1975,
no writ). The crucial factor was that the retirement benefits in issue had not "been
before the court." If characterization had been litigated and the property deemed
separate property of the husband, the determination would have been res judicata. See
id. at 474 (concurring opinion); cf. Constance v. Constance, 537 S.W.2d 488, 490 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Austin), rev'd on other grounds, 544 S.W.2d 659 (Tex. 1976).
388. 457 S.W.2d 551 (Tex. 1970), discussed in McKnight & Raggio, Family Law,
Annual Survey of Texas Law, 25 Sw. L.J. 34, 40 (1971).
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whether retirement is voluntary or involuntary, those retirement benefits which accrue during the marriage are community property. 3s9 The
former wife was, therefore, awarded one-half of the entire sum of the
benefits received in spite of the fact that the couple was not married
until after the husband had been in military service for four of his
almost twenty-one years of active service. A strict application of this

rule could produce unjust and anomalous results. 39 0

Lower appellate courts in several subsequent decisions ignored the
rule seemingly laid down in Busby in favor of a proportionate calculation of the community interest if all benefits had not been earned during a marriage in a community property state." 9 ' In Angott v.
Angott,392 for example, the employee-husband's interest in his employ-

er's retirement benefit plan had accrued during marriage, but no division
of the benefits was made in the divorce decree. As a result, the wife
thereafter claimed her rights as a tenant in common in the benefits.

The court concluded that the community interest is represented by "the

389. Busby v. Busby, 457 S.W.2d 551, 554 (Tex. 1970); Fulton v. Duhaime, 525
S.W.2d 62, 63 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.). Disability
benefits are also considered to be community property under similar circumstances. Cf.
In re Marriage of Butler, 543 S.W.2d 147, 150 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1976, no
writ); Ramsey v. Ramsey, 474 S.W.2d 939, 940-41 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1971, writ
dism'd) (divorce case), discussed in McKnight, Matrimonial Property, Annual Survey of
Texas Law, 27 Sw. L.J. 27, 31 (1973).
390. See Note, 25 Sw. L.J. 340, 350 (1971). One of its most curious consequences
was that it equated the acquisition of the pension claimant, in the sense of inception of
title, to that of the naked trespasser asserting title to realty by adverse possession rather
than the trespasser with color of title. See McKnight, Matrimonial Property, Annual
Survey of Texas Law, 26 Sw. L.J. 31, 33 n.21 (1972). See also McKnight, Matrimonial
Property, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 27 Sw. L.J. 27, 30-31 (1973). In applying the
doctrine of inception of title to a situation of adverse possession, the trespasser with
color of title acquires title from the date of his possession, whereas the naked trespasser
acquires title only after the statute of limitations has run.
391. Mitchim v. Mitchim, 509 S.W.2d 720, 725 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1974), rev'd
on other grounds, 518 S.W.2d 362 (Tex. 1975); Wilson v. Wilson, 507 S.W.2d 916, 91718 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1974, no writ); Dessommes v. Dessommes, 505
S.W.2d 673, 680-81 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Angott v. Angott,
462 S.W.2d 73, 74-75 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1970, no writ). The same approach to
division of community property has been employed in numerous divorce cases. See, e.g.,
Gaulding v. Gaulding, 503 S.W.2d 617, 618 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1973, no writ);
In re Marriage of McCurdy, 489 S.W.2d 712, 715-16 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1973,
writ dism'd); Marks v. Marks, 470 S.W.2d 83, 84 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1971, writ
ref'd n.r.e.). For cases arising prior to Busby, see Webster v. Webster, 442 SW.2d 786,
788 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1969, no writ); Mora v. Mora, 429 S.W.2d 660, 663
(Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1968, writ dism'd); Kirkham v. Kirkham, 335 S.W.2d
393, 393-94 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1960, no writ).
392. 462 S.W.2d 73 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1970, no writ). The couple was married
in 1939 and divorced in 1966. The husband began work in 1941 and voluntarily retired
in 1967.
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proportion which the benefits earned during marriage bears to the total
benefits earned during the entire period of employment, represented

by the fraction 291/303."191 The same approach has been employed
in dealing with the situations in which an interest in a retirement fund
was earned while the spouses were domiciled in noncommunity property states.8 0 4 A similar recourse to equitable considerations was had
in Dessommes v. Dessommes9 5 where the ex-wife again asserted a partitionable cotenancy interest in all the husband's undivided retirement
benefits. After the divorce, the former husband continued to augment
the fund,3 96 and the prior retirement plan was superseded by a new
one under which the ex-husband was entitled to an annuity when he
subsequently retired. The trial court granted an instructed verdict for
the husband. Reversing and remanding, the appellate court first
observed that the oversight of the divorce court left the spouses with

a tenancy in common.19 7 The court then stated that:
[w]hen the proportions contributed by several owners to a common

fund cannot be established and the equities are equal, the owners
must be considered equal tenants in common ...
• . . [But] the circumstances shown here justify imposing on
the former husband the burden to establish the portion of the
commingled retirement fund attributable to contributions since the
393. Id. at 74. See also Wilson v. Wilson, 507 S.W.2d 916 (Tex. Civ. App.Houston [lst Dist.] 1974, no writ), commented on in McKnight, Family Law, Annual
Survey of Texas Law, 29 Sw. L.J. 67, 85 (1975).
394. Mitchim v. Mitchim, 509 S.W.2d 720, 725 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1974), rev'd
on other grounds, 518 S.W.2d 362 (Tex. 1975), relying on Dessommes v. Dessommes,
505 S.W.2d 673 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.). But the foreign law
must be proved. See Wilson v. Wilson, 507 S.W.2d 916, 918 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston
[1st Dist.] 1974, no writ). In Mitchim the right to retirement benefits accrued while
the couple was living in California. Without any discussion of California law, the court
assumed that Texas law (i.e., Busby) was applicable, but as interpreted in Dessommes.
Mitchim v. Mitchim, 509 S.W.2d 720, 725 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1974), rev'd on
other grounds, 518 S.W.2d 362 (Tex. 1975). There the dissenting judge read Busby as
holding that when the husband's retirement benefits accrued in a community property
state, the wife becomes "entitled to her portion of that part of the interest in the
retirement plan which was earned while the parties were man and wife." Id. at 726
(dissenting opinion). See also Lumpkins v. Lumpkins, 519 S.W.2d 491, 494-95 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Austin 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (dissenting opinion).
395. 505 S.W.2d 673 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.), a sequel to
Dessommes v. Dessommes, 461 S.W.2d 525 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1970, no writ).
396. In Fox v. Smith, 531 S.W.2d 654 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1975, no writ), the
husband was a participant in a funded employee profit-sharing plan, the interest in which
was undivided on divorce. He subsequently designated his sister as beneficiary of his
share. After his death, his ex-wife was adjudged entitled to one-half the fund. Id. at
656.
397. Dessommes v. Dessommes, 505 S.W.2d 673, 677, 679 (Tex. Civ. App.-Da~las
1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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. [I]f the parties are shown to have been the equal

owners of a fund at a certain time, and one of them is shown to have
made additions to that fund in an undetermined amount, the party
who made the additions should have the burden to show the

amount of the additions. 9

On motion for rehearing the ex-wfe argued that "since the couple was
married when the employee's interest accrued, the interest was community property, just as if it were a tract of land then acquired, and contributions either after the divorce or before the marriage would not
affect the parties' equal ownership. '399 The court did not agree with
the wife's argument. It found that the characterization of benefits as

community property under the doctrine of inception of title would not
do substantial justice and the benefits should be apportioned to the
former spouses by recognizing the accrual of interests before and during the marriage and after it was dissolved as might be proved by the
ex-husband.4 0 The court recognized that Busby presented some diffi-

culties in this regard, but concluded that "the law on this point [could]

not be regarded as settled."' 1 In Cearley v. Cearley"2 the Texas
Supreme Court concluded that pension rights earned during the
marriage, though not yet accrued or matured, are contingent commu-

nity property interests subject to division on divorce. The court also
indicated that such community property interests left undivided on
divorce-and later sought to be divided---embrace only those interests
4 °3
earned during marriage.
398. Id. at 679 (emphasis added).
399. Id. at 681.
400. Id. at 681. On remand, however, the ex-husband was apparently unable to
discharge his burden of proof. See Dessommes v. Dessommes, 543 S.W.2d 165, 169-70
(Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1976, no writ). The divorce court cannot, of course,
consider projected postdivorce accruals in value of an interest in a retirement fund. In
In re Marriage of Rister, 512 S.W.2d 72, 74 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1974, no writ),
discussed in McKnight, Family Law, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 29 Sw. L.J. 67, 78
(1975), it was concluded that the divorce court should not consider projected postdivorce
increases in value of an interest in a retirement fund. But cf. In re Marriage of
Freiberg, 127 Cal. Rptr. 792 (Ct. App. 1976). But the California approach is not
always helpful in these matters. See 3 COMM. PROP. J. 125 (1976), where in discussing
In re Marriage of Brown, 126 Cal. Rptr. 633 (1976), it was said:
One final point noted by the court is that judicial recognition of the non-employee
spouse's interest in vested and nonvested pension rights was not intended to, nor
does it, limit the employee's freedom to change or terminate employment, to agree
to modification of the terms of the employment (including retirement benefits), or
to elect between alternative retirement programs. (It would seem that this last
statement may cause some problems in the future.)
401. Dessommes v. Dessommes, 505 S.W.d 673, 681 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1973,
writ ref'd n.r.e.).
402. 544 S.W.2d 661, 663-64 (Tex. 1976).
403. Id. at 666. The court thereby allows avoidance of many inequities that had
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The appellate courts have not spoken conclusively concerning the

limitation of actions asserting claims to community property left
undivided on divorce. Nonetheless, some guidance may be adduced
from their treatment of these problems thus far. With respect to seek-

ing a declaratory judgment regarding an interest left undivided, the
courts have spoken of a petitioner's having to proceed within four years
of the development of a controversy 4 4 unless the subject matter of the
dispute is controlled by a statute of limitation of shorter duration. With
respect to a right of partition to property in esse, no statute of limitation
runs as to the right to seek the partition itself. 405 But if a defense of
title is interposed as to realty, the rules applicable to adverse possession
of a tenancy in common are applicable to the former spouse.40 6 As
to interests in personalty, it is most likely that the statute of limitation
applicable to the tort of conversion will be pled,4 °7 but the cause of

action with respect to retirement benefits does not arise until the right
to receive a benefit matures.408
Since rights of reimbursement are fixed on termination of marriage

by divorce, 409 a right of reimbursement not adjudicated in the divorce
concerned critics of Busby. See McKnight, Matrimonial Property, Annual Survey of
Texas Law, 26 Sw. L.J. 31, 33 (1972); McKnight & Raggio, Family Law, Annual Survey
of Texas Law, 25 Sw. L.J. 34, 40 (1971); Comment, Military Retirement Benefits as
Community Property: New Rules from the Supreme Court?, 24 BAYLOR L. REV. 235
(1972); Note, 25 Sw. L.$. 340 (1971).
404. Dessommes v. Dessommes, 543 S.W.2d 165, 168-69 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1976, no writ); Dessommes v. Dessommes, 505 S.W.2d 673, 677 (Tex. Civ. App.Dallas 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Dessommes v. Dessommes, 461 S.W.2d 525, 527 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Waco 1970, no writ); TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5529 (1958). Since the
controversy in this instance developed prior to maturation of the retirement benefits, a
court might hold that the statute of limitions for seeking a declaratory judgment does
not commence until a controversy has arisen after maturity of the interest.
405. Constance v. Constance, 537 S.W.2d 488, 490 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin), rev'd
on other grounds, 544 S.W.2d 659 (Tex. 1976); see Dessommes v. Dessommes, 505
S.W.2d 673, 677 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (statute of limitations
begins to run on repudiation of one cotenant's interest). Nor is the ex-spouse bound by
estoppel. Taggart v. Taggart, 540 S.W.2d 823, 825 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi
1976, writ granted).
406. There is an inconclusive discussion on the point in Bradley v. Bradley, 540
S.W.2d 504, 514-15 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1976, no writ). A third person might
also assert title by adverse possession in which case the usual rules governing the period
relied on are applicable.
407. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5526.2 (1958).
408. Dessommes v. Dessommes, 505 S.W.2d 673, 677 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1973,
writ ref'd n.r.e.) (court also alludes to laches at this point).
409. Dakan v. Dakan, 125 Tex. 305, 320-21, 83 S.W.2d 620, 628-29 (1935);
Pritchard v. Tuttle, 534 S.W.2d 946, 952 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1976, no writ). It
is clear from the context of the opinion in Pritchard that in using the phrase "date of
partition," the court means the date the community estate was terminated. Id. at 952.
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proceeding may be pursued after the divorce.4"' For the purposes of
determining the statute of limitation applicable to such a claim, the
Supreme Court of Texas has characterized the right of reimbursement

as a "debt." 41 ' Consequently, the appropriate limitation period is
either four years 412 or two years 18 depending on whether the debt is
evidenced by a writing or not.
The jurisdiction of Texas courts to deal with foreign realty undisposed

of in a Texas divorce has not been conclusively resolved, 14 and an
Oklahoma federal court has abstained from ruling on a dispute with
respect to Oklahoma realty undisposed of by a Texas divorce court.415
The power of Texas courts to adjudicate title with respect to Texas
realty undisposed of by a foreign divorce court is undisputed, although
a Texas court will not exercise its jurisdiction in all instances. In Cole
v. Lee4" a property settlement agreement had been entered into in
connection with a divorce of foreign domiciliaries at their place of

domicile in the Virgin Islands. The ex-wife sued to set aside a portion
of the agreement with respect to the Texas land and sought to recover
a one-half interest in the land alleged to have been community property. The ex-husband made a special appearance under rule 120a4 17

410. See Howle v. Howle, 422 S.W.2d 252, 255-56 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1967, no
writ), discussed in McKnight, MatrimonialProperty, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 23
Sw. L.J. 44, 56 (1969).
In Starkey v. Holoye, 536 S.W.2d 438, 441 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.), the court uses the word "reimbursement" to refer to a right to set
off for mortgage payments made after divorce. This is a reference to a general equitable
principle, rather than that of marital reimbursement which must accrue prior to the
termination of the marriage. On the other hand, in spite of the termination of a
marriage, the concept of marital fraud or constructive fraud (if not with respect to
community property but in relation to the interest of children of the prior marriage) still
has relevance as between the former spouses. See Great Am. Reserve Ins. Co. v.
Sanders, 525 S.W.2d 956, 959 (Tex. 1975); Box v. Southern Farm Bureau Life Ins. Co.,
526 S.W.2d 787, 789 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.). Both
cases are discussed in McKnight, Family Law, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 30 Sw. L.J.
68, 89-90 (1976).
411. Burton v. Bell, 380 S.W.2d 561, 565 (Tex. 1964).
412. TEx. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5527.1 (1958) (writing).
413. Id. art. 5526.4 (no writing).
414. See Estabrook v. Wise, 506 S.W.2d 248, 252 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler), dism'd as
moot per curiam, 519 S.W.2d 632 (Tex. 1974), discussed in McKnight, Family Law,
Annual Survey of Texas Law, 29 Sw. L.J. 67, 84 (1975); notes 332-34 supra and accompanying text. See also Note, 28 BAYLOR L. REV. 425 (1976), reprinted with modifi.
cations in 3 COMM. PROP. J. 236 (1976).

415. Williamson v. Williamson, 306 F. Supp. 516, 518 (W.D. Okla. 1969). For
possible breaks in the federal abstention doctrine in matrimonial matters, see McKnight,
Family Law, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 30 Sw. L.J. 68, 74-76 (1976).
416. 435 S.W.2d 283 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1968, writ dism'd).
417. TEx. R. Clv. P. 120a.
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for the purpose of objecting to jurisdiction of the court under the principle of forum non conveniens. The ex-wife asserted that the suit was
one in rem for recovery of title to Texas land and that article 1975418
conferred jurisdiction. The Dallas Court of Civil Appeals concluded
that the settlement agreement should first be rescinded before an action
for recovery of realty could be brought and that the proper forum for
rescission under the forum non conveniens doctrine was that of the
domicile of the parties.4 19 But Texas realty of a nonresident couple,
regardless of their domicile, would not necessarily be community property. Its characterization would depend on the source of funds and
20
other circumstances of its acquisition.
Carter v. Burleson4" 2 ' involved a foreign divorce in which one of the
spouses was a Texas resident. The husband commenced the divorce
proceeding in Texas, 422 and the wife brought a subsequent suit in
Nevada. The wife's proceeding succeeded, but without division of
property. On subsequent remand the trial court partitioned the undis42 3
posed community property.
CONCLUSION

The last word on the subject of division of property in consequence
of marital breakdown will never be written. When it seems that
analysis is almost abreast of legislative reform, judicial decisions follow
in such quick succession that the commentator is soon badly out of date.
As this article is completed, several cases dealt with here are before
the Texas Supreme Court on writs of error. If one waited for them
to be decided, others would have then taken their place on the docket.
In recent years the law has shown substantial growth in this field.
But as the open places in the law have been filled with clear directions
418. TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 1975 (1964).
419. Cole v. Lee, 435 S.W.2d 283, 287 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dalas 1968, writ dism'd).
420. See Huston v. Colonial Trust Co., 266 S.W.2d 231, 233-34 (Tex. Civ. App.-El
Paso 1954, writ ref'd n.r.e.). See also Patterson v. Metzing, 424 S.W.2d 255 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Corpus Christi 1967, no writ).
421. 439 S.W.2d 381 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1969, no writ).
422. Burleson v. Burleson, 419 S.W.2d 412 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
1967, no writ).
423. See McKnight, Family Law, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 24 Sw. L.J. 49, 49-50
(1970); cf. Mitchim v. Mitchim, 509 S.W.2d 720, 725 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1974),
rev'd on other grounds, 518 S.W.2d 362 (Tex. 1975) (proceeding for division of prop-

erty commenced in Texas after foreign decree of divorce without a property division).
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for the future, new voids are opened. Thus the law is developed and
refined. With little likelihood in the diminution of family disputes and
the assurances that the results of many of those rows will be adjudicated
in the appellate courts, what is written here must serve merely as a beginning for those who seek to advise their clients-a guide to the path to
be paved with the cases of tomorrow.
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